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Abstract 
The thesis will discuss one of the Plato's dialogue; Parmenides. Basically, 
the Parmenides is divided into two halves: the first halfwhere Plato's middle 
theory is under criticism, and the second halfwhich is further divided into eight 
deductions and the deductions are contradicting with one another; between these 
two halves, there is a transitional passage which supposedly tells us how are we 
going to understand the contradictions in the second half. Many scholars has made 
attempts to understand the second halfbut their attempts are having difficulties. In 
my thesis, I shall discuss Cornford's ambiguity theory. Miller's dialectic approach, 
Meinwald's analytic approach and Chen's revisionist's approach. As it turns out, 
each of these scholars has some insights on the second half. 
My thesis will proceed in three stages: Stage 1 will discuss the first half, in 
the first half, Plato's middle theory is under criticism. In order to fully understand 
the first half, I will have some extensive discussions on the Republic and the 
Phaedo. As it tums out, the puzzles in the first halfhave their roots in the Republic 
and the Phaedo, because Plato left some philosophical issues unexplained in the 
Republic and the Phaedo and these are the source of troubles. Stage 2 will be an 
analysis of the second hal fof the Parmenides. It turns out that the distinction 
between being a nature/having some features is very vital in our understanding of 
the second half. Eventually, this distinction is the clue to solve the dilemma in the 
first half. Also, this distinction helps us to have a better insight on the seemingly 
contradictory deductions in the second half. In stage 3,1 will analysis Plato's 
solution offered to the dilemma in the first half. At the same time, 1 will be able to 
discuss to what extent Plato has revised his understanding on Forms in order to 
answer to those challenges. Also, there will be an additional discussion on Plato's 
understanding on Forms in the Sophist. Notice that the Sophist is written after the 
Parmenides, thus if Plato has any new insight regarding Forms in the Parmenides, 
it is worthwhile to see if the Sophist is a continuation of the Parmenides. From a 
developmental point of view, it tums out that Plato's has some adjustment on his 
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Outline o f M y Thesis 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
In chapter 1,1 will laid out the objective of my thesis. I will also deal with the 
general structure of the Parmenides and the difficulties involved in understanding it. 
Chapter 2: The Development of the Theory ofForms 
lfAristotle is correct that it is Plato who separates Forms from things, then this 
chapter will attempt to locate where this revolution begins. Stylometry and chronology of 
Plato's dialogues thus become a crucial factor in my analysis. Plato's dialogues can be 
divided into three main groups -1) the early Socratic dialogues which recorded the 
historical Socrates' philosophical inquiry; 2) the middle dialogues which reported Plato's 
development and his departure from his master; 3) the late dialogues which tell us Plato's 
own revision or reflection on his middle theory. In my analysis, I will start from the 
Meno, a transitional dialogue between the middle and the early. We will see that the 
revolution, as Aristotle puts it: the separation ofForms from things, actually begins in the 
Meno, and the revolution gathers its momentum until it reaches its height in the Republic. 
However, there are a lot of puzzles or ambiguities along the way. ln this chapter, I have 
discussed some of these ambiguities that are relevant to the first halfofthe Farmenides. 
In fact, many dilemma in the first half of the Parmenides have their roots in the Fhaedo 
and the Republic. For example, Julia Annas points out the tension regarding the extent of 
Forms between Bk. V and Bk. X, also, we have a potential Third Man in Bk. X ... etc. 
Chapter 3: The First Half of the Parmenides 
In this chapter, 1 will discuss the first half of the Parmenides. lfstylometric 
evidence is correct that the Parmenides is written after the Republic, if it is also the case 
that Plato is aware of the problems in his middle theory, then Plato should address these 
problems after the Republic. Thus, I will do a lot o f" matching “ work in this chapter. On 
the one hand, I will analysis the dilemma poised by the persona Parmenides in the first 
half. On the other hand, I will trace back these dilemma to the Phaedo and the Republic. 
It turns out that a lot of these puzzles have their roots in the Phaedo and the Republic. 
Scholars are puzzled by the fact that the Theory ofForms from the young Socrates is so 
poorly formulated that perhaps the mouthpiece Socrates represents not Plato but someone 
else's position ( Chen's interpretation). However, if my matching is correct, it is 
reasonable to believe that the poor formulation as such does make those ambiguities in 
the middle dialogues conspicuous. 
Chapter 4: The Methodological Remarks ( 135c - 137c ) 
In this chapter, I will discuss the methodological remarks, on the one hand, the 
methodological remarks tell us that we should find solution to the dilemma ofthe 'first 
half. Yet, the methodological remarks is highly unspecified. Especially the “ in relation 
to “ qualification according to the remarks. Commentators in general agree that the 
second halfdeals with ifthe Unity is, what follows for the Unity and the others. Yet, they 
cannot spell out the significance of the in relation to qualification. Notice that the in 
relation to qualification is vitally important to our understanding of the second half. For 
one thing, we have eight sections in the second half, if we simply consider what follows 
for the Unity and the others, if the Unity is and if the Unity is not, we should have only 
four sections. We do have eight, therefore, we could not avoid the in relation to 
qualification or leave it unattended. 
Chapter 5: Different approaches to the Second half of the Fannenides 
In this chapter, 1 will deal with different approaches to the Farmenides, namely, 
the ambiguity theory, dialectical approach, analytic approach, and the Aristotorean 
approach or the revisionist approach. In fact, the distinction here is not that clear cut. For 
example, Allen is quite hostile to Cornford,s ambiguity approach but he eventually must 
admit that ambiguity lies elsewhere. Also, ambiguity theory is related to the dialectical 
approach, it is these ambiguities that generated all the troubles in the second half, ourjob 
is to see through these ambiguities. On the other hand, both Chen and Meinwald treat the 
dialogue as demonstrative but reach very different conclusion. For Chen, Plato is giving 
up his middle theory in the Farmenides. For Meinwald, we are not to expect a major 
overhaul in the middle theory from the Farmenides. Anyway, 1 am not to decide whether 
any one ofthese approaches is correct or the least problematic in this chapter because I 
believe that the bestjudge is the second half itself. 
Chapter 6: The First Hvpothesis 
I am not going to deal with all the arguments in Hyp 1 but I shall pick out two 
very difficult arguments (I think ) to discuss. I will discuss the same/different argument 
and also the One is not one argument. For Chen, Hyp I generates negative results, not 
only that all the conclusion in Hyp 1 is a “ is not “ sentence, these conclusions are also 
negative in a sense that they are unacceptable. However, in the same/different argument, 
the conclusion that the Unity is not the same to others and also is not different to itself 
are among those “ is not “ conclusions that are reasonable. On the other hand, for those 
who claim that all the arguments in the second half is acceptable are also having trouble 
because some of these arguments do look very bad. Anyway, for Chen, the conclusions in 
Hyp I is convincingly negative and therefore we are to look for positive results in Hyp II. 
For Meinwald, the conclusion ofHyp 1 is convincingly positive as a pros heauto section. 
Nonetheless, both have difficulties in arguing their case. Perhaps this is the motivation 
for Miller to try the dialectical approach. Instead of looking for convincing argument. 
Miller looks for fallacy, ourjob is to detect these fallacies and see through them. 
Basically, Miller's principle is: if you cannot convince them, convert them. 
Unfortunately, his interpretation cannot convert me because the best judge, the second 
half itself, does not totally agree with his approach. Eventually, I do believe that Hyp 1 
deals withpros heauto predication, or the Unity's nature, or, according to the 
methodological remarks, Unity in relation to itself, ln fact, when we equip with the 
distinction being/having, or pros heautolpros ta alla, or in relation to itself/ in relation to 
others, it tums out that the same/different argument is sound. The only obstacle remains 
is the One is not one argument. Recently, this obstacle is removed by Peterson. 
Chapter 7: The Second Hypothesis 
Having equipped with the distinction beingy^having and getting some initial 
success, we are to look for further confirmation from the Hyp II. 1 will not discuss every 
arguments but to pick up only two - those two unlimited arguments and the 
same/different argument, ln the 1st and 2nd Unlimited Arguments, they are not redundant 
because these two arguments prove two different things, ln the first proof, Plato shows us 
how the Form, Unity, is related to the Form, Many. In the second proof, Plato shows us 
how the Form, Many, is related to the Form, Unity, ln the same/different argument, Plato 
shows us that under what condition the Form Unity is related to the Form Difference or 
Sameness. Anyway, this part of deduction is very difficult and contrary to Chen's claim 
that results in Hyp II are more positive. The result that the Unity is the same to the others 
not one is certainly not welcome by many commentators. Again, if we simply consider 
how Unity is related to the Form Sameness and Difference, then it is indeed true that 
Unity is related to Sameness with respect to others under the condition Plato had 
specified. Further, Forms are related in two different ways. According to Parmenides, the 
Form Unity and Being are different to each other by virtue to another Form Difference. 
Therefore, Forms, besides being their own nature, are also related to many other Forms to 
display many features. This is type I relation. On the other hand, the Form Color and 
Shape are also related, not because that Shape has color or that Color has shape for no 
Forms will have any color or shape. Yet, these two Forms are related for the sake of 
participants. Any sensible, if participate in the Form Shape and thus have shape, must 
also have color, therefore, whenever a thing participates in the Form Shape, it necessarily 
participates in the Form Color, thus, Color and Shape are related. I consider this sort of 
relation as type II. Again, the in relation to others qualification, together with the type 1/ 
type 11 relation, do solve the puzzle in the same/different argument. 
Chapter 8: Hypothesis IIA - the Philosophical Significance of the Instance 
Hyp IIA is not a separated hypothesis. Rather, it is a supplementary section which 
bridges the gap between Hyp I and Hyp 11. According to Parmenides, at the instance, the 
Unity is neither in motion nor at rest. I believe that Plato is doing some sort o f" stripping 
off" or “ singling out “ procedure in IIA, the Form Unity, besides being its own nature, 
also has many other features when relates to other Forms. Once stripping off all those 
irrelevant features, at the instance, we grasp the notion ofUnity as absolutely one. ln the 
case of a man, a man never appears not man, yet a man also never appears as a pure man. 
When we look at a man, this man is perhaps a good-looking man, or an ugly man, he may 
be a Chinese, or an American... etc. However, the definition ofMan does not require 
good-looking, ugliness, Chinese or American as part of it. ln fact, Gail Fine, in his 
discussion of the Republic, proposes that the argument of irrelevance is the bridge 
between Bk. V and Bk. X. The argument of opposite is only a special case of the 
argument ofirrelevance. Unlike equal sticks, man never admits its opposite, yet man 
admits other irrelevant features that call upon our though, we strip off these features, at 
the instance, we grasp the notion ofMan. Thus, IIA provides an answer to the extent of 
Forms in the first half. Also, at the instance, Unity is absolutely one, while beyond the 
instance. Unity rolls between is and is not in a sense that it relates to many other Forms 
and displays many other features. 
Chapter 9: Hypothesis III & IV 
Hypothesis III shows us that Forms other than Unity can relate to one another if 
they relate to Unity at first. Hyp IV shows us that if other Forms are not participate in the 
Form Unity, without this limiting factor, all we get is an indefinite mess, any relation 
discussed in Hyp III becomes unintelligible. 
Chapter 10: Hypothesis V to VIII 
In Hyp V to VIII, we begin with the hypothesis that if the Unity is not. ln the 
Sophist, Plato has a very detail discussion on “ is not “ In fact, compare the argument in 
Hyp V and those ofthe Sophist, they are very similar, lf we adopt Plato's treatment of" 
is not “ as different, then both Hyp V and VII will have no problem. On the other hand, 
assume that “ is not “ can also mean absolutely nothing, that the “ Unity is not “ means 
that there is no such entity called Unity whatsoever, then result in Hyp VI and Vlll are 
also unproblematic. 
Chapter 11: Puzzles in the First Half Solved 
Not only that the distinction being/having resolves the contradictions in the 
second half, it also provides very important clue to the dilemma in the first half. That 
Largeness is large by being it, yet large things are large by relating to the Form Largeness 
so that they display such feature. Largeness belongs to the instance while large things 
partakes ofTime. The regress will crank up if we assume that Largeness is yet another 
very large thing, but this is shown to be not true. 
Chapter 12: Conclusion 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Plato's Parmenides finds itself in a very strange position: it is clearly an 
important work, yet its importance remains unclear. The dialogue is important 
because it is mentioned again in later dialogue. In the Sophist (217d), Plato 
mentions the magnificence of the arguments that was employed in the Parmenides. 
Clearly, Plato intends the Parmenides as a serious work and the dialogue should 
make significant contribution to his thought. Yet, its significance is uncertain, 
scholars cannot come up with any consensus about the meaning ofthis dialogue. 
There are a large variety ofapproach to this dialogue, ranging from neo-Platonic, 
rejectionist, ambiguity theory, analytic approach to revisionist's approach. 
Basically, the Parmenides is divided into three parts, the first half, the 
second half, and a brieftransitional section connecting the two. The first half of 
the dialogue is a typical Socratic dialogue with the exception that Socrates is not 
the questioner anymore, instead, Socrates is being questioned by others and he 
fails to give proper responses to his questioner. At last, Socrates is in the stage of 
aporia. ( However, this is not the only exception in Plato's dialogues. From a 
stylistic point of view, it is true that Socrates is the main questioner in the Early 
Socratic dialogue, yet, in many middle and late dialogues, the role of the character 
Socrates is changing, in some dialogues, for example, in the Meno, after 
questioning others, Socrates is being counter-attacked and has to give reply to the 
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challenge, ln the Sophist, Socrates remains passive in the course ofdiscussion. In 
the Law, Socrates is simply not present )• 
The first hal fof the dialogue is comparatively easy. At the beginning, the 
young Socrates puts forward a Theory of Forms and the theory is challenged by 
Parmenides. The young Socrates, due to his immaturity, fails to response properly. 
The discussion seems straight forward. However, there are debates whether the 
Theory of Forms in the Parmenides is really the Theory ofForms in the Phaedo or 
the Republic. Cornford believes that it is. On the other hand, Chen believes that it 
is not. According to Chen, although there are similarities between these two 
theories, there are also some significant differences between the theory put forward 
in the Parmenides and the theory in the Phaedo\ In the Parmenides, Form is 
treated as physical object while Form is never materialized in both the Republic 
and the Phaedo. Thus, the Theory ofphysical Forms does not represent Plato's 
own position. (1 do not agree with Chen, we shall come back to this point in 
Chapter 3 ) 
The second half, on the other hand, consists o f a series of seemingly 
obscure and unadomed arguments. First ofall, scholars differ in whether the 
second halfshould be divided into eight hypotheses or nine hypotheses. Secondly, 
scholars can not agree on the meaning o f " the one ” in the second half. Some 
maintain that the term had different meanings in each hypothesis. Some believe 
that “ the one ” is in fact ambiguous and Plato explored on the ambiguity of this 
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term and generated contradictions in order to make the ambiguity conspicuous. 
Once the ambiguity is located, inter-section contradiction can also be removed. 
This is the so called “ ambiguity theory ” On the other hand, we have the 
rejectionist's approach which treats the inter-section contradictions as real and the 
second halfbecomes a reductio ad absurdum exercise. Recently, we have scholars 
like Meinwald and Peterson who make distinction between two different kinds of 
predication, thus “ the one，，can be predicated differently.^ 
Not only that scholars differ on the meaning o f " the one ”• They also differ 
in the relation between the second halfand the problem poised in the first half. 
Some commentators believe that the second half is an attempt to deal with the 
difficulties in the first half( Miller, Meinwald ) and other commentators claim that 
the second halfdoes not deal with the difficulties in the first half. Instead, the 
second halfconfirms the difficulties ( Chen ). Therefore, the difficulties in the first 
halfcannot be solved by any minor adjustment in the Theory of Forms. Instead, a 
major overhaul of the theory is immanent. This is the revisionist's approach ( 
Chen's approach ). There is also some other peculiar approach, for example, 
Comford's approach is certainly not revisionist. Yet, he claims that in the second 
half, instead of defending his own position, Plato moves on to attack ( probably the 
best defense is to attack ) other philosopher's position. According to Comford, the 
historical Pamienides' notion o f " the one ” is being refuted in the Hyp I. Thus, the 
second half, to a certain degree, becomes a discussion of various metaphysical 
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theories, although Plato's own theory is in deep trouble, his rivals are as bad as 
Plato's theory. However, Comford's approach is not simply a historical approach ( 
although Cornford has a lengthy discussion on the history of Greek thought and in 
his treatment of the second halfhe does believe that certain Parmenidean thesis are 
reftited ), he also points out that Plato, in the second half, is also attempting to save 
his theory by making clarification or ad justment in his Theory of Forms. As I have 
mentioned above, Cornford believes that the Parmenides explores the ambiguity of 
“ the one ” Thus, to classify Comford is not easy, ln fact, the distinction between 
these different approaches is not that clear cut. It is usually the case that 
commentators do not fall neatly into any one ofthese categories. 
Thus far, we have touched on briefly the issue concerning the Parmenides. 
In order to decide which approach is more appropriate, one must go back to the 
text. It is the objective of this thesis to discuss the whole dialogue, to find out the 
relation between the first and the second halfand to decide what kind of solution 
Plato has offered us to save his Theory of Forms. In chapter 2,1 will discuss the 
development of the Theory of Forms, this chapter is necessary because we need to 
compare the Theory ofForms in the Phaedo and the theory proposed by the young 
Socrates. In chapter 3,1 will discuss the first ha l fof the dialogue and in Chapter 4, 
I will discuss the transitional passage. Chapter 5 will discuss different approaches 
to the Parmenides. Chapter 6 will discuss Hyp I of the second half, ln chapter 7, 
Hyp II will be discussed. Then in Chapter 8 and this is perhaps the most important 
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chapter, we shall discuss how Plato resolves the seemingly contradictions between 
Hyp 1 and Hyp II. Chapter 9 will deal with Hyp III and Hyp IV. In chapter 10, the 
last four hypotheses will be discussed. It is perhaps the most difficult part of the 
whole dialogue. Thus, in this chapter it will include a brief discussion on the 
Sophist and Plato's treatment o f " is not ” statement. The insight in the Sophist is 
very helpful for us to understand different senses o f " the one is not,, in Hyp V and 
VI. The final two chapters will be the conclusion and an analysis on Plato's 
solution. 
In the first half of the dialogue, the Theory of Forms is being challenged. 
Thus, it is necessary to discuss briefly on the development ofPlato's Theory of 
Forms. As we shall see in the next chapter, Plato is constantly reflecting on his 
notion o f “ Forms “ From time to time, Plato would adjust his notion o f " Forms “ 
Before I move on to the next chapter, it is necessary to settle down some 
translation issue, ln my thesis, there will be heavy discussions on the Republic, 
Phaedo, Parmenides and Sophist. For the sake of simplicity, R.E. Allen's 
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translation of the Parmenides , G.M A. Grube's translation of the Republic , F.M. 
Cornford's translation of the Sophisf and Huge Tredennick's translation of the 
Phaedo^ will be used. Also, there will be some minor discussion on the Meno, in 
this case, W.K.C. Guthrie's translation will be used^. Thus, unless otherwise 
specified, the above translations will be used in my thesis and instead ofhaving 
citations for every quotation I make from these Platonic works, I will only mention 
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the dialogue and the corresponding page and section according to the Stephanus' 
original edition. Also, most of the reference works and commentaries on the 
Parmenides are written in English and therefore 1 don't have to bother myselfto 
translate them. However, Chen's commentary is written in Chinese and since there 
is no English translation of Chen's work, I will have to translate the relevant 
passage by myselfand 1 hope that my translation will be accurate enough. 
Finally, the title of my thesis “ Plato in the Parmenides: A Comparative 
Analytic Study “ is a little vague. Please note that “ Parmenides “ in the title refers 
to the dialogue Parmenides, not the historical Parmenides. As 1 have mentioned 
above, Plato has been revising his notion o f " Forms “ in different dialogues, ln 
fact, I believe that Plato's Theory ofForms is constantly developing and revising ( 
please refer to next chapter for detail discussion of my position ). Therefore, the 
title “ Plato in the Parmenides “ is referring to Plato's understanding o f " Forms “ 
during the time he wrote the Parmenides. Also, my study is comparative because 1 
am going to compare Plato's understanding o f " Forms “ at different stages, from 
the Meno, the Phaedo and the Republic, then the Parmenides and finally, the 
Sophist. On the other hand, my study is analytic because in order to compare 
Plato's understanding at different stage, 1 must first analyze the deductions in the 
second half of the Parmenides so that we can have a better picture about Plato's 
development in the Parmenides. 
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Chapter 2: Development ofTheorv of Forms 
ln fact, the Theory ofForms is constantly being revised by Plato. Starting 
from the Meno, where the Theory ofRecollection is first proposed. Though the 
notion o f " Form，，is not explicitly stated, Plato does admit that we human being 
have a soul and our souls have experience in other worlds. As a result, learning is 
nothing but recollecting our previous experience. 
ln the Phaedo, the notion “ Form ” is introduced. Plato contrasts the Form “ 
Equality ” with equal sensible objects, according to Plato, the former is absolutely 
equal while the latter are only “ appear to be equal ” and from different 
perspective, they can be viewed as ‘‘ unequal ” 
Again, in the Republic, Plato points out that sensible objects is both “ is and 
is not ”. While the Form will never permit its opposite. This is Plato's "Argument 
from Opposite". However, in Book X of the Republic, Plato puts forward another 
version of the Theory ofForms. According to Plato, there is a Form “ Bed ,, which 
sensible beds are made after this Form and the maker ofbed, when making a bed, 
looks towards the Form Bed. Thus Form serves as a model or paradigm. Then in 
the Parmenides, the Theory ofForm is being challenged, ln this dialogue, it seems 
to me that Plato regards the Form Largeness as the largest object, it is larger than 
any other large objects. As a result of this theory o f " Physical Form ”，Plato faces a 
series ofdifficulties poised by Parmenides. 
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Plato also has some discussion on Forms in the Sophist, ln the Sophist, Plato 
discusses the blending ofForms. According to Plato, “ some will blend, some not ” 
(Sophist, 256c ), the combination is somewhat like the letters of the alphabet that 
there are rules governing the combination ofalphabet. In the case ofForms, the 
rules are much complicated. In the Sophists, Plato does not explore all the rules, 
yet, he does discuss some ofthose rules. Anyway, one thing we have to keep in 
mind at this moment, according to Plato, each Form is “ being a nature ” and in 
virtue ofits own nature, it can stand in some appropriate relationship with other 
Forms. According to Michael Frede, Plato is making a distinction between “ being 
a nature，，(in virtue of its own nature) and “ having a feature,’ (in relations to 
other Forms).i 
According to modern stylometric studies^, Plato's writings should be 
divided into three periods, early, middle, and late. 
The early dialogues are those in which Plato is most fully under the 
influence ofSocrates. In these dialogues, the historical Socrates attempts to seek 
definitions ofmoral properties. However, such attempts fail (yet, this is not totally 
negative because in the process of inquiry, one indeed deepens his/her 
understanding on that particular moral term at issue). Stylometric analysis suggests 
th^LtthQApology, Charmides, Crito, Euthyphro, Hippias Minor, Ion, Laches, and 
Protagoras, belong to the Early Socratic Dialogues. Besides, in these Early 
Socratic Dialogues, we are quite certain that the character “ Socrates “ is indeed 
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the historical Socrates, we also have some dialogues which are in between the 
early and the middle period. They are the Gorgias, Meno, Lysis, Euthydemus, 
Menexenus，Hippias Major and Republic Book I. 
ln the middle dialogues, the character “ Socrates,, becomes a mouth piece 
ofPlato. In these dialogues, Plato touches on a large variety of issue. The 
discussion is no more limit to moral properties. Starting from the Meno where the 
very possibility ofSocratic inquiry is being questioned and the Theory of 
Recollection is proposed, then in the Phaedo, the Theory ofRecollection is further 
elaborated. We can see that Plato was departing form his master. In these middle 
dialogues, Plato shows his deep interest in Metaphysics and Mathematics. The 
middle dialogues consist of: the Cratylus, Phaedo, Symposium, Republic II - X, 
Phaedrus, Parmenides and Theaetetus. 
In the late dialogues, with the exception ofthe Philebus, the character 
Socrates either plays a minor role or is simply absent from the dialogues. There 
comes a series ofpuzzles, did Plato survive the criticism in the Parmenidesl What 
do we find in these late dialogue? A radical break, smooth continuity, or something 
in between? As I have mentioned above, it seems to me that Plato still upholds 
some ofhis Theory ofForms in the Sophist (that also depends on the interpretation 
ofthe Sophist). I believe that Plato did survive the criticism in the Parmenides and 
he did modify his theory ofForm to coup with those challenges. Nothing in the 
Sophist suggests that Plato had abandoned his Theory of Forms. 
9 
Modem stylometric analysis also agrees with Aristotle's distinction between 
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the real Socrates and the Socrates who is a mouthpiece for Plato. According to 
Aristotle, the real Socrates was busying himself about ethical matters and he was 
interested in definition ofamoral terms. ( Metaphysics 987bl-10 ) 
Given the fact that the dialogues are so divided, we can have a better idea of 
the development ofPlato's Theory ofForms by looking into dialogues at different 
stages. Although in the Early Socratic dialogues, Socrates does not propose any 
notion like “ Forms ” Yet Socrates' inquiry into definition, the way Socrates 
inquiring into many instances of a moral terms and trying to locate the common 
character in these instances, deeply influenced Plato's understanding on Forms, ln 
the Meno, unlike other Early Socratic dialogues which only discuss the definition 
ofcertain moral terms, this is the very first time Plato examines his master's 
method ofinquiry, and although the notion o f " Forms ‘‘ is not explicitly stated in 
the Meno, the notion is nonetheless emerging. Thus, my discussion ofPlato's 
development of the Theory ofForms will begin at the Meno. 
2.1 Theory ofRecoHection in the Meno 
The Meno is a typical transitional dialogue between the historical Socrates 
and the maturing Plato. The first halfof the dialogue is a typical Socratic dialogue 
which Socrates attempted to define a moral term but was not successful. Usually 
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the Early dialogues stop at this point. However, it is not the case in this dialogue. It 
is Meno's tum to launch his counter-attack. According to Meno: 
But how will you look for something when you don't in the least know 
what it is? How on earth are you going to set up something you don't 
know as the object ofyour search? To put it another way, even ifyou 
come right up against it, how will you know that what you have found is 
the thing you didn't know? ( Meno, 80d ) 
Socrates endorses Meno's move: 
I know what you mean. Do you realize that what you are bringing up is the 
trick argument that a man cannot try to discover either what he knows or 
what he does not know? He would not seek what he knows, for since he 
knows it there is no need of the inquiry, nor what he does not know, for in 
that case he does not even know what he is to look for. ( Meno, 80e ) 
In the whole career of Socrates, he is employing his method of inquiry into 
moral terms. On the one hand, Socrates claims that he does not know, yet, he keeps 
questioning people. This is the first time his method is being questioned. While in 
the Early dialogues Socrates takes his method for granted, this method is being 
challenged in this transitional dialogue. It is now Socrates' turn to defend his 
method. 
ln reply to Meno's paradox, Plato proposed his famous Theory of 
Recollection in the Meno. According to Theory ofRecollection, we have a soul 
which is immortal in our previous life, our souls have experiences in ‘‘ virtue and 
other things ”, probably in a world which is similar to our sensible world, or may 
be some other world which is more stable than this changing world. At least, Plato 
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pointed out that in our previous life，we were once in a form o f " not human ” 
Given the fact that all these experiences in our previous life add up, our souls are 
certainly more knowledgeable. Therefore, what we call leaming is nothing but 
recollecting our previous experiences in “ virtue and other things ”. 
Plato also gives us a demonstration on how people can recollect their 
previous experience. He asks one ofMeno,s servants who supposedly knows 
nothing in geometry to follow his inquiry. Initially, the slave boy made some 
mistakes. However, with Socrates' careful guidance, the slave boy eventually 
discovers some mathematical truth which is within himself. ( 82b-85e ) 
What role does the Theory of Recollection play in Socrates' defense? If 
Plato simply proposed an ac hoc theory to explain away the paradox, then 
Socrates' defense w ^ not be convincing. I believe that the Theory ofRecollection 
is an explanation to certain facts in Socratic inquiry. For example, the slave boy, 
with correct guidance, can make correct inference by himself, this is not 
accidental. Furthermore, in the Early dialogues when the historical Socrates is 
searching for definition, although Socrates fails to find a definition, he never 
claims that we are always wrong in making ethical judgment. The difficulty is not 
that we cannot make judgment, rather, it is the failure to locate the common 
character in all these instances of a moral property. In fact, we can't even start our 
search for definition if there is no reliable instances at hand. 
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Therefore, I believe that the Theory ofRecollection is not a direct reply to 
Meno,s paradox. Yet, the theory explains certain facts in human nature. These 
facts are vital in our inquiry of definition. For example, we tend to favor true over 
false beliefs, ln the course of inquiry, we have the capacity to make correct 
inference. Also, we have some moral beliefs which is reliable. These facts cannot 
be accidental. Thus, according to Plato, the Theory ofRecollection provides an 
answer to these facts. 
Therefore, with the Theory of Recollection, together with certain facts 
which are demonstrable ( for example, our capacity to make correct inference ), 
Meno's paradox is no more a trouble. Although we are far from true knowledge, 
we have some reliable true beliefs ( for example, we believe that certain action is 
just, courage or pious ), thus we have some reliable instances. Though we may not 
locate the common character in these instances at this point, we are not in total 
darkness which makes inquiry impossible. 
To a certain degree, Plato is departing from his master because in the Meno, 
Plato goes beyond moral inquiry. Yet, the Theory of Recollection justifies Socratic 
method ofinquiry. Therefore, it is a continuation with the project that was begun 
in the Socratic dialogues. 
Notice that in the Meno, the notion ‘‘ Form ” was not introduced. However, 
according to the Theory of Recollection, our souls have experiences in “ virtue and 
other things ” in our previous lives. Although Plato does not specify whether the 
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other world we once lived in is the world ofIdeas or not. The theory certainly does 
not deny there is such a world. It is in the Phaedo Plato proposed that our souls 
were once in the world ofIdeas and thus we are able to recollect those experiences. 
To the question regarding the extent ofForms, although the notion ‘‘ Form ,， 
is not introduced in the Meno and Socrates only focuses on definition ofmoral 
terms, definition on other things is not denied. Since our souls have experience in 
"virtue and other things", our souls certainly have experience in man, mud...., etc. 
in our previous life. Thus, in principle, we can also search for a definition ofman, 
mud ..., etc. At this point, Plato makes no attempt to limit the extent ofForms. 
1 have completed my discussion on the Meno and we will now move on to 
discuss a much mature view on Forms in the Phaedo. 
2.2 Theory ofForms in the Phaedo 
The overall tone of the Phaedo is very pessimistic. Plato repeatedly points 
out that our body is an obstacle to our knowledge. The situation is so desperate that 
according to Plato: 
Ifno pure knowledge is possible in the company of the body, then either it 
is totally impossible to acquire knowledge, or it is only possible after 
death. ( Phaedo, 66e ) 
Yet, there is something positive in the Phaedo: 
……ifthe question is put in the right way they can give a perfectly correct 
answer, which they could not possibly do unless they had some knowledge 
and a proper grasp ofthe subject. And then if you confront people with a 
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diagram or anything like that, the way in which they react is an 
unmistakable proof that the theory is correct. ( Fhaedo, 73b ) 
On the one hand, given our bodily nature as such, knowledge is very 
difficult to acquire. On the other hand, we do indeed improve our understanding 
on a subject i fwe are challenged by the right question. The dilemma is somewhat 
similar to the Meno's paradox. 
In the Meno, the very possibility of Socratic inquiry is made possible by 
certain undeniable facts in human nature. These facts include reliable beliefs and 
our capability to make true inference. The Theory of Recollection is an attempt to 
explain these facts. However, some questions remain unresolved regarding this 
theory. One question is what sort ofexperience did we have in our previous 
existence? Was it a world of true definitions or what else? 
In the Phaedo, after discussing the tension between our bodily defects and 
our positive nature, Plato again puts forward his Theory ofRecollection to deal 
with the tension. This time, he also discusses what sort ofexperience we had in 
our previous life. According to Plato, there are two types of reality, one is the 
sensible world and the other is the world of Ideas. According to Plato，in the 
sensible world: 
Equal sticks and stones sometimes, being the same, appear equal to one 
person and not to another. ( Phaedo, 74b - c ) 
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This description of the sensible world, I must admit, is poorly formulated. If 
it is the case that one person sees the sticks as equal and another sees them as 
unequal from the same perspective, then no inquiry is possible because we never 
know who makes the correct judgment. Probably, all we can do is to stop asking 
questions and wait until we die. If it is the case that one says the diagram drawn is 
triangle and the other says that it is a circle, then Socrates in the Meno is doing a 
hopeless task with the slave boy. It also contradicts with what Plato has said 
previously that people indeed deepen their understanding by asking them the right 
question or confronting them with an appropriate diagram. 
The only interpretation to this poorly formulated statement about the 
sensible world is, I believe, that we have one person looking at these two sticks 
from one perspective ( position A ) and another person looking at them from a 
different perspective ( position B ). As a result of different perspectives, one says 
they are equal and the other says unequal. In fact, we can imagine that any person 
who stands at position A will say that they are equal. Furthermore, if this person 
moves to positive B, he/she will say that these two sticks are not equal. Of course, I 
am not saying that we are always correct in ourjudgment. In fact，the slave boy in 
the Meno had made a lot ofmistakes, yet, he finally gets through with the help of 
Socrates. Thus, I should add, any person, with proper training, will see equal sticks 
at position A and unequal sticks at position B. Thus, things being equal or unequal 
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depend on the perspective ofthe observer, but it is not due to the relativity ofthe 
observer. 
However, the issue becomes very tricky when we talk about a beautiful 
woman in the sensible world, ln this case, a consensus of judgment is quite 
difficult to reach, lt seems ourjudgment on beauty is rather a kind ofpersonal 
preference. Yet, it is still true that a beautiful woman is perspective dependent. 
Though Helen is beautiful from many angles, Helen may appear ugly in one or two 
angles and ifanyone looks at Helen from those angles, probably, they all will say 
that Helen is ugly. Furthermore, i fwe disagree about the beauty of a woman from a 
particular perspective, we may also employ the Socratic method by showing these 
people with pictures ofbeautiful woman and by asking the right question, 
hopefully, our understanding on beauty will be deepened and we can make better 
judgment. 
We are troubled by uncertainties in our judgment on beauty. On the other 
hand, we are troubled by too much certainties in ourjudgment on entity such as 
man. In the sensible would, Socrates is a man. However, it seems Socrates is a man 
is true from all perspectives, lt is impossible to find a perspective that Socrates 
appears ‘‘not man” Quickly following his description ofthe sensible world, Plato 
points out that in the world ofIdeas, the notion Equality never appears unequal. 
However, in the sensible world, a man also never appears not man, then what sort 
ofreality is this? 
17 
However, besides this changing phenomena of the sensible, there are 
certain notions in our mind that is relatively stable. According to Plato, we do 
recognize such a thing as absolute uprightness, absolute beauty and goodness. 
Also, we recognize the real nature ofany given thing - what it actually is. Of 
course, our senses cannot bring us to this. According to Plato, 
..…with the unaided intellect, without taking account of any sense of sight 
in his thinking, or dragging any other sense into his reckoning - the man 
who pursues the truth by applying his pure and unadulterated thought to 
the pure and unadulterated object..... ( Phaedo, 66a) 
Thus, Plato points out that on the one hand, there are equal sticks in the 
sensible world，yet, their being equal is circumstance and perspective dependent. 
Also, any beautiful object or just action in the sensible world are of the same sort. 
On the other hand, our judgment or thought are performing certain optimization to 
those sensible experiences. This unaided intellect, according to Plato, grasps the 
notion of absolute Equality, Beauty or Goodness. Ifat this point, Plato simply puts 
forward a theory of innate knowledge, his entire theory will have a different 
outlook and he can still limit himself in epistemological discussion. 
However, Plato makes a move that seems unfamiliar to modem philosopher. 
Plato intermingles certain kinds ofepistemological issue with the metaphysical 
issue. First ofall , he attempts to prove the existence of soul. He analyses the 
process of generation. For example, a thing becomes worse because it was once in 
a state ofbetter. Same principle applies to hot/cold, fast/slow, just/unjust. Since 
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life/death is a pair of opposite, death obviously follows life, yet, the principle also 
implies life follows death. Thus, according to Plato, a soul must exists. On the 
other hand, since we have the notion absolute Equality in our thought, it cannot 
come from our sensible experience on equal objects because their being equal is 
circumstance and perspective dependent, it must come from somewhere else. 
According to Plato, we simply recollect these notions we previous known. Before 
our birth, our souls already possessed such knowledge. Looking at a picture makes 
us recalling a person. By the same token, looking at two equal sticks makes us 
recalling our notion ofabsolute Equality. 
The story does not complete here. The existence of soul can explain certain 
facts in human. For example, our notion of absolute Equality in our thoughts. Yet, 
it does not imply that our soul is immortal. At most, these certain facts tell us that 
we know something before our birth. It may be the case that our souls existed three 
minutes prior to our birth and all these knowledge was somehow installed. Once 
we died, our soul may be perished. Thus, Plato distinguished two sorts of reality. 
The first one is the composite, changing and unstable sensible world. Due to the 
fact that all the objects in this world are composite, they must decay. On the other 
hand, there is a world which is changeless, stable and incomposite. The Form, 
Equality belongs to this world. Thus, Forms are incomposite, stable and 
changeless. These two worlds are thus separated from each other. It implies that 
Forms and sensible particulars are separated from each other. Obviously, the last 
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move for Plato is to claim that our souls belong to the world ofIdeas. Thus, our 
soul is immortal. 
If the historical Socrates wants to find a definition of"Equal", he will look 
at many instances of equal sticks, equal stones and try to locate the common 
character that is in them. He will proceed slowly by trial and error, testing the 
definition with counter examples. However, this method of trial and error becomes 
less important in the middle dialogues. At this point, we see a departure of Plato 
from his master. In the Meno, Plato tells us that our souls had experiences in 
virtues and many other things. These experiences all add up will of course provide 
us with a more reliable ground to inquire. Yet, in the Meno, Plato did not argue 
explicitly that the common character exists apart from the instances. In the Phaedo, 
Plato makes it explicit. According to Cornford, no earlier dialogue is there a single 
expression definitely implying that the common character exists apart from the 
many things possessing i t , Aristotle also points out that this further step of giving 
these common characters an independent existence and called them Forms was 
made by Plato ( Metaphysics 987b ) (we might expect certain embarrassment here, 
the dialogue happens during the last hour of Socrates, in such an important 
occasion, Socrates separated the common characters. He also seems to abandon his 
usual trial and error method. If Aristotle is true that it is Plato who separated 
Forms, from the modern point ofview, there is certain academic dishonesty. Why 
manipulated such an important occasion? In fact, some Scholars, such as A.E. 
20 
Taylor, claimed that this is indeed what the real Socrates have said during the last 
hours and the Phaedo also belongs to early Socratic dialogues^ However, this does 
not agree with what Aristotle has said previously that it is Plato who separated 
Forms. Also, stylometric evidence suggests that we should put the Phaedo in the 
middle period. I personally believe that the Phaedo belongs to the middle period 
judging from the content and the style. Yet, there is no academic dishonesty, ln 
ancient time, there was no such thing like authorship. Student often wrote 
materials in the name oftheir master. This is the case for a lot of writings in the 
Bible. The reason for Plato to pick such an important occasion, through the mouth 
of Socrates, pronounces his theory is that Plato believes that the Theory ofForms is 
such a major academic achievement that he must, in respect ofhis master, 
attributes to Socrates.) 
Perhaps the Theory ofForms may seem redundant if Plato does not attempt 
to prove the immortality of soul, lf we follow the argument in the Phaedo, Plato's 
objective was to establish the immortality ofsoul, the Theory of Forms is part of 
the argument that aims at this goal. Actually, the primary concem of many other 
dialogues are also not ofForms (Exception : the Parmenides and the Sophist), but 
Forms are introduced to serve the particular purpose of the dialogue. That makes 
me extremely difficult to hunt down the Theory ofForms. In the Meno, the Theory 
of Recollection does not imply the existence of Forni ( certainly, it also does not 
deny that possibility ). Yet Forms are not necessary tojustify the possibility of 
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inquiry because an experienced soul is good enough. In the Phaedo, in order to 
justify the claim that souls are immortal and are separated from the bodies, Plato 
are forced to make a distinction between the two realities. According to Comford: 
But in the Phaedo this doctrine is skillfully led up to by a series of steps. 
It is entailed by the belief in Anamnesis. This is shown to involve the 
separate existence of a conscious and knowing soul, apart from the body 
and its senses, before birth - a conclusion which all parties to the 
discussion take as satisfactorily demonstrated, provided that the Forms 
exists.6 
The trouble does not end here. If the two worlds are thus separated, what is 
the relation between Forms and particulars. Can such Forms, being incomposite, 
“in” the composite particulars? Here, Plato makes another distinction. According 
to Plato, we also distinguish the Equality itselfand the equality in these two equal 
sticks. By now, we have three entities: 1) the Form, Equality, 2) two equal sticks, 
3) the equality in these two equal sticks. In his attempt to show the immortality of 
soul, distinction between 1 and 2 is made. However, the question whether 1 and 2 
are related immediately follows the distinction. Plato, in order to deal with this 
question, points out the distinction between 1 and 3. Since 1 and 2 are separated 
from each other and they are ofdifferent ontological status, it seems, by no mean 
they can be combined. Thus 3) is pointed out. Yet, what kind of entity is this. 
Equality itself, of course, cannot change to Inequality. Forms, with the ontological 
status as such, can never change, or perish or cease to be. However, we do have 
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two sticks that partake of Equality in one perspective and partake ofInequality in 
other perspective. Thus, the immanent character is pointed out. 
What happens to this immanent character if one moves from one 
perspective to another when looking at the same pair of sticks. The Form, Equality 
itself, of course will not change to Inequality, nor Equality cease to be. According 
to Plato, 
It seems to me not only that the form of tallness itself absolutely declines 
to be short as well as tall, but also that the tallness which is in us never 
admits smallness and declines to be surpassed. It does one of two things. 
Either it gives way and withdraws as its opposite shortness approaches, or 
it has already ceased to exist by the time that the other arrives.( 
Phaedo,l02Q) 
These immanent characters, according to Plato, will either withdraw or 
cease to exist when the opposite characters are approaching. These entities are thus 
different from Forms because Forms will never permit to withdraw or cease to 
exist. However, though Plato points out how these immanent characters operate, he 
never defines their ontological status. Also, how these immanent characters come 
about? What is the relation between Forms and immanent characters then? It seems 
to me that Plato does not provide us with any answer to these two questions. 
Anyway, Plato does discuss the issue of participation: 
It seems to me that whatever else is beautiful apart from absolute beauty is 
beautiful because it partakes of that absolute Beauty, and for no other 
reason. (Phaedo, 100c) 
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This formulation is very ambiguous. All we get is the claim that ifHelen is 
beautiful, then Helen partakes of Beauty. Plato simply repeats the distinction 1, 2 
and 3 and adds nothing to it 
Plato also offers another formulation : 
Well, now, that is as far as my mind goes; I cannot understand these other 
ingenious theories of causation. If someone tells me that the reason why a 
given object is beautiful is that it has a gorgeous color or shape or any 
other such attribute, I disregard all these other explanations -1 find them 
all confusing - and 1 cling simply and straightforwardly and no doubt 
foolishly to the explanation that the one thing that makes that object 
beautiful is the presence in it or association with it; in whatever way the 
relation comes about, of absolute Beauty. 1 do not go so far as to insist 
upon the precise details - only upon the fact that it is by Beauty that 
beautiful things are beautiful. This, I feel, is the safest answer for me or 
for anyone else to give, and I believe that while I hold fast to this 1 cannot 
fall. (Phaedo, lOOd-e) 
The second formulation also tells us nothing more. However, Plato points 
out that the issue is a very tricky one. Thus, Plato chooses to play safe. As I have 
pointed out earlier, once the distinction is drawn between 1 and 2, the trouble is 
inevitable. Plato is certainly aware of this difficulty and he warns us to be cautious 
in this regard. (In the first half of the Parmenides, the young Socrates is more 
eager to put forward his theory and makes bold assumption, that is exactly the 
opposite to the cautious Socrates in the Phaedo). 
Besides the relation between Forms and the sensibles, there are also 2 
classes ofentity that puzzle Plato. Entity like man, according to Plato, although 
Simmias is taller than Plato but shorter than Phaedo and at that moment there are 
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in Simmias both tallness and shortness, Simmias is the same man. ln one case, 
tallness approaches and shortness withdraws, in the other case, shortness 
approaches and tallness withdraws. Yet, Simmias retains his identity amid these 
changes. Other entity, such as fire, also creates puzzle to Plato. First ofall, heat is 
distinct from fire. Yet, the immanent character heat always associates with fire. 
According to Plato, 
So we find, in certain cases like these, that the name of the Form is 
eternally applicable not only to the Form itself, but also to something else 
which is not the Form but in variably possess its distinguishing 
characteristic. ( Phaedo, 103e ) 
Furthermore, there are Forms that is etemally not applicable to a thing. For 
example, Evenness is incompatible with three. Cold is incompatible with fire. 
As I have mentioned above, the entity "man" created certain puzzle for 
Plato because man seems to be more “ real ” than other beautiful things or equal 
sticks. While equal sticks, beautiful things, or just action is circumstance and 
perspective dependent, it seems “ Socrates is a man “ is true in all perspectives. 
So far, we have discussed the Theory ofForms in the Phaedo. Let me 
summarize a few points that is relevant to our discussion o f the Parmenides. 
1) There are Forms, Likeness itself. Unify itself, etc. 
2) Sensible objects partake Forms, also it is possible for sensible objects to partake 
in two opposite Forms. For example, two sticks may appear equal from one 
perspective and unequal from another perspective. 
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3) The Equality in two equal sticks, Cornford called it immanent character. 
According to Plato, these immanent characters should be distinguished from the 
Form itself. 
According to Cornford, the young Socrates in the Parmenides also believes 
in these three premises. Thus, the theory put forward in the Parmenides is identical 
to the theory in the Phaedo? However, there are a few more points that Plato also 
maintains in the Phaedo. 
4) The Forms are etemal and incomposite ( However, the Forms in the 
Parmenides is a little different, in the second hypothesis of the second half, if we 
take it that the Unity-Being complex is a combination of two Forms, then Plato 
have demonstrated to us that this complex can be divided and each elements of this 
complex can also be divided infinitely). 
5) Forms are absolute. For example. Equality itself is absolutely equal. I believe 
what Plato means is that Equality itself is equal unqualifiedly. That is to say. 
Equality is equal independent ofcircumstance and perspective. ( ln the first half of 
the Parmenides, the young Socrates treats Largeness as the largest entity. Yet, no 
matter how large a thing is, i fwe put it far enough and compare with another 
object nearby, this largest entity will appear small). 
6) Man is an entity that puzzles Plato. On the one hand, any man in the sensible 
world is composite. Yet, man retains his own identity through changes. In short, 
Plato puzzles this kind of entity on ontological grounds. 
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7) The notion fire in the sensible world also stirs some doubt for Plato because in 
the case offire, heat is etemally associated with fire. While many sensible objects 
appear F and not F depending on the circumstance and perspective, it is not true 
for fire. ( In the first half of the Parmenides, according to the young Socrates, it is 
the value of these entities that matters, things that are worthless do not deserve to 
have Forms )• 
8) Regarding the relation between Forms and immanent characters, Plato wams 
against any speculation on the issue. Plato only accepts the fact that "By Beauty, 
things happen to possess the immanent character beauty" ( The young Socrates, 
on the other hand, allows Parmenides to speculate on the issue ). 
Thus, I believe that the Theory of Form in the Parmenides is not identical to 
the theory in the Phaedo. Yet, 1 also do not believe that the theory belongs to 
o 
someone else as Chen suggested. I suggest that the theory in the Parmenides is a 
Theory of Forms or some implications ofPlato's theory misunderstood by the 
student in the Academy. In the next chapter, I will defend my position in details. 
Before I proceed to the next chapter, I want to make a few remarks on the 
Theory of Forms in the Republic. 
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2.3 Theory of Forms in the Republic 
In general the Theory ofForms proposed in the Republic is very similar to 
the one in the Phaedo ( with the exception that in Book X where quite 
unexpectedly, Plato puts forward another version of Forms ). In Book V, Plato 
points out that: 
Since the beautiful is the opposite of the ugly, they are two things And 
since they are two, each is one The same is true of the just and the 
unjust, the good and the bad, and all the Forms each is itself one, but 
because they appear everywhere in association with actions, and bodies, 
and each other, each appears to many. ( Republic, 476a ) 
For Plato, the lovers ofspectacles and lovers of crafts and practical men are 
interested in beautiful sounds and colors and shapes, but their thought is unable to 
see and welcome the nature of the Beauty itself. Only a few philosophers are able 
to appreciate the Beauty itself. According to Plato, “ philosophers, on the contrary, 
believe that there is such a thing as the Beauty itself, who can see both it and the 
things which share in it, and does not confuse the two. “（ Republic, 476d ) Again, 
like the theory in the Phaedo, Plato makes the distinction between the Forms and 
the things that partake of them. 
Just like what was happening in the Phaedo, the epistemological issue 
intermingles with the metaphysical issue. According to Plato, Form “ fully is ” and 
is fully knowable. On the other hand, sensible objects partake ofbolh opposites. 
For example, beautiful things will appear ugly under certain circumstances. Thus, 
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sensible objects, according to Plato, “ are rolling around between non-being and 
pure being “ (Republic, 479d ). While the Beauty itselfis fully beautiful, a thing is 
beautiful in some circumstances and is ugly in other circumstances. However, 
Plato is not casting doubt on our judgment on beautiful things. Nobody can doubt 
Helen's beauty, yet for those who say Helen is beautiful, they only have an opinion 
about one beautiful instance. Only a few of them grasp what fully is, the Beauty 
itself. According to Plato，” what fully is, is fully knowable and what in no way is, 
is altogether unknowable “（ Republic, 477a )• Sensible objects lie between what 
purely is and what completely is not. Thus, our opinion on any sensible objects, 
also lies between knowledge and ignorance. 
The distinction between sensible objects and Forms in the Republic is very 
similar to that of the Phaedo. Yet, the metaphysical connotation in the Republic is 
much stronger. In the Republic, the distinction is between what fully is and what 
rolls between is and is not. Nevertheless, not all composite sensible objects rolls 
between is and is not. As I have mentioned earlier, entities such as “ Man ” or ‘‘ 
Fire ” created some tensions in the Phaedo and Plato is certainly aware ofthat. 
Again, in the Republic, Plato discusses these entities. 
.•…Here, we say, are three fingers, the smallest, the second and the middle 
finger. Assume that I am talking about them as being seen quite close. 
Now examine this about them. Each of them equally appears to be a 
finger, and in this respect it makes no difference whether it is seen to be at 
the end or in the middle. Whether it is white or black, thick or thin, and all 
that sort of things. In all this the soul of the many is not compelled to ask 
the intelligence what a finger is, for the sense of sight does not indicate to 
it that the finger is the opposite of a finger. ( Republic, 523c - e ) 
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I fwe stick to the distinction between the two worlds in the Phaedo. Finger 
clearly is not Form ( although finger never appears not finger) because a finger 
consists of parts. Yet, it does not roll. The further trouble is whether all these 
instances offinger deserve a Form, Finger, to fix our thought. It seems, the notion 
“Finger ” is already “ fixed ” by our sense and we do not need our intelligence to 
think through the perplexity, lf we do not think in our encounter of fingers, even 
there is Form for Finger, we will not know. On the other hand, Plato puts forward 
the Argument from Opposite: 
What about these fingers' largness or smallness? Does the sense of sight 
have a sufficient perception ofthein, and does it make no difference to it 
whether the finger is in the middle or at one end? Or their thickness and 
thinness, their hardness or softness in the case of the sense of touch? And 
do our other senses not lack clearness in their perception of these 
qualities? Does not each sense behave in the following way: in the first 
place the sense concerned with the hard is of necessity also concerned 
with the soft and it declares to the soul that it perceives the same object to 
be both hard and soft. Then in those cases the soul in turn is puzzled as to 
what this perception means by hard. It says that the same thing is also soft; 
and so with the perception oflight and heavy ..... It is likely then, that in 
these cases the soul will attempt, by calling upon calculation and 
intelligence to examine whether each of the things announced to it is one 
or two "... But we say that the sense of sight saw big and small not as 
separate but as commingled. So in order to clarify this, intelligence is 
compelled to see big and small not as commingled but as separate, the 
opposite way from sight. And it is from some such circumstances that it 
first occurs to us to ask: what is the nature ofbigness and again of 
smallness? ( Republic, 523e -524c ) 
In the Meno, the dilemma is that if one knows, there is no need to inquire, 
yet, i fone does not know, he/she does not even know what he/she is inquiring. The 
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solution to the dilemma is the fact that one does have some true opinions which 
roll between “ is and is not “ In the Republic, the Argument from Opposite points 
out that when something is F and is not F, the soul is puzzled by it. According to 
Plato, these contrary appearances call upon our thought and tum our soul toward 
the contemplation of reality. 
However, the Argument from Opposite may severely limit the extent of 
Forms. Even there is Form for Fire or Man. Since the instance ofFire or Man does 
not call upon our thought, we will not grasp Man itself or Fire itself. According to 
Plato, 
If the unit, in and by itself, is adequately seen or perceived by any other 
sense, then, as we were saying in the case ofthe fingers, it would not draw 
one towards reality. ( Republic, 524e) 
Notice that Plato never stales explicitly that the extent ofForms is limited. 
Yet, in the Republic, he focuses his discussion on contrary pairs such as 
beauty/ugly,just/unjust, large/small, soft/hard ..…，etc. Also, the Argument from 
Opposite may hint at such limit. I do not know what position Plato had held in this 
regard. Certainly, student in the Academy would have the same puzzle. Thus, in 
the Parmenides, Plato addresses the issue again. 
So far so good. Yet, the story does not end here. While in Book V and VII, 
according to the Argument from Opposite, extent ofForms may have limit. In 
Book X, Plato offers another version ofTheory ofForms: 
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We are accustomed to assuming one Form in each case for the many 
particulars to which we give the same name ..... Let us then take any set of 
particulars you like. For examples, there are many beds and tables. But 
there are only two Forms for these two articles, one for the bed and one 
for the table ..". We also usually say that the makers of these articles look 
to the Form when they make, one the beds, the other the tables, which we 
use. ( Republic, 596a-c ) 
According to Plato, the Form is what the craftsman “ looks towards ” and 
tries to embody in his work when he makes beds, whereas the painter, more 
superficial, copies only the way particular beds appear. The painter's product is 
thus oflower status, “ three removes from nature ,,; the craftsman's bed, as a copy 
from Form, is o f a higher status, though it falls short of the Form itself. Plato also 
points out that there is only one Form ofBed and is made by God, there can't be 
two Forms of Bed for ifthere were, there would be a further Form of Bed in which 
they partook.( Republic, 597c-d ) 
There are a lot of problems in this new version ofForms. First of all, 
supposed the distinction between the world of Ideas and the world of sensible 
objects still holds. Forms are incomposite and eternal, then how can Fonns be 
created by God. Secondly, the Srgument from Opposites may limit the extent of 
Forms, yet, this new version ofForms re-opens the possibility for more Forms. 
ln the Parmenides, the Third Man Argument was put forward to challenge 
the Theory ofForms. There won't be such regress i f w e maintain the ontological 
distinctness of Forms. However, the new version in Book X states that if there are 
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two Forms of Beds, there would be a further Form of Bed in which they partook. 
Certainly, sensible objects need to partake in a Form in order to possess that 
immanent character. Yet, it is very problematic for Form of Bed to partake in 
another Form ofBed. Plato believes that there is only one Form of Bed, but the 
way he argued seems to suggest that he has forgotten the ontological distinctness 
of Forms and treated them as yet another sensible object. 
Thus, a lot ofcommentators find this new version very puzzling.^ In fact, 
Plato made no attempt to reconcile these two versions in the Republic. However, I 
think Plato does attempt to make some modification in his theory to reconcile the 
two versions in the Sophist, ln the Sophist, Plato discusses the communion of 
Forms. According to Plato, the communion of Forms is somewhat like our alphabet 
system that letters are combined in various way to give meaningful words ( 
Sophist, 253a). Forms, like Unity, Plurality, Rest, Motion, Square, Roundness, 
Hardness, Softness... etc. becomes the “ letter “ in this system and can combine in 
some cases and separated in other cases. Probably, when making beds, the maker 
ofbeds looks towards some certain combinations ofUnity, Plurality, Square, 
Roundness, Hardness and Softness. 
The Parmenides is believed to be written between the Republic and the 
Sophist. In the Phaedo, Plato begins his revolution by separating Forms from 
sensible objects. The Republic is the continuation of the revolution. However, 
there are many puzzles remains after the first revolution. For example, the extent of 
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Forms, the ontological status of some sensible objects and the relations between 
immanent characters and Forms, ln order to clear up these puzzles, Plato starts his 
second revolution in the Sophist. That is his communion ofForms. The 
Parmenides, then, is a dialogue amid these revolutions. In the first halfof the 
dialogue, Plato re-addresses many issues that were unresolved in the Phaedo and 
the Republic. In the second half, some of those hypotheses deal with the blending 
of Forms to some extent. Especially in Hyp V, the treatment o f " is not ‘‘ is very 
similar to that of the Sophist. Furthermore, in the Sophist, Plato refers to the ‘‘ 
magnificent arguments “ in the Parmenides. All points to the fact that the 
Parmenides is a transition between the two revolutions. 
What role does the dialogue Parmenides play in the development of the 
Theory ofForms then? The remaining part of my thesis will explore this question. 
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Chapter 3: First Haif of the Parmenides 
3.1 Introductory Conversation (126a - 127a ) 
The stage setting is complicated. The Parmenides is narrated by Cephalus 
ofClazomenae, who has heard it from Plato's half-brother, Antiphon, who heard it 
in turn from Pythodorus, a student of Zeno, who was present at the original 
conversation. The narrator is thus three stages removed from the conversation he 
narrates. 
Scholars are divided regarding the significance ofthe introductory 
conversation. We have Adeimantus and Glaucon who welcome Cephalus in the 
marketplace. Some scholars believed that since Adeimantus and Glaucon are also 
present in the Republic, Plato is indicating certain connection between the 
Republic and the Parmenides. We have Mitchell Miller' on this side. On the other 
hand, scholars such as Chen and R.E. Allen^ believed that the mere occurrence of 
names is accidental. 
Judging from the age ofSocrates and Parmenides, Plato intended the 
original conversation to be placed around 450 BC.^ 
On the other hand, Antiphon is Plato's half-brother by his mother's second 
marriage. His birth date is unknown, but he was ofcourse younger than Plato, who 
was born in 428/427 BC. By the time Antiphon told Cephalus ofthe original 
conversation, according to Plato, Antiphon is no longer young ( 126c ). Very 
likely, then, Cephalus visits Athens after the death ofSocrates. For one thing, if 
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Socrates was not dead, Cephalus might come to Socrates to get the first hand 
report. Also, Antiphon was still quite young in 399 BC, the time Socrates died. 
From the original conversation till Cephalus gets the third hand report, there 
is at least a gap of fifty years of time. 
Well over fifty years after the event, Cephalus, an infrequent visitor, leads a 
delegation of fellow citizens “ much interested in Philosophy “ across the Aegean 
from Asia Minor to Athens for the purpose ofhearing a third hand report of a 
remote meeting. We must appreciate their sincereness in Philosophy. We must thus 
ask: why is this meeting so important that after fifty years oftime, people still 
trouble themselves to cross the Aegean to get only a third hand report of it? 
Cephalus, according to the dialogue, is from Clazomenae, it was also the 
birthplace of Anaxagoras. According to Miller: 
Plato makes Clazomenae conspicuous as the home of Cephalus and his ‘ 
philosophical ‘ companions in the opening phrase of the dialogue..... to the 
contemporary Greek hearer, the Ionian town was distinguished only as the 
birthplace of Anaxagoras. Yet the philosopher himself is not directly 
mentioned. Thus Plato establishes a loose, tacit association: Cephalus and 
his philosophical friends presumably share the basic interests and 
directions but not necessarily the particular doctrines, of Anaxagoras. ^ 
If this is what Plato intended, then why does Plato want us to associate with 
Anaxagoras? The fact is, Plato had done this once in the Phaedo, according to 
Plato, he found Anaxagoras' theory quite appealing initially, yet, the mixture and 
seperation ofcertain entities such as “ earth “ or “ water ‘‘ is not the cause, rather, 
it is only a pre-condition. According to Plato, we may say that the cause of my 
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conversing with you is that I have certain biological make-up or mixture ofcertain 
entities so that 1 can say something. Also, you will be “ mixed “ in certain ways so 
that you can hear. Finally, there should be medium, in this case, air, so that sound 
can travel. However, these are not cause, these are only some pre-conditions.( 
Phaedo, 97a-100e ) Perhaps I can put the issue in a more Platonic way, let's say 
someone explains to me that Helen is beautiful because she has certain shapes and 
colors, perhaps her eyes are blue. Plato will argue that blue eyes will be a pre-
condition for someone who is beautiful. Yet, a fundamental question - what makes 
beautiful things beautiful? - is left unattended. Thus far, we have some second 
hand quotations ofAnaxagoras from Plato. In order to have more insight in this 
issue, we need to look at some of the Anaxagoras' writings. 
The Greeks have an incorrect belief on Coming into Being and Passing 
Away. No thing comes into being or passes away, but it is mixed together 
or separated from existing things. Thus, they would be correct if they 
called coming into being mixing and passing away ‘ separation-off'. { 
Frag. 17 f 
Anaxagoras, like Plato, is puzzled by the “ absolutely is ‘‘ and the “ is and is 
not “ of the sensible world. “ Absolutely is ‘‘ can never become or perish. Yet, we 
do see things that become or perish. For Plato, “ is and is not ‘‘ is due to the 
approaching or withdrawing of immanent characters. Furthermore, Plato points out 
that the world of Ideas is “ absolutely is “ and sensible objects happen to process 
some immanent characters for no reason other than Forms. For Anaxagoras, he 
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also accepts the Parmenidean maxim that what is real can't become or perish. 
However, change is possible because of the mixing and the separating of some 
immutable and permanent components. Anaxagoras called them “ seeds “ These 
seeds are unlimited in number, and they were originally “ all together “ in a 
primitive mixture, from which they could be separated out without anything new 
coming into existence and without their suffering any change/) According to 
Anaxagoras, 
Before these things were separated off, all things were together, nor was 
any colour distinguishable, for the mixing ofall things prevented this, 
namely the mixing of moist & dry & hot & cold & bright & dark, and 
there was a great quantity of earth in the mixture, and seeds infinite in 
number, not at all like one another. For none of the other things either is 
like any other. And as this was so, one must believe that all things were 
present in the whole. ( Frag. 4 f 
In the Book V of the Republic, Plato maintains that there are Forms for 
opposite-pairs. ( Republic，476a) In the Book X, his new version ofForms reopens 
the possibility for more Forms, not only that there are Forms for opposite pairs, 
there will also be Form for Bed. ( Republic, 597c ) In fragment 4, Anaxagoras 
maintains seeds for opposite such as moist/dry, bright/dark ... etc. On the other 
hand, he also believes in seeds for every sensible things. Thus, there are certain 
similarities in this regard. 
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Therefore, like Plato, Anaxagoras is also interested in accommodating 
Parmenides' denial of nonbeing while preserving plurality and change. However, 
Anaxagoras' attempt fails. In fragment 16: 
From these, while they are separating off, Earth solidifies; for from the 
clouds, water is separated off, and from the water, earth and from the 
earth, stones are solidified by the cold, and these rust outward rather than 
the water.^ 
It is very interesting to see such seeds, in this case Earth, can be solidified. 
Any attempt to save the phenomenon, I believe, must maintain the ontological 
distinction between the immutable elements and the mutable mixtures. The trouble 
for Anaxagoras is that on the one hand he puts forward a notion of immutable 
seeds. Yet, in working out the relations between the immutable seeds and the 
mixing of them, Anaxagoras has only physical relations in his mind. Thus, Earth 
solidifies, seeds portion out from the original mess. 
Plato's Theory ofForms is an effort, in effect, to meet Anaxagoras' own 
goals. In the Phaedo and the Republic, he works out the ontological difference 
between Forms and sensible things. In the Phaedo, his reluctance to say explicitly 
the relation between Forms and immanent characters suggests that Plato is aware 
of the difficulties to describe such relation ( probably this can never be worked out 
). 
Thus, Cephalus and his fellows bother themselves to come to Athens to hear 
the conversation between Parmenides and Socrates. Plato may intend to remind us 
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ofthe Anaxagorean tradition. However, it is too early to make any conclusion. I 
think the best judge on this issue is the remaining part of the dialogue itself. 
3.2 Zeno's Treatise (127d - 128e ) 
Zeno was reading aloud from a book that he has brought to Athens for the 
first time. When he is finished, Socrates fastens on one ofhis hypothesis and uses 
the Theory of Forms to refute it. 
According to Zeno, if things are many, it follows that the same things must 
be both like and unlike. But that is impossible: unlike things cannot be like, nor 
like thing unlike. “ Thus it is impossible that things should be a plurality; if many 
did exists, they would have impossible attributes.“ 
According to Chen, Zeno's argument can be summarized as follows: 
( 1 st Argument) 
1. Assume things are many, it follows that they must be both like and 
unlike. 
2. but that ( both like and unlike ) is impossible. 
3. If unlike things cannot be like nor like things unlike, then things are not 
many. 
(2nd Argument) 
If i t is impossible for unlike things to be like and like things unlike, it is also 
impossible for there to be many things. 
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( 3 rd Argument) 
Ifthere were many things, they would undergo impossible qualifications.^ 
According to Chen, the 3rd argument simply strengthens the conclusion of 
the 1st argument. The 2nd argument, on the other hand, is important because it fills 
the gap between premise 2 and 3 in the 1st argument. In the 1st argument, premise 
2 only states that “ both like and unlike is impossible “ The meaning of premise 2 
is more clear with the help of the 2nd argument, it points out the impossibility for 
unlike things to be like and like things unlike. Thus it is more specified than what 
the premise 2 in the 1st argument has stated. 
We must appreciate Chen's effort to arrange the Zeno's argument. 
Furthermore, Chen points out that it is a mistake for some commentators to ignore 
this part of the dialogue and treats Zeno's treatise as sophistry. ( Unfortunately, 
Meinwald is one ofthose commentators who does not address the Zeno's Treatise 
).I also agree with Chen that the Zeno's argument is valid and its logical form is 
modus tollens. Yet, in this argument, terms such as “ like “ or “ unlike “, are very 
ambiguous. 
Also, there is a question whether Parmenides would endorse Zeno's 
argument. First ofall, Parmenides was not present when Zeno was reading his 
treatise. On the other hand, Zeno also admitted that the treatise was written in the 
controversial spirit in his young days; and someone copied it surreptitiously ( 128c 
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).Thus, Zeno's original intention was not to publish this treatise. To a certain 
degree, the absence ofh is master Parmenides, together with the preservation of 
Zeno regarding his treatise, seem to suggest that the treatise should not be taken 
seriously. Yet, Zeno reads it in the meeting anyway. 
R.E. Allen offers an explanation for the preservation ofZeno and the 
absence of Parmenides. According to Allen: 
The primary thesis ofParmeiiides' thought is that what is absolutely 
excludes what is not and therefore generation and destruction. No doubt 
he also held, as the dialogue Parmenides puts it, that All is one, in that 
Being is one and indivisible. But that claim is derivative, not primary in 
his thought. Plato and Aristotle, however, both treat Parmenides primarily 
as a monist - treat him as assuming as his fundamental hypothesis that the 
All is one - and the historical Zeno, defending Parmenides, leveled his 
awesome powers of argument against pluralism, the hypothesis that things 
which are many. As an interpretation of Farmenides, this would seem to 
involve misplace emphasis. “> 
Furthermore, according to Allen, the proposition that generation and 
destruction are impossible and that plurality is impossible, are independent, in that 
there might be a plurality ofentities that do not admit generation and destruction." 
(For Plato, these are Forms and for Anaxagoras, these are seeds )• It follows that 
Zeno, i f h e was saying very much the same thing as Parmenides, was not saying 
exactly the same thing. He was primarily attacking, not generation and destruction, 
but pluralism; he was not defending Parmenides' main thesis, but developing a 
dependent theme in Parmenides' thought. 
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Ifthis is really the relation between Parmenides and Zeno, then the young 
Socrates is making the first mistake at this point by identifying Zeno's treatise as 
the same as Parmenides，. As our discussion proceeds, we will see more and more 
mistakes made by the young Socrates. 
Regarding the ambiguity on the term “ like “ and “ unlike “, according to 
Cornford: 
If we take the word in the former, Parmenidean sense, (like as 
homogeneous and unlike as helcrogcneous), it is easy to construct a 
Zenonian argument on these lines: if things are many, they must be both 
homogeneous and heterogeneous. For (]) each of them must be one and 
what is one is homogeneous; therefore they are homogeneous. But (2) if 
they are many, they must be distinguishable, and therefore unlike one 
another; therefore they are heterogeneous. '^  
Initially, this interpretation seems funny because Zeno's paradox fails to be 
a paradox any more. According to Allen, there is no absurdity in a plurality being ( 
collectively) heterogeneous and ( distributively ) homogeneous.'^ In the Republic 
V, Plato already said that “ each is one, but they are two “ ( 476a )• Eventually, 
Zeno turns out to be quite Platonic. Furthermore, ifZeno's paradox fails to be a 
paradox, the young Socrates' solution fails to be a solution also. It turns out that 
the young Socrates is elaborating Zeno's treatise and his Theory ofForms satisfies 
the primary Parmenidean criterion that what is absolutely is homogeneous, 
incomposite and immutable. 
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This interpretation seems silly at first sight. However, it is not altogether 
impossible. It explains certain facts in the dialogue; 1) Both Parmenides and Zeno 
endorse the young Socrates' Theory ofForms, 2) Parmenides is willing to train the 
young Socrates ( the exercise in laborious for the old Parmenides ), 3) the reverse 
role of Socrates and Parmenides in the dialogue. 
It is also possible to argue that Plato purposefully leaves the terms “ like “ 
and “ unlike “ unspecified in Zeno's treatise so that it leaves room for the young 
Socrates to specify the meaning of‘‘ like ‘‘ and “ unlike ‘‘ as homogeneous and 
heterogeneous. 
l f the interpretation works, then we will not expect any confrontation 
between the Monist, Parmenides and the pluralist, Plato. In fact, Allen points out 
that pluralists like Plato and Anaxagoras, in their attempts to save the phenomenon, 
never abandon the Parmenidean maxim that what absolutely is excludes is n o t ” 
What these pluralists want is a reconciliation between the Parmenidean maxim and 
the changing phenomenon. As I mentioned before, Anaxagoras' attempt fails 
because the seeds is no longer immutable and incomposite. While beginning from 
the Parmenidean maxim, Anaxagoras eventually cannot uphold it. 
3.3 Socrates' Solution to Zeno's Treatise (128e - 1 3 0 a ) 
In reply to Zeno's treatise，the young Socrates proposes the Theory of 
Forms. The young Socrates makes the following distinctions; 
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1)The Forms，Likeness itself. Unity itself, etc.; 
2) Things can share in two contrary Forms at the same time and may have 
other characters as well. 
3) Things that get share in the Forms will possess that particular character. 
As 1 have mentioned before, some commentators believe that this is the 
theory in Republic and the Phaedo, others say this is not. We shall come back to 
this issue at the end of this chapter. Yet, one thing is for sure. There are certain 
ambiguities in the Theory of Forms proposed by the young Socrates. From 129a to 
130 a, we have at most one page coverage regarding the Theory ofForms. Without 
the more elaborated Theory of Forms in the Phaedo and the Republic, 1 wonder if 
anyone can understand the theory simply from this one page argument in the 
Parmenides. 
For example, in 129b, the young Socrates mentions “ things that are just 
like cannot be unlike, nor things just unlike like “ According to Allen, the context 
implies that this is true ofthe Form, Likeness. However, the expression “ a u i a i a 
o^ioia “ also applies to the immanent character of Forms in things in the Phaedo, 
120c:5 
Miller also compares the original Greek text of the Parmenides, the Phaedo 
and the Republic, he concludes that the young Socrates distinguishes the Form 
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from its immanent character and yet still treats it as if, like the immanent character, 
it was subjected to plurality]() 
Should the historical Socrates in the meeting, he would have simply pointed 
to the fact that he is one person and he consists of parts. This is enough to reduce 
his opponent to aporia and the historical Socrates will simply withdraw from the 
conversation and let Zeno to think through the perplexity. To the issue whether the 
meeting is a historical one, I think we would have no more dispute on that, lt is 
quite certain that the Parmenides is a piece offiction and meant to be read as such. 
Anyway, let's turn back to Socrates' reply to Zeno. 
Unlike the historical Socrates, the persona Socrates does not simply put 
forward a counter-example. He makes the distinction 1), 2), and 3). In 1), the 
Pari7ienidean maxim is fulfilled. From 2), things come to possess opposite 
characters and other characters as well. However, l )and 2) is not enough. This is 
exactly where Anaxagoras fails. If this immutable units are in the mixture, whether 
it can still be immutable is questionable. However, with 3), we can explain how 
things possess two opposite characters at the same time, we don't have to worry 
about the Parmenidean principle being violated. 
Thus, according to the young Socrates, he won't be surprised if someone 
shows him that sticks and stones and things like that are many, and the same thing 
one. Yet, he will be surprised ifsomeone can show him that Unity itselfis many or 
Plurality one. At 129e, the young Socrates even swings to the extreme that he 
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would be surprised if Forms among themselves can be combined or separated from 
one another. 
The claim that Forms can't be combined is in conflict with the Sophist 
where the Communion of Forms is discussed. However, notice that it is the young 
Socrates who makes this move. In addition, the issue here is whether opposite 
Forms combine, lf it is the case. Forms will be both one and many, both at rest and 
in motion...etc., but that is impossible. Anyway, due to his immaturity, the young 
Socrates is creating some unnecessary trouble for himself. 
3.4 Parmenides' Criticisms of the Theory of Forms 
As the young Socrates was speaking, we might expect both Parmenides and 
Zeno to be annoyed by the rudeness and the theory proposed by Socrates. Yet, they 
paid close attention to what Socrates have said and from time to time glanced as 
each other and smiled as if in admiration. Then, Parmenides moves on to question 
the young Socrates. First of all, he asks whether Socrates has made the following 
distinction: 
1. Likeness itself. 
2. Things that share in Likeness. 
3. The likeness that things possess. 
It seems to me that the mouthpiece Parmenides has a better idea about the Theory 
of Forms than the young Socrates. While the presentation of the young Socrates is 
47 
quite confusing, Parmenides, it seems at least at this point, is trying to help him to 
clear things up. Once getting the confirmation from the young Socrates that these 
distinction is indeed what he had proposed, the extent of Forms is being 
questioned. 
3.5 The Extent ofForms (130a - e ) 
Parmenides discussed four kinds ofForms: 
1. Highly general terms such as Likeness, Unity, and Plurality. 
2. Moral and evaluative Forms such as Justice, Beauty, and Goodness. 
3. Forms such as Man, Fire, or even Water. 
4. Forms for hair, mud, dirt. 
The young Socrates accepts Forms for the first two classes. For the third 
class, he is in perplexity. Yet, he has no trouble with the forth class; there is no 
corresponding Forms for these worthless things. In the Phaedo, Plato is puzzled by 
entities such as man and fire, again in the Republic, Plato pointed out that finger 
cannot appear not finger and therefore it does not call upon our thought. In both 
dialogues, Plato remains doubtful on entities such as man, fire or finger for 
ontological ( the man never appears not man or heat always associates with f i re) or 
epistemological reason ( the finger does not call upon our thought). Yet, in the 
Parmenides, the young Socrates denies Forms for mud simply because it is trivial. 
Let us assume that the reason for young Socrates remains doubtful on the third 
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class is the same as that of the Phaedo and the Republic. Very well! Yet how can 
he be so unphilosophical in his denial of the fourth class. In this case, the young 
Socrates is still in a state of confusion. I f the reason for the young Socrates to 
remain doubtful is that these things like man and fire are not totally useless, then it 
is a “ great leap backward “• I simply cannot imagine such a thoughtful 
philosopher, being aware of the ontological and epistemological significance of 
these entities in the Phaedo and the Republic, all of a sudden turns back the clock 
and deals with the issue in such an unphilosophical manner. 
Furthermore, to the question what makes large large, the answer is 
Largeness. Yet, to the question what makes mud mud, since there is no Form of 
mud, Plato must admit that it is mud and no more. It is rather ironical, precisely 
because mud is worthless and Form is not needed, the young Socrates had 
endowed mud with independent and substantial reality. 
It seems the young Socrates is not in command ofh is Theory ofForms. Yet, 
Parmenides remains hopeful: 
You are still young, Socrates, said Parmenides, and philosophy has not yet 
taken hold of you as 1 think it one day will. You will despise none of these 
things then. But as it is, because of your youth, you still pay attention to 
what people think. ( Parmenides, 130e ) 
Notice that similar kind of encouragement from Parmenides will reoccurs as 
the conversation proceeds. 
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3.6 The Dilemma of Participation (131a - c ) 
Parmenides now turns to the issue of participation. According to the young 
Socrates, there exists Forms such as Likeness, Largeness, Beauty and Justice; 
sensible things, by coming to partake of Largeness or Likeness or Beauty or 
Justice, they become large or like or beautiful or just. Parmenides then asks 
whether each thing partaking in Form receives part of the Form or the whole of it. 
Nevertheless, before considering each option, Parmenides asks the young Socrates 
whether there are other alternatives and Socrates replies “ No, how could there be 
？ “. Thus, we have to treat these two alternatives as exhaustive and exclusive 
disjunction. Ifthere is participation, it must be either part or whole. If it is shown 
that both disjuncts are unacceptable, then there is no participation. On the other 
hand, it is equally absurd ifi t is shown that both disJuncts are true. ( Notice that in 
the following argument, both disjuncts are shown to be unacceptable. However, in 
Hyp II of the second half, in those two seemingly redundant arguments of 
unlimited, Parmenides seems to affirm both disjuncts.) 
Parmenides first considers whole participation. If each thing get a whole of 
Form, since things are separated, it follows that Form will be separate from itself. 
The young Socrates, in order to avoid such separation, puts forward the simile of 
the ‘‘ day “ Day is in many places at the same time, yet it remains integrally one 
and selfsame. If Form is like day, then it can in all things and yet remains one. 
Parmenides quickly replaces this smile with his own simile of sail. To the modem 
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readers, this replacement may seem a little bit of sophistry. However, according to 
Chen, this replacement is legitimate because in Plato's time, people believed that 
the world is covered by a very big sail, one side is white and the other side is black. 
When the white side is facing us, it is day. If it is the black side facing us, it is 
night/7 Anyway, according to Parmenides, although it is one sail spreading over a 
number of people, each person actually covers by part of it. Since the first 
alternative is shown to be unacceptable, Socrates has no option left but reluctantly 
tums to participation as part. 
However, ifeach thing gets only a part ofthe Form, again, since things are 
separated, the single Form is divided. 
The trouble for the young Socrates is that he fails to uphold the distinction 
between the immanent character and the Form. First ofall, the young Socrates 
believes that Form is in the participant. Secondly, accepting the whole/part disjunct 
will simply repeat Anaxagoras' mistake. According to Cornford, this is to 
understand participation in the most gross and material sense ( Chen, Miller, Allen, 
and Meinwald also share a somewhat similar view ).'^ However, for those who 
maintain that the theory ofForms in the Parmenides is identical to that of the 
Phaedo may have some embarrassment here because it seems quite clear that Plato 
does not believe in such a physical participation in the Phaedo. ( Recall that Plato 
chose to play safe in the Phaedo, please refer to my discussion in Chapter 2 . ) 
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Since the young Socrates admits only two alternatives and both are shown 
to be unacceptable, it follows that there is no participation. The Theory ofForms, 
at this point, is already collapsed. But Parmenides adds an illustration. 
3.7 The Paradox of Divisibility (131 c - e ) 
Assume things partake part of the Form, ln the case o f a large thing, it 
partakes of part of the Form Largeness. However, part of Largeness is smaller that 
the whole of Largeness. Again, equal thing will partake part ofEquality which is 
less equal. In the case of small thing, since small partakes a small portion of the 
Smallness, then the whole Smallness itself will be larger. 
In the Phaedo and the Republic, Form is absolute. As I mentioned earlier, 
the notion Equality is equal absolutely in the sense that it does not depend on 
perspective and circumstance. If we treat Largeness as yet another large thing, then 
no matter how large it is, when putting it far enough, it can still appear small when 
compare with an object nearby. The distinction between equal sticks and Equality 
in the Phaedo and the distinction between absolutely is and “ is and is not “，all 
points to the line of interpretation that Equality being equal independent of 
circumstance and perspective. Yet, in the Parmenides, the young Socrates treats 
Largeness as a large thing. 
In the Paradox ofDivisibility, the young Socrates accepts the notion that 
Largeness is the largest thing. Although neither Socrates nor Parmenides make this 
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point explicit, it must be implied by the argument. Since Largeness is the whole 
and things get only part of Largeness, whole is always larger than any parts, thus 
Largeness is always larger than any participant's share of Largeness. In the case of 
Equality, it is the most equal ( let ' s not question what ‘‘ most equal “ means ). 
Participant gets only part ofEquality, which is less equal. In the case ofSmallness, 
each participant gets a part ofSmallness which is smaller than the whole. At this 
point, we are in deep trouble because Smallness turns out to be the largest. 
In the case of Smallness and Equality, the Paradox ofDivisibility is most 
damaging because Smallness will no longer small and participants which partake 
Equality are not equal. 
In the case of Largeness, we still have a way out. Suppose A has ten units of 
Largeness and B has eight units ofLargeness. A then is larger than B by two units. 
However, this kind ofquantitative analysis was already denied by Plato in the 
Phaedo; that 10 is greater 8, not by a difference o f2 , but by virtue of two different 
Forms ( Phaedo, lOla-c )• 
Judging from the past performance of the persona young Socrates, we are 
not expecting him to remember such important insight in the Phaedo. However, it 
seems that the Paradox ofDivisibility is not fatal to all Forms. At least, some can 
escape from the paradox ( for example, the Form Largeness )• The final blow from 
Parmenides, is the Third Man Argument. 
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3.8 Third Man Argument (131e - 132b) 
The Third Man Argument will not even get start if we distinguish the 
difference between Equality being equal and sticks that appear equal. However, 
from the Paradox ofDivisibility, Plato makes it conspicuous what sort of problem 
we will face if we treat Largeness being large and large things large in pretty much 
the same way. The Paradox ofDivisibility, in fact, is only preparatory, it paves the 
way for further trouble to the young Socrates. 
It is assumed that in the Paradox ofDivisibility that Largeness itself, has the 
character in the same way as many large things have it. If that is so, then it isjust 
one more member of the class oflarge things and there will be the same reason to 
demand a second Form over and above the group oflarge things and the first 
Largeness. Thus, we get a regress. 
Notice that in the Dilemma of Participation, the issue was primarily an 
ontological issue; the relation between Forms and sensible objects, whether Forms 
can remain one, whether Forms are divided, all ofthese are examinations of the 
ontological status ofForms. Yet, the concern in the Third Man Argument is the 
epistemological status ofForms. 
First ofall, mind-eye is mentioned in this argument. Secondly, there won't 
be a regress i fwe do not think about the group oflarge things, we do not even 
grasp the first Form. Forms themselves will not generate new Forms, it is our mind 
eyes, which puzzle about the large things, get the first Largeness, and again puzzle 
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about the new group oflarge things and the first Largeness that we get the second 
Largeness. A regress thus gets start. 
There are two assumptions in the Third Man Argument, without them, the 
regress will not start; 
1) Largeness is a large thing. ( According to the Paradox ofDivisibility) 
2) Largeness does not partake of itself. 
If other large things were large by partaking of Largeness and Largeness 
were large by partaking of itself, a further Form of Largeness would not be 
required. In the Hyp III ( Parmenides, 158a), it argues that anything partakes of 
Unity must be other than Unity, since if it were not, it would not partake ofUnity 
but be Unity; it follows that ifUnity partakes ofUnity, Unity is other than itself. So 
if Largeness partook ofitself, it would be other than itself. There is a difference 
between being and having ( as we shall see, this difference is discussed in both the 
second halfof the Parmenides and in the Sophist). By appealing to the difference 
between being and having, the Third Man can be solved ( we shall come back to 
this in the next few chapters). Anyway, since the young Socrates does not realize 
the difference between being and having, that Largeness would not partake of 
Largeness but be it, he has no option but to grasp a second Largeness. 
The Third Man Argument never attempts to show that there are infinite 
number of Largeness, lt only declares a disjunct. Either our mind grasps no Form, 
if there is any, there will be an infinite number o f a very similar From ( Largeness 
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1, Largeness2 ... etc., certainly, each Largeness is different to the others )• Should 
the young Socrates realizes the root ofhis difficulties, he will overcome the Third 
Man. Unfortunately, the young Socrates does not realize the root ofhis problem, 
instead, he keeps insisting that Forms are in the participants. Thus, further trouble 
is ahead ofhim. 
3.9 Forms as Thoughts (132b - c ) 
In this brief argument, the young Socrates suggests that the Form may be 
only a thought that is in a mind. Thus, its status as a mental entity will be different 
from the sensible things that partake ofthat Form. Regress will not start. 
In the Phaedo, the Form, Equality which is immutable and the notion of 
Equality being absolutely equal in our thought is connected by the Theory of 
Recollection. Certainly, it will be absurd to say that the Form, Equality itself, gets 
into my mind when I recollect the notion absolutely equal. 
If the young Socrates can make the distinction between the Form itself and 
the experience on the Form that we recalled, then Socrates may have a shot to get 
rid of the regress. Certainly, the young Socrates had already grasped some notion 
ofLargeness as the largest thing in the Third Man Argument. If Largeness is only a 
thought of the largest thing, probably a regress will not start. However, Parmenides 
quickly points out that a thought is a thought of something. Once we grasped the 
notion that Largeness is the largest, then we are also asserting something that is 
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larger than all participants add up. This thought ofLargeness, according to 
Parmenides, is a thought of what is because what is not is unthinkable. Since 
Largeness is ( or the largest thing is), it is put side by side with the original group 
oflarge things and form a new group. Our mind, seeing this new group, are 
puzzled by it until we grasp Largeness2 that is over and above the original group. 
Yet, this Largeness2 is larger than all large things and Largenessl add up. Thus, a 
regress will also start if a thought is a thought of something. 
However, this is not the end of the story. It tums out that ifForms are 
thought, then participants that get share ofthought must think. 
The result follows from two premises; 1) Form o f X = Thought o fX , 2) 
Participant gets a share o f X or, part ofForm o f X is in the participant. Thus, a 
thought of X is in the participant, and the participant must think. Once again, the 
young Socrates is led to absurdity. 
Parmenides refutation is not a piece of sophistry. It is the young Socrates 
who treats participation as physical relation. Parmenides' objection to Form as 
thought，then, is an attempt to penetrate deep down to Socrates' root ofdifficulties 
and urges him to reconsider his own subtle assumption. Unfortunately, Socrates is 
not able to see through these perplexities and makes another attempt to evade the 
Third Man. 
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3.10 Forms as Paradigm (132d - 133a) 
The young Socrates now turns to the view that Forms are paradigms fixed 
in the nature of things and that the other things that participate in Forms are 
likeness of them. Thus, for a sensible thing to participate in a Form is to resemble 
that Form. 
Instead of going back to examine the primary assumption that has led to his 
perplexity, the young Socrates has side-stepped once again by offering further 
premise. However, the suggestion that Forms are paradigms is very promising, the 
whole/part dilemma assumes that if there is participation, either the whole Form or 
part of it is in the participant. But if participation is resemblance, there is no reason 
to suppose that Forms are in the participants. Just like when you look at the mirror, 
the image of your face resembles your face, yet, there is no reason to suppose that 
your face is “ in “ your reflected image. According to the young Socrates: 
....this participation they come to have in the Forms is nothing but their 
being made in their image. (Parmenides, 132d ) 
Surprisingly, after suffering from so many defeats, the young Socrates 
seems to strike home. In the Phaedo, Plato maintained that sensible object falls 
short and cannot be really like it, only a poor imitation ( Phaedo, 74e )• In the Book 
X of the Republic’ forget about the issue of the extent ofForms at this moment, it 
suggests that Forms are paradigm. The maker ofbed, in making a bed, looks 
towards the Form ofBed as the model ( Republic, 596b ). Notice that Forms as 
58 
paradigm and participation as resemblance deny that the Form is in the participant. 
It thus removes the Dilemma ofParticipation. 
Still, the young Socrates is immature. He is not able to uphold his new 
suggestion. Parmenides questions him: 
if something resembles a character, is it possible for that character not to 
be like what has come to resemble it, insofar as it has become like it? ls 
there any way in which what is like is not like what is like it?( 
Parmenides, 132d) 
Suppose we look at 5 persons and 5 stones in front of us, we get the notion 
o f " Five “ Can we say that these 5 persons resemble the Form ofFive? Yes. Can 
we say that these 5 stones also resemble the Form of Five? Again, yes. Can we say 
that the Form ofFive resembles an instance of 5 persons? Probably not. 
Unfortunately, the young Socrates accepts that ifsomething resembles a Form, the 
Form also like the thing, thus treating the Form as yet another instance. Thus, the 
Form and the thing, being like one another ( or in Platonic terminology, that the 
Form and the thing have likeness in them ), must have a share of one and the same 
Form. 
As a result, we get a infinite regress. If A and B are like each other, then 
they share in one and the same Form, namely. Likeness. But to share is to 
resemble, to resemble is to be like, and likeness is symmetrical as what the young 
Socrates has accepted. Thus A and B are like Likeness and Likeness is like A and 
B. We in tum look at this new group ofthings: A, B and Likeness, since they like 
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each other and likeness is symmetrical, there must be another Likenessl in which 
they share. Again, we crank up the engine of regress. Thus, the proposal that 
Forms are paradigm is tumed down. 
There is a debate whether the suggestion that Forms are Paradigm is 
identical to the new theory of Forms in the Book X of the Republic. According to 
Chen, the young Socrates' suggestion is not that of the Republic. In Book X, the 
maker is mentioned, ln the Parmenides, though the Forms as Paradigm is 
proposed, the maker is never mentioned/) However, whether or not the maker is 
mentioned, the regress will still crank up. Furthermore, the young Socrates' 
treatment ofForms as Paradigm will allow more Forms. It seems to me that the 
Theory of Forms from the mouthpiece Socrates is not very coherent. For those 
scholars who believed that the Theory of Forms from the young Socrates 
represents Plato's own position ( Comford ) or other people's position ( Chen ), 
they may have some difficulties trying to explain the sort of incoherence here. 
According to Cornford, Parmenides' objection to Forms as Paradigm is 
fallacious. It is because Plato did not give up speaking ofForms as patterns in the 
nature of things in the Timaeus. Furthermore, Comford points out that: 
The upshot is that the argument is fallacious, unless Socrates meant to 
assert that participation is the same thing as likeness, and it is clear that he 
did mean that. The conclusion that the two relations are not identical is 
sound; but it is no reason against regarding the Form as a pattem of which 
the many individuals are copies. Plato must have seen this because he 
continues to speak ofForms and individuals in these terms.^^ 
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The reason why Comford maintains that this argument is fallacious, 1 
believe, is that he treats the first halfof the Parmenides as demonstrative. That in 
this argument, Parmenides tries to show that Forms as Paradigm will still generate 
a regress and in order to do it successfully, Parmenides deliberately twists the 
meaning of Socrates' proposal. In fact, Cornford's treatment of the second half, 
that he omitted Aristotle's response in his translation also shows that Comford has 
certain tendency to treat the whole dialogue as a treatise. As a result, arguments in 
the whole dialogue must fall into two classes; sound argument or fallacious 
argument. 
However, the dialogue can also be treated as dialectical. ( ln fact, I would 
say that both the term ‘‘ demonstrative “ and “ dialectical “ are rather misleading 
because these two terms are so widely used that at some point we really cannot tell 
what they mean. The term “ dialectical ‘‘ are used by Comford, Miller, Allen and 
Meinwald, and yet, each may have very different approach to the Parmenides. l f I 
were to choose another term to replace “ dialectical “，I would choose “ 
philosophically illuminating “ because this term is not so “ colourful “ That the 
argument from Pamienides is neither true nor false. Rather, they are 
philosophically illuminating. They do not prove or disprove anything, instead, 
Parmenides' challenges make it clear that if some issues are unsettled or remained 
ambiguous, then we will have to face those perplexities. I shall come back to this 
issue in the last two chapters of my thesis. ) In Parmenides’ objection to Forms as 
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Paradigms, since Socrates is too young and philosophy does not yet get hold of 
him, his view is immature. Therefore, Parmenides tests him with another kind of 
physical relationship, namely, likeness. Once again, the young Socrates, though 
having a very promising starting point, falls back to his own subtle assumption. As 
a result, Socrates' attempt fails. Notice that it is Socrates who accepts Parmenides’ 
invitation to explore in that direction. This indicates that Socrates is not in 
command ofhis theory. Parmenides, on the other hand, is trying to help Socrates 
finding out his own stubborn assumptions. 
At this point, even the most promising suggestion fails. Readers may tempt 
to conclude that participation is impossible. However, Parmenides points out that if 
Forms are separated from us, it will be unknowable by us. 
3.11 Separation and lJnknowabiIity (133a - 134e) 
Commentators are puzzled by this part of the argument. Cornford believes 
that the argument is “ grossly fallacious “？】Miller, on the other hand, points out 
that Parmenides simply capitalizes on the misunderstanding of the young Socrates 
that relation among Forms are similar to that of the particulars ( for example, slave 
to master is the same as the Form Slave to the Form Master), and thus generates 
2) 
the absurd result that only god knows Forms and Forms are unknowable to us. 一 
I believe that the argument here is only hypothetical. In those previous 
arguments, every attempt to define participation fails. Perhaps, readers may swing 
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to the other extreme and claim that there is no participation. So, now, Parmenides 
moves on to explore the issue: What if there is no participation. 
However, before Parmenides moves on to deduce the result that Forms are 
unknowable to us, Parmenides points out that: 
lf someone said that it does not even pertain to the characters to be known 
if they are such as we say they must be, one could not show him that he 
was mistaken unless the disputant happened to be a man of wide 
experience and natural ability, willing to follow many a remote and 
laborious demonstration. Otherwise, the man who compels them to be 
unknowable would be left unconvinced. ( f)urmenides, 133b-c ) 
This is the first time he mentions the laborious argument in the second half. 
According to Parmenides, the greatest difficulties is a tough one, yet, it is 
resolvable. What one needs to do is to follows the arguments in the second half. 
At the beginning of the first half, the young Socrates argues that; 
1) There are Forms. 
2) There are sensible objects. 
3) Sensible objects participate in Forms. 
With 3) fails, what left are l ) and 2) but without participation. According to 
Parmenides, Forms have a real being just by itself and that no such real being 
exists in our world. Further, those Forms which are what they are with reference to 
one another, and not with reference to the sensibles in our world. On the other 
hand, things in our world are related among themselves, not to the Forms. For 
example, slaves in our world are referenced to the masters in our world. Form of 
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Slavery is referenced to Form ofMastery. Form of Knowledge itself, will be 
knowledge of the World ofIdeas. On the other hand, knowledge in our world will 
be knowledge of the real ity in our world. Since Forms do not exist in our world, 
none of the Forms is known by us. Only god, then, can possess the Knowledge 
itself. Since things in our world have no reference to the world ofForms, god does 
not know our world. 
Comford points out that although Forms do not exist in this world, there 
might be perfect instance ofknowledge. The whole Socratic and Platonic attempt 
to define Forms implies that we can start from imperfect knowledge of the Forms 
， 1 
themselves and gradually improve our knowledge." However，Parmenides has 
argued that since there is no participation, immanent character has no reference to 
Forms. At this point, even the Theory of Recollection does not work because 
immanent characters and Forms are not related in any way. Perhaps our soul may 
live in the world ofIdeas previously, yet, our soul recollect nothing ifimmanent 
characters in this world are not related to Forms. 
The problem ofComford is that he treats the argument here as 
demonstrative. Therefore, he is eager to add back all those missing premises such 
as participation, soul, or imperfect knowledge. However, the argument is 
dialectical ( philosophically illuminating), it begins with the question; what if 
there is no participation between Forms and things. It ends in an absurdity. 
Readers are urged to think through the perplexity and locate the root of difficulties. 
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We have to make a distinction between the argument itself and the understanding 
we get after seeing through the perplexity. The argument itself, assuming there is 
no participation, is sound. The conclusion of the argument, is absurd. The 
understanding when we see through the perplexity, afterall, is Comford's criticism. 
Probably, Plato is aware of the danger that this part of the argument may 
tempt people to swing to the other side of the extreme and no longer stick to Forms 
and participation. He repeatedly wams against giving up Forms. He wams us once 
before he laid out the argument. He is going to wam twice in the conclusion. 
3.13 Whether the Young Socrates' Theory of Form is Identical to that of the 
Phaedo 
I believe that, to a certain degree, the Theory of Forms from the mouthpiece 
Socrates is not the theory in the Phaedo or in the Republic. In the Phaedo and the 
Republic, Plato never assumes any physical participation. He never treats 
Largeness as a large thing. In the Phaedo, Plato claims that Equality is absolutely 
equal and its being equal is circumstance and perspective independent. As 1 
mentioned before, it is possible to find some perspective that the Largest Largeness 
appears small. Furthermore, Plato's puzzle on entities such as man and fire stems 
from ontological and epistemological grounds, not simply because some things are 
worthless and do not deserve to have Forms. Also, the immanent characters play a 
very important role in the Phaedo. However, in the Parmenides, although the 
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young Socrates points out the notion immanent character at the beginning ( rather, 
I should say, it is Parmenides who questioned the young Socrates and eventually 
the immanent character is confirmed ), as the argument proceeds, it is part of the 
Form itself，rather than the immanent character, that is in the participants. Should 
the young Socrates upholds the claim that it is immanent character that is in the 
participants, he could avoid a lot of troubles, it seems, the young Socrates is not 
able to see the role that immanent character should play in the participation. In the 
Phaedo, Plato is very cautious regarding the relation between Forms and 
participants, it is very likely that Plato is aware of the difficulties and therefore he 
chooses to “ play safe “ In the Parmenides, the young Socrates is eager to put 
forward new assumptions and it seems he is not aware of the difficulties ahead. 
Therefore, I can't see how the theory in the Parmenides is identical to that o f the 
Phaedo. 
On the other hand, 1 also disagree with Chen's thesis that the theory is not 
that of the Phaedo. First of all, if the theory belongs to someone else, when 
someone else's theory is in trouble, there is no need for Plato to revise his own 
theory. Furthermore, this someone else's theory is very incoherent, at one time. 
Forms are thought, later. Forms are paradigm. 
My position is that the theory from the mouthpiece Socrates is a distorted 
version of the Theory ofForms in the Republic and the Phaedo. ln fact, 1 would 
suggest, it is not even a theory for a theory will have some coherence, rather, the 
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young Socrates' different views of Forms are a cluster of misunderstandings or 
implications from the Theory ofForms in the Phaedo and in the Republic. Some of 
the misunderstandings are created by Plato himself. Imagine you were one ofthose 
students in the Academy, when you read the Book V and Book X of the Republic, 
you would be puzzled by the two versions of Forms. On the one hand, the 
argument from Opposites may imply only limited extent ofForms. On the other 
hand, the claim that Forms are Paradigm seems to suggest that there is no limit. 
Furthermore, when you read the Phaedo where Plato is reluctant to say more on 
the issue regarding relation between immanent character and Form, as a young 
student in the Academy, not aware of the difficulties, you might be eager to put 
forward new theory regarding participation into test. Probably that is the reason 
why Plato chooses the young Socrates to present the theory. 
The Theory ofForms from the young Socrates, then, is and is not that of the 
Phaedo and the Republic. It is that of the Phaedo and the Republic because it is 
based on the theory in those two dialogues and there are many ambiguities in the 
Phaedo and the Republic that need further discussion. It is not simply the theory in 
the Phaedo because it is a misunderstood version. However, my position will put 
myself into a very difficult situation. For those who believe that the theory in the 
Parmenides is identical to the Phaedo, they would look for solution from the 
second half. For those who believe that the theory in the Parmenides is not Plato's 
own, they will be happy to see that the objections to this someone else's theory 
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being confirmed in the second half. However, if it is the case that the theory of 
Forms in the Parmenides is a cluster of misunderstandings and implications arise 
from the ambiguities in the Phaedo and the Republic, then we may expect Plato to 
do either one ofthe two things or both in the second half; 1) make adjustment in 
his own theory to clear up misunderstandings, 2) reduce these misunderstandings 
once again to absurdity. As we shall see in the next few chapters, in the second 
half, Plato attempts to clarify these ambiguities arised in the Phaedo and eventually 
his modified view about Forms will solve most paradox in the first half. 
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Chapter 4: The Transitional Passage (135d-137c ) 
Having generated all the perplexities from Socrates' immature version of 
the Theory ofForms, Parmenides nevertheless pointed out that Forms are 
necessary for all thought and discourse; to deny the existence ofthe Form is to 
destroy the possibility, not only ofphilosophy, but of all discourse. ( Parmenides, 
135c) 
If my analysis of the first half is correct, then Plato's manipulation of the 
persona Parmenides is reasonable. Plato, in his attempt to save the phenomenon, 
never gives up the historical Parmeiiidean maxim as his starting point. On the other 
hand, the immature version ofForms departs from this maxim and therefore, 
through the mouth of Parmenides, Plato calls upon us to re-examine what went 
wrong in this immature version. 
If the persona Parmenides is to offer help to those who are troubled by this 
immature version, then we are looking forward to seeing his solution to those 
perplexities. In 135c-d, according to Parmenides, the trouble of this immature 
version is that Forms such as “ Beauty “, “ Justice “, ‘‘ Good ‘‘ are being defined or 
posited too soon, before any proper training. 
In the Phaedo, the Form Equality is absolutely equal and its being equal is 
different from any equal sticks or stones. ( Phaedo, 74b-d ) At the same time, Plato 
also points out that Forms are immutable, incomposite and etemal. ( Phaedo, 78c-e 
)Thus, Equality, besides being absolutely equal, as a member of the class of 
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Forms, Equality is also immutable, incomposite and eternal. Furthermore, in the 
Republic Bk. X, Plato explicitly says that if there are two Forms ofBed, there will 
be one more Form “ Bed “，that is over and above the two. ( Republic, 597c ) Thus, 
there is only one Form ofBed. This argument also applies to other Forms. Thus, 
each Form is one. It turns out that Forms, besides being their own nature, also have 
many other features. 
However, ifit is the case that Forms do process more than one character, 
here comes a trouble. Taking Equality as an example, Equality is equal, one, 
immutable, incomposite and eternal, yet when sensible participant comes to 
partake ofEquality, it becomes equal only, it does not become one, immutable, 
incomposite or eternal. Clearly, some distinctions are needed before we defined 
Forms. ( Notice that Parmenides never explained what does he mean by “ defining 
Forms too soon “, all I have said so far is only a speculation, the best judge to such 
speculation is that whether Paraieindes in the second half does make any 
distinction between Equality being equal and Equality being etemal, incomposite, 
one and immutable.) 
Parmenides next proceeds to describe his dialectic exercise. He first defines 
the subject ofhis exercise (Parmenides, 135d-e ): 
you would not allow the survey to be confined to visible things or to 
range only over that field; it was to extend to those objects which are 
specially apprehended by discourse and can be regarded as Forms. 
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According to Cornford's translation as such, the exercise should discuss 
both Forms and things. However, according to Allen, Comford's translation is a 
distortion of the original text. Allen thus offers another translation: 
……you would not allow inquiry to wander among things we see, nor even 
within their domain, but rather in the field of those things there, which one 
would most especially grasp by rational account and believe to be 
characters.^ 
Thus, according to Allen, the subject of the exercise should be Forms only. 
Furthermore, in 136b, Parmenides suggests what sort ofthings that can be 
hypothesized in the exercise, namely. Likeness, Unlikeness, Motion or Rest. 
Clearly, these are all Forms. As a result, Allen believes that “ the Unity ‘‘ in the 
exercise means only one thing, namely the Form Unity. However, the drawback of 
this translation is that it tums out in the exercise that the Form, Unity, is having all 
sorts of characters. For example, in Hyp II, Parmenides argues that Unity is related 
to Motion, (Parmenides, 145e-147a) yet. Forms can hardly move. 
For Comford, since the subject can either be Forms or things. The 
dialectical exercise becomes an exercise to detect ambiguities of the One and the 
Others. According to Cornford, the One can mean the Form Unity which is simply 
one and not many ( in Hyp I ) or a one entity which is many and has all sorts of 
characters ( in Hyp II ).^  The advantage of Cornford's translation is that the 
contradictions between different hypotheses tum out to be only apparent because 
different subjects are being discussed in different hypotheses. However, for 
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scholars such as Allen and Meinwald, they cannot but object to this kind of 
distortion of the Greek text. Further, they point out that this kind of multi-sub ject 
approach or ambiguity theory does not agree with the text. In the transitional 
passage, according to Parmenides, the subject of the dialectical exercise is the One, 
but not different “ Ones ".^ 
Since I do not read Greek, I am not in a position to decide the issue. 
However, there are certain difficulties i fwe treat “ the One “ to mean the same 
thing in the exercise. In Hyp II, that the Form Unity is in motion is questionable. If 
that means the Form Unity is in motion, it is certainly impossible. On the other 
hand, if we treat the subject of Hyp II as one entity ( a one which is), then to talk 
about such one entity is in motion or at rest makes more sense. Yet, to ascribe 
different meanings to the subject of the second half may make the second half 
irrelevant to the first half. It is the Theory of Forms that is in trouble. Exercise on a 
thing, or one entity, seems irrelevant to the problem of Forms. 
Nonetheless, the dispute between Cornford and Allen is not totally 
unresolvable. Notice that although the Form Unity itself, has nothing to do with the 
Form Motion because Forms can't move; yet, a one entity, which participates in 
Being and Unity, does partake in the Form Motion when it moves. In the Sophist, 
Plato discusses extensively on the problem ofBeing. According to Plato, whatever 
is in motion or at rest, it is, yet. Being itself is neither in motion nor at rest. Neither 
to be in motion nor to be at rest is what it is to be. ( Sophist, 250b-d ) We need to 
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keep in mind that Cornford is not dealing with a mere thing, rather, such thing 
must partake Unity, Being, Shape, Motion and Rest. Recall that whatever is in 
motion, it is. If a thing partakes in the Form Motion, it also partakes in the Form 
Being, thus, Motion and Being are related in such a curious way. 
Having settled the subject of the dialectical exercise, we now come to the 
format of the exercise. According to Parmenides, 
In short, about whatever may be hypothesized as being and as not being 
and as undergoing any other affection whatever, it is necessary to examine 
the consequences relative to itself and relative to each one ofthe others, 
whichever you may choose, and relative to more than one and relative to 
all in like manner. And the others, in tum, must be examined both relative 
to themselves and relative to any other you may choose, whether you 
hypothesize what you hypothesize as being or as not being, if you are to be 
finally trained accurately to discem the truth. ( Parmenides, 136b-c f 
There are certain difficulties involved in the methodological remarks, the 
trouble is that the number doesn't add up. Also, it doesn't agree with what 
Parmenides have said so far. Parmenides had pointed out that some possible way to 
perform the exercise, for example, he said that we may assume ifLikeness is and 
what will follow, also, we need to consider what will follow ifLikeness is not. 
Similarly, we are to consider what follows i fMany is and i fMany is not. Yet, 
according to the methodological remarks, we are to start from three alternatives, 
not only that we will consider i f the subject is and if the subject is not, we will also 
consider what follows if the subject has any other affection. Strangely enough, 
when Parmenides moves on to further elaborate his exercise procedure, the third 
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alternative is never mentioned again. Parmenides simply points out that one starts 
from hypothesis and so on, then one next goes on to suppose that what one 
originally hypothesized is not the case. Thus, not only that the methodological 
remarks is intemally incoherent, it also disagrees with those few examples that 
Parmenides has cited so far. 
Furthermore, if we stick to the original three alternatives, it doesn't agree 
with the structure of the second half. It tums out that we will consider if the Unity 
is，or if the Unity is not, or if the Unity undergoes any other affections ( 3X ), what 
follows for the Unity or the Others ( 2X ), in relation to itself or in relation to 
Others ( 2X ). Thus, we are expecting 12 sections, yet, only a person with God's 
intelligence can chop up the second halfinto 12 sections. 
According to Meinwald, the trouble can be resolved by alternating the 
placement of some punctuation. Since punctuation is the work ofeditors and not 
part ofPlato's text, the placement of punctuation could be a rather interpretative 
issue.^ Unfortunately, I do not read Greek and therefore I really can't tell such 
alternation of punctuation suggested by Meinwald is legitimate. Anyway, let us 
summarize how the methodological remarks will read after the alternation by 
Meinwald: 
One's initial hypothesis may have any one of the following three forms: 
something is, something is not, or something has any other affection. One 
starts from this hypothesis, and must derives results from it for the subject 
in relation to itself, and for the subject in relation to the others, and then 
for the others in relation to themselves and for the others in relation to the 
subject. One next goes on to suppose that what one originally 
74 
hypothesized is not the case, and derives in tum results for the subject in 
relation to itself, and for the subject in relation to the others, and then for 
the others in relation to themselves and finally for the others in relation to 
the subject.7 
Thus, according Meinwald's reading, the exercise will allow hypothesis of 
three particular forms. We may hypothesize ifUnity is, then we consider what will 
follow in four sections, next, we consider if the hypothesis is not the case and then 
make four more deductions. However, we may also begin the exercise with a 
hypothesis that something has any other affection. For example, we can start from 
ifUnity is or Unity is not ( the first two forms ofhypothesis ), or that ifUnity is 
many ( the third possible form ofhypothesis that something having other affection 
)• In case ofUnity is not, we will also consider ifit is not the case that ifUnity is 
not and make four more deductions. In case ofUnity is many, we will also consider 
ifUnity is not many and make four more deductions. Thus, the beginning of the 
methodological remarks does not force us to consider all three alternatives, rather, 
it simply specifies what sort ofhypothesis we may begin with in this exercise. 
Next, Permenides suggests that the subject of the hypothesis is the Form 
Unity. Thus, the original hypothesis is: ifUnity is and we are to make four 
deductions from this hypothesis, next, we will also consider if the original 
hypothesis is not the case, that is, ifUnity is not and we will make four more 
deductions. The ordering of the second half then, according to Meinwald's edition 
of the methodological remarks, should be: 
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I. IfUnity is, what follows for the Unity in relation to itself. 
II. IfUnity is, what follows for the Unity in relation to others. 
III. IfUnity is，what follows for the others in relation to the Unity. 
IV. IfUnity is, what follows for the others in relation to themselves. 
V. IfUnity is not，what follows for the Unity in relation to itself. 
VI. IfUnity is not, what follows for the Unity in relation to others. 
VII. IfUnity is not, what follows for the others in relation to Unity. 
VIII. IfUnity is not, what follows for the others in relation to themselves.^ 
Notice that although Plato will consider all these eight alternatives, the 
ordering that I have summarized so far is not strictly observed. That is to say, Plato 
may have other reasons to discuss some sections first before he moves on to the 
next section. As a matter of fact, Plato chooses to discuss VI first before he re-
addresses V, also, Plato discusses VIII and then he finally comes back to VII to 
complete his deductions. 
Also notice that the notion ‘‘ Others “ is quite ambiguous. As we shall see in 
the second half, Parmenides will eventually points out that “ others “ should refer 
to those things and Forms that is other than the Form Unity. Thus we have, on the 
one hand, the Form Unity and on the other hand, other Forms and things that are 
set in contrast to the Form Unity. Notice that ‘‘ others ‘‘ is not simply an entity, 
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rather, the notion denotes a set of things and Forms that is set in contrast to the 
Form Unity. 
I f " others “ is to be understood this way, we will have no problem 
regarding Hyp II, III, VI and VII. In these four deductions, we are to consider how 
the Form Unity relates to other Forms or things, or how these other Forms and 
things relate to the Form Unity, if Unity is or is not. Yet, IV and VIII are 
ambiguous, in what way these other Forms and things are related to themselves? 
Supposedly, there should be two alternatives. To make my point more clear, let us 
assume that there are only three Forms whatsoever; Unity, Difference and Being. 
Since the subject of the exercise is the Form Unity, the two other Forms will be 
automatically grouped together to form the set “ others “ When considering others 
in relation to themselves, we can consider ( first alternative ): 
a) Difference in relation to itself. 
b) Being in relation to itself. 
When considering both a) and b) together, we are indeed considering the 
others in relation to themselves. To a certain degree, we are considering each 
Form, by virtue of itself, and then collectively speaking, all these Forms other than 
Unity, by virtue of themselves. In fact, we are talking about their natures in 
general. ( Notice that at this point, we are considering the others collectively, not 
distributively. I fwe are considering each of these others, certainly, Difference and 
Being will have their particular or unique nature ). 
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On the other hand, we can have a broader sense o f " others in relation to 
themselves “： 
a) Difference in relation to itself. 
b) Being in relation to itself. 
c) Difference in relation to Being. 
d) Being in relation to Difference. 
In this case, unlike the first alternative, we are also considering how these 
others relate to one another. At this point, it is not clear whether Plato is 
considering a broader sense of relation or not. However, as it tums out, the 
distinction I mentioned above is not applicable to Hyp IV and VIII because in these 
two hypotheses, Plato is considering these “ others “ prior to their participation in 
the Form Unity. Without displaying unity, it is impossible for these “ others “ to 
relate to each other as part to whole or whole to part. 
Thus far, we have settled the format of the exercise and that we should 
expect eight hypotheses in the second half. Before we move on to look at the 
exercise in the second half, I want to discuss briefly some different approaches to 
the Parmenides. 
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Chapter 5: A Preview of Different Approaches to the Parmenides 
In the second half of the Parmenides, we are facing two types of 
contradiction; intersection contradiction and intrasection contradiction. 
Intrasection contradictions are easy to resolve because when Parmenides says “ the 
Unity is in motion and at rest “，he is simply dropping the qualifier. In fact. Unity is 
in motion from one perspective and at rest from another perspective. Thus Helen is 
and is not beautiful is true in a sense that Helen is beautiful physically and not 
beautiful morally. In the course ofhis dialectical exercise, Parmenides does specify 
the circumstance and the perspectives that he is relying on in reaching his 
conclusion. Only when he is summarizing the results of these deductions, he drops 
those qualifications. Thus, the contradiction is only apparent if we pay attention to 
how Parmenides reaches his conclusions. 
Intersection contradiction, on the other hand, is more troublesome. It seems 
we can no more appeal to circumstance or perspective. Ifthe contradiction is real, 
then it is destructive, it seems to me that it is hopeless to find any solution to the 
problem of the first half unless we believe that Plato is doing what Zeno had done 
in the first half: that is to pay them back in the same coin with something to spare. 
In others words, Plato's position is: I have nothing to say of your criticism, but I 
tell you what, that your theory is having more trouble than mine.^ Thus, the second 
halfis a criticism of other theories and those contradictions suggest that their 
theories are even worse. I don't think this approach makes any sense at all. lt is 
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doubtful whether a sincere philosopher like Plato will use this strategy. Further, it 
doesn't agree with the text. IfHyp 1 is a denial ofhistorical Parmenides' 
homogeneous sphere, Plato should stop right at the point when he concludes that 
the Unity has no shape. Yet, Plato moves on until he concludes that the Unity is 
not one. Not only that Plato has refuted historical Parmenidean thesis, deduction as 
such also inflicts damage to Plato's Theory ofForms. 
On the other hand, the text does not suggest this sort o f " paying-back ‘‘ 
strategy. First ofall, in the concluding part of the first half, Parmenides points out 
that the young Socrates' impulse toward argument for Forms is noble and divine. 
Also, according to Parmenides, the trouble for the young Socrates is that he posits 
Forms too soon before he is trained properly ( Parmenides, 135d ) and this is the 
job of the second half to provide such training. All these exchanges between the 
young Socrates and Parmenides suggest that we are to look for something 
constructive from the second half. 
Thus, there are many scholars who believe that intersection contradiction is 
only apparent and look for ways to resolve it. I believe that this approach is more 
reasonable and it also agrees with what Parmenides had said so far that with these 
training - we shall have more insight on Forms. However, these scholars agree on 





5.1 Rejectionist's approach 
According to the rejectionist, the contradictions in the second half are real 
owing to some false premises or false rule of inferences. Thus, the second half 
becomes an exercise oireductio ad absurdum, our job is to detect the false 
premise that generates the trouble. According to Meinwald, the target premise is 
not explicitly stated and that tells against rejectionism because normal reductio will 
require the vulnerable element to be stated beforehand. Furthermore, Meinwald 
points out that the respondent, Aristotle, shows no expression of dissatisfaction at 
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those contradictions. 
However, I think Meinwald's criticism is oversimplified. It is true that 
Parmenides never tells us what premise is vulnerable and that Aristotle usually 
does not usually show any sign of doubt in the course of deduction. Thus, it is true 
that normal reductio procedure does not work. 
Yet, the very fact that Plato not pointing out some vulnerable elements does 
not mean that there is nothing wrong in the deduction. As a matter offact, Miller 
believes in a more subtle form ofrejectionism ( again. Miller would not accept this 
label, nonetheless, given rejectionism defined as such. Miller's approach does 
belong to this group ). According to Miller, it is the readers' job to see through 
these contradictions and to detect any false premise that Parmenides implicitly 
assumed in the course of deduction. On the other hand, the unreflective and 
unphilosophical manner of Aristotle serves as a waming or a counter-example to 
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the readers of the Parmenides - that they are not to follow Aristotle, unlike 
Aristotle who gives green light to every steps of inference, the readers are wamed 
not to do so, instead, given the failure of Aristotle, the readers are to reflect at 
every steps. Thus, when Parmenides assumes that to be is to be in time at the end 
of Hyp I and argues that Unity is not one, the readers cannot but object to the 
assumption and eventually see through the trouble of this assumption and regrasp 
the timelessness ofForms.^ 
The reason why I point out Miller's rejectionist approach is that a lack of 
vulnerable elements and the unreflective Aristotle is not altogether incompatible 
with reductio. ln fact, the manipulation of characters by Plato as such may even 
stir us to think more on the issue and eventually able to reject some hidden 
premises. The only thing that tells against rejectionism, I believe, is that i fwe are 
able to argue that the deduction in the second half is true and thus there is nothing 
to reject. 
5.2 Ambiguity Theory^ 
According to the Ambiguity Theory, it is not any false premise that creates 
the trouble, it is some ambiguities in the subject ‘' the Unity “ or “ the Others “ that 
are the source of perplexities/' Once we identify the ambiguity of those terms, the 
contradiction is only apparent. Thus, Plato does not explicitly state his false 
assumption, rather, the falsity is hidden in the ambiguity ofcertain terms in the 
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exercise. Again, normal reductio procedure doesn't work, yet, we are still looking 
for something to reject, or to clarify. To a certain degree. Ambiguity Theory is only 
a sub-division of rejectionism because Ambiguity Theory is looking for problems 
in the exercise, once detecting the ambiguity of those terms in the exercise, we 
modify or clarify them. The basic strategy is the same; that is to detect fallacy. Yet, 
Ambiguity Theory does more than that, it also clarifies different senses of the 
subject so that contradiction becomes apparent. Cornford is one of those advocates 
of the Ambiguity Theory. Once detecting the ambiguities in the terms “ Unity “ 
and “ Others “, he clarifies them and according to Cornford, it tums out that these 
terms have different meanings. Thus, starting from the Ambiguity Theory, 
Comford continues his quest on the second half with the multi-subject approach. 
5.3 Multi-subject approach^ 
Since it is the ambiguities of the notion “ Unity “ and “ Others “ that create 
trouble, Comford points out that “ Unity “ in Hyp I and Hyp II means different 
things. In Hyp 1, Unity refers to the Form Unity while in Hyp II, Unity refers to a 
one entity. Thus, intersection contradiction becomes apparent because different 
subjects are being discussed in different sections. However, this approach is 
drawing heavy criticism from many commentators. According to Allen: 
The ambiguity theory, and the serial order of hypothesis it requires, is 
defective in that it distorts the structure ofeverything that follows. So far 
from resting on a textual base, it is inconsistent with that base: it requires 
that the conclusions Parmenides explicitly draws at 160b and 166c which 
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are contradictory, be dismissed as merely ostensible; it requires that the 
initial arguments of each deduction, which are presented as inferences 
from the same hypothesis, be treated as disguised definitions marking off 
different hypothesis; it requires that Parmenides' own introduction to the 
exercise, and his own statement of what is to be examined, namely, the 
Idea of Unity, be ignored; and finally, it requires that the clearly 
demarcated and antithetical structure of what follows be dismissed, and a 
serial structure not present be substituted in it place. With deference to 
and immense respect for two of the greatest Platonist ( referring to 
Cornford and Proclus ) who have ever written on the Fannenides, we must 
conclude that the ambiguity theory is not an interpretation but a failure to 
interpret, for it ignores structure.^ 
Allen points out that according to the methodological remarks in 136b-c, 
there is only one hypothesis; that Unity is. However, for those who believe that 
there is only one subject in the exercise, their task to make sense out o f the second 
half is no more easier. I f the subject is always the same, then they have to explain 
how the Unity is neither/nor in Hyp I but the Unity is both/and in Hyp II. There are 
at least three ways ( as far as I know) to achieve the task. For Chen, he eventually 
denies halfof the results of the second half and claims that the Unity is no more in 
itself, by itself, rather, i f w e are to avoid the negative result o fHyp I, we will have 
to admit that Forms must commune with each other.() Other scholars such as Miller 
and Allen, they blame the inexperienced Aristotle because it is he who allowed 
Parmenides to manipulate the argument this way. Eventually, these scholars pay 
their attention of what sort of mistake Aristotle is making unconsciously]() Thus, 
the inexperienced Aristotle tums out to be a very valuable counter-example. This is 
so called the dialectical approach. ( I am quite uncomfortable with the term ‘‘ 
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dialectical ‘‘ because the term, I believe, had been abused, not only that Miller and 
Allen explicitly say that the exercise is dialectical, in fact, many other scholars also 
described the second half as dialectical exercise but in fact their approach to the 
second half is totally different from Miller and Allen.) I shall come back to the 
dialectical approach shortly. 
The third approach to resolve these intersection contradictions is to assume 
that the subject is always the same but we are looking at the same subject from 
different perspectives. Meinwald and Peterson are among those who try to resolve 
the contradiction by appealing to perspective difference. Therefore,'they explore 
on the “ in-relation-to "qualification. I shall also come back to this shortly. 
It is indeed that case that multi-subject approach distorts the structure of the 
exercise to a certain degree. It seems there is no indication from the second half 
that we are actually dealing a term with different meanings. However, take a closer 
look at Comford's approach, although he believes that there is ambiguity in the 
subject and thus “ Unity “ should mean different things in different sections, he 
does attempt to restore that structure. For example, “ the one which is “ in Hyp II， 
though it is different from the bare Unity in Hyp 1, Comford indeed points out that 
“ the One which is ‘‘ in Hyp II partakes of Being and Unity. Again, the subject is a 
not simply a mere one entity, rather, it also partakes in the Unity." Further, in Hyp 
III and IV, it is indeed the case that the Others must have different meanings, 
otherwise, how can we account for the Others as other ones in Hyp III but Others 
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as mere multitude in Hyp IV. Thus, before we criticize any multi-subject approach 
or Ambiguity Theory, we must first look at how they try to restore the structure and 
relate the second half to the first half. 
Further, although Allen believes that there is no ambiguity in “ the Unity “， 
there is ambiguity in some other terms: 
What is to be understood by ‘ the Other '? The phase has recurred often in 
what has gone before, usually in reference to other things, which partake 
of Ideas, but sometimes in reference to things that are simply different 
from a given Idea. Since it has been assumed that sensible participants in 
Ideas may have a substantial existence of their own, it follows that the 
others may be considered either in their character as participants, or in 
their character as other, apart from participation. The phrase ‘ the Others ‘ 
is thus ambiguous, but the ambiguity is systematic, predicated on 
Socrates' own admissions, and in effect in what follows is a direct 
function of the consequences for Unity that are adduced.^^ 
Even Allen, being a critics of the Ambiguity Theory, must admit that there 
are some other ambiguities in the exercise. His difference between the Ambiguity 
Theory, then, is between systematic ambiguity and non-systematic ambiguity. 
Thus, while denying multi-subject approach to the Unity, Allen admits that there is 
ambiguity in the term “ the Others “ and he supplies to it with different meanings. 
Eventually, Allen adopts multi-subject approach to “ the Others “ 
5.4 Dialectical Approach 
According to this approach, that the arguments in the exercise should not be 
treated as their face value. We must see through these perplexities in order to 
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advance our understanding. According to the Argument from Opposite in the 
Republic, that the same thing appears equal and unequal will call upon our 
thought, if we think through this perplexity, we advance our understanding and 
grasp the notion of absolute Equality. ( Republic, 475c-480a) Thus, the dialectical 
approach believes that Plato wants us to work out the perplexities by ourselves and 
that we are all able to do this if we are given the right guidance or a perplexity that 
is carefully laid out. We have found this optimistic view on human nature in both 
the Mem and the Phaedo, that we are capable of making correct inference and that 
the slave boy, ifgiven correct guidance, is capable of discovering certain 
geometrical truth by himself]� The dialectical approach suggests that the second 
halfis doing exactly this: that the perplexities are carefully calculated for us to see 
through them and advance our understanding. 
In addition, according to Allen and Miller, the choice of respondent, 
Aristotle, a future thirties, further supports such a dialectical structure. Since 
Aristotle is inexperienced, he will make mistakes along the deduction, we are not 
to follow him.i4 Thus, every Parmenides' moves that is endorsed by Aristotle 
becomes a point of reflection. For Allen and Miller, instead ofblaming the 
• ambiguities on certain terms, they blame Aristotle. That it is Aristotle who 
generates the contradictions as such, and the readers will learn from Aristotle's 
failure and not to repeat the same mistake. 
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The dialectical approach also has certain drawbacks. First of all, whether or 
not Aristotle was totally naive is questionable. In 135d, Parmenides points out that 
the young Socrates and Aristotle has discussed Forms the other day. Thus, in the 
dialogue, the character Aristotle must have some basic understandings on Forms. 
Also, according to Comford, although he drops most of the Aristotle's response in 
the second half, he does preserve those occasions when Aristotle does not agree 
with Parmenides or that he is showing signs of doubt in his response.'^ As a matter 
offact, Aristotle is not totally inexperienced and he does in some occasions 
question Parmenides' inference. 
It seems to me that Aristotle is not totally naive, through we can argue that 
he made certain mistakes in the course of the arguments. Perhaps, we are not to 
doubt every moves that Aristotle endorsed. Yet, in case when even Aristotle is 
showing signs ofdoubt in the deduction, we must look into it ( in fact, I think any 
approach to the second half, not only dialectical approach, should look into such 
occasion). 
On the other hand, not only that any Aristotle's response becomes a point of 
reflection, as claimed by Miller, when Parmenides does not explicitly lay out the 
reason or the assumption in the course of arguments, these also become points of 
reflection. It seems to me that sometimes Miller is going too far. 
Notice that dialectical approach is compatible with the ambiguity theory and 
the rejectionist's approach. Sometimes, it is the case that the contradictions in the 
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second half are caused by ambiguity in certain terms or some false premises. Thus, 
when seeing through these perplexities, the dialectical approach may suggest 
different meanings in certain terms or introduce a new premise that can ‘‘ correct “ 
the false deduction. For example. Miller points out that the One in Hyp 1 and Hyp 
11 refer to different things. In Hyp I, the One should refer to any eternal and unique 
Form, while in Hyp II, the One should refer to any temporal, composite “ one thing 
“16 Thus, although I have pointed out some different approaches to the 
Parmenides, these approaches I have discussed so far are compatible with each 
other in many cases. 
Finally, for the sake of a more fruitful discussion in the Parmenides, I think 
it is necessary to have a more restrict definition o f " dialectical “• Notice that in the 
second half we have contradictions pile up with contradictions, any attempt to 
understand the second half must somehow tries to explain or resolve these 
contradictions, lfdialectical approach is to be understood as any attempt to see 
through these contradictions, then perhaps we will have to admit that Meinwald's 
and Chen's approach are also dialectical because these scholars also try to resolve 
these contradictions somehow ( although their approaches are quite different to 
that ofMiller and Allen ). I suggest that we should have a narrow definition o f " 
dialectical approach “ :- any attempt which believes in the Plato's manipulation of 
the character Aristotle and Parmenides, and that Aristotle serves as a counter-
example, and therefore we are to dojust the opposite ofAristotle -1 shall consider 
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this sort ofapproach as dialectical. I believe that this definition has certain 
advantage: first of all, as I have pointed out earlier, the term “ dialectical “ has 
been used indiscriminately, which at some point we really don't know what it 
means ( Meinwald and Cornford also claim that the second half is dialectical, yet, 
their approaches are altogether different ) .�Second ly , this definition helps us to 
mark offcertain approaches to the second half and gives me some convenience in 
my discussion of the second half. According to this definition. Miller and Allen 
clearly belong to this approach while Meinwald, Comford, and Chen are marked 
off from it. 
Notice that although I have pointed out some different approaches to the 
Parmenides, in fact, when dealing with a particular commentator, the situation is 
more complicated than this. Usually, we will find that these commentators have a 
mixed approach rather than a single approach. For example, Comford's approach 
is a mixture ofambiguity theory, rejectionism, and multi-subject approach^ Also, 
Miller's approach is a mixture of dialectical ( narrow sense )，multi-subject, and 
rejectionism. Anyway, let me move on to discuss Comford's approach in further 
details. 
5.5 Cornford's Approach 
As I have mentioned above, Comford's approach to the second half is a 
mixed one. Cornford's mixed approach is further complicated by the fact that 
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according to Cornford, the second half is not simply a discussion of ambiguity or 
different notion o f " One “ and ‘‘ Others “, it is also a discussion of the dispute 
between Parmenidean maxim that all is one and the Pythagorean evolution of 
plurality. It tums out that Comford's approach is also a historical approach. 
Further, Cornford explicitly says that the second halfof the Parmenides is a 
challenge to the student to discover for himself the ambiguities of the hypothesis 
and any fallacies there may be in the form of deductions.^^ Although Comford 
does not blame Aristotle for these fallacies, he still maintains that the deduction 
laid out as such is a challenge for the student to see through it. Thus, to a certain 
degree, Cornford treats the second half as dialectical. 
Yet, in his translation, he omits most of the Aristotle's responses which will 
somehow distort the dialectical structure. ( Certainly, Miller and Allen will not 
omit these responses because these responses are philosophical illuminating ) 
Nevertheless, Comford preserves those responses which show any sign of doubt 
on Parmenides's inferences. 
ln short, if Comford's analysis is correct, then Plato had done the following 
things in the Parmenides: 
1) Exploring on the ambiguities in certain notions such as “ Unity “, “ 
others “，“ is “ and “ is not “. 
2) Inserting false premises in the deduction for the readers to detect. 
3) Laying out perplexities purposefully for the readers to see through it. 
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4) As against the historical Parmenides, Plato has shown that the one being 
is not a homogeneous sphere. 
5) As against the Eleatic thesis that a one is, and yet a plurality ofbeings is 
irrational, Plato has offered a brilliant refutation to it. 
6) While denying the Parmenidean One, Plato at the same time restored the 
whole course of the Pythagorean evolution o f a manifold world from the One, 
through numbers and geometrical magnitudes, to physical bodies in space. 
7) On the issue of separateness of Forms in the Phaedo, Plato has offered 
argument to reject it in the second half. 
8) Regarding Parmenides' criticism of the Theory ofForms in the first half, 
Plato has solved some of the puzzles, namely, the dilemma of participation. 
Since Comford's approach is a mixed one, commentators sometimes focus 
on a particular aspect of Comford's approach while ignore or overlook other 
aspects. Thus, we have Meinwald criticizes on the rejectionist's approach of 
Comford, Allen criticizes on the ambiguity theory and multi-subject approach. 
Miller's criticism, on the other hand, is milder. First ofall, Miller points out that 
Allen's reason against Comford's ambiguity theory is not sufficient. Yet, Miller 
admits that Comford's omission ofAristotle's response is nonetheless a distortion 
on the dialectical structure?() 
Nevertheless, I think many ofthese criticisms are unfair to Comford. Notice 
that although Cornford omits most of Aristotle's responses, he still preserves those 
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cases when Aristotle is showing some sign ofdoubt. For Cornford, this is good 
enough because he adopts a milder dialectical approach. On the other hand, to say 
that Cornford's ambiguity theory ignores structure is problematic, as we shall see, 
i f " others “ is not to have different definitions, it would be extremely difficult for 
Cornford to resolve the intersection contradiction between Hyp III and Hyp IV. In 
fact, others must mean other ones in Hyp III and in Hyp IV, it must mean unlimited 
multitude other than Unity, indeed, the text supports such definition. ( Notice that 
at this point, it seems that I am defending Comford's ambiguity, however, 1 am 
not. All I have said so far is that their criticisms is unfair to Comford. In fact, the 
reason why Cornford must rely on ambiguity theory is that he does not successfully 
spell out the significance of the methodological remarks, according to the 
methodological remarks, we will have a section considering what follow for the 
others in relation to Unity, ifUnity is. For me, it is clear enough that since we are 
considering these others having a share of Unity, they are certainly displaying the 
features unity, that each of them is one. Thus, I also disagree with Cornford's 
ambiguity theory, not because he ignores structure, or that others cannot mean 
different thing, rather, it is that according to the methodological remarks, we are to 
consider different relation between Unity and others, m one case, when others 
relate to Unity, we have other ones, in other case, when we consider others in 
relation to themselves, their nature gives them unlimited in multitude. To a certain 
degree, others mean differently in different sections, not because others have 
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different meanings, but because we are conceiving others in different relation to 
different Forms. Others, throughout the second half, mean the same, yet, when 
relate to different Forms，they display different features. Thus, Comford, I believe, 
does not totally miss the point. In fact, given that he is not able to spell out the 
significance of the methodological remarks, he has done a great job. ) 
Regarding Comford's historical approach, 1 think it is problematic. The first 
half, as I see it, is not a battle between the Eleatic thesis and Pythagorean thesis. 
Rather, it is the Theory ofForms that is in trouble. In fact, i fmy discussion on the 
first half is correct that these paradoxes have their roots in the Phaedo and the 
Republic^^ it is very reasonable to expect that Plato would re-address these 
problems elsewhere and I believe that this is what Plato is doing in the 
Parmenides. Anyhow, perhaps Cornford is true to point out that the motivation for 
Plato's Theory of Forms is to save the phenomenon and at the same time to keep 
the Parmenidean maxim. Also, it may also be the case that Plato is influenced by 
the Pythagorean tradition as suggested by Cornford's historical analysis, especially 
in his generation ofnumbers from “ the One which is “ in the Hyp II. Therefore, it 
is very likely that Plato was under the influences ofboth of these traditions and 
eventually developed and modified his Theory ofForms. Yet, it may not be the 
case that in the Parmenides Plato is putting both ofthese traditions on the stage 
and discusses how they have influenced his own thought and eventually sides with 
one of them but denies the other. 
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Another potential trouble for Comford is that he is not able to work out the 
relation between the puzzles in the first halfand exercise in the second half. It is 
important to know how Plato formulated his thought and how Plato was influenced 
by different philosophical traditions. Yet it is more important to know how Plato 
solved the puzzles in the first half. Notice that these two “ how “ questions are 
related and it is indeed the case our ability to answer the first “ how “ question will 
throw light on our understanding of the second “ how “ question. Nevertheless, in 
Cornford's works, he only focuses on the first “ how “ and his coverage on the 
second “ how “ is only minimal. I fmy summary of Cornford's analysis is correct, 
then Comford has only addressed the dilemma of participation and the solution 
Plato offered, according to Comford, is simply a call or an advice for not to shrink 
n 
from the dilemma, in fact, this is hardly a solution at all. 
Although I have pointed out some troubles of Comford's approach, his 
approach, afterall, is compatible with many other approaches. It seems to me that 
there are indeed some ambiguities in terms such as “ Unity “ and “ others “， 
without different definitions of the term “ others “，one simply cannot go through 
the deduction in Hyp III and Hyp IV. In fact, any attempt to resolve the intersection 
contradictions must somehow assume that these crucial terms mean differently in 
different hypotheses. Further, not only that we must assume such different 
meanings, the text itself also suggests that these terms must mean differently.^^ As 
we have seen, Allen has also assumed some “ systematic “ ambiguities in the term 
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“ others “ Also, as we shall see in the next few paragraphs, Comford's ambiguity 
theory is also compatible with Meinwald's analytic approach. For Meinwald, when 
others are conceived in relation to Unity, each is one and we thus have many “ 
other ones “ Eventually, Meinwald will also admit that terms such as “ Unity “ and 
“ others “ mean differently in different hypotheses. Nonetheless, Meinwald differs 
from Comford in the explanation of these ambiguities or differences in meaning. 
For Comford, Plato is capitalizing on the ambiguities ofthese terms and the 
puzzles thus created in the second half are philosophical illuminating. For 
Meinwald, it is rather that according to the methodological remarks, we are to 
conceive the same notion in relation to different Forms in different hypotheses. 
Anyway, to have a full-scale discussion on Comford's analysis would 
require another paper. Therefore, I will stop at this point and move forward to 
discuss briefly on two other approaches to the Parmenides. I will first discuss 
Meinwald's analytic approach and then Chen's approach. 
5.6 Meinwald's analytic approach 
According to Meinwald, the distinction between pros heauto ( in relation to 
itself) predication and pros ta alla ( in relation to others ) predication is vitally 
important in our understanding of the second half. Although the distinction is not 
explicitly mentioned in the second half, the methodological remarks certainly 
endorse such distinction.^^ Let us now tum to this important distinction. 
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Pros heauto predication: according to Meinwald, predicates hold of a 
subject in relation to itself when they are properly connected with the subject's 
nature. That in the second half, the Unity is X in relation to itself when being X is 
a part ofbeing Unity. Thus when we are looking into pros heauto predication, we 
are trying to determine whether the nature o f X is part of the nature ofUnity. In 
25 
pros heauto predication, we are concerning relations between natures. ^  
Further, Meinwald believes that the relation between natures is somewhat 
1 r • . • 
like a genus-species relation. To illustrate the idea, we might imagine a tree 
showing the animal. We can imagine dividing animal into vertebrate and 
invertebrate, and dividing vertebrate in tum into mammal and so on. ln the 
Sophist, according to Meinwald, Plato devotes a great deal of attention to such 
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trees, ln such a tree, a kind A appears either directly below or far below another 
kind B if B is a part o fwhat is to be A. In this case, we can say, A is B pros 
heauto. Some other example of true predication pros heauto are: 
The Just is Virtuous. 
Dancing Moves. 
The Just isjust.28 
That the Just is Virtuous pros heauto is true because being virtuous is part 
of what is to be just. Also, dancing moves is true because motion is part of the 
account of dancing. For Meinwald，the most trouble-some predication is the third 
statement which we usually classify as self-predication. According to Meinwald, 
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that the Just is just is uninformative but safe. So far, Meinwald's discussion on 
pros heauto predication is quite convincing. Yet, her treatment of self-predication 
is very problematic. If my analysis is correct that Equality is equal absolutely and 
that its being equal is circumstance and perspective independent, then self-
predication is not simply uninformative and safe, rather, Plato should regard self-
predication as most true and perhaps most informative. 
Pros ta alla predication: Pros ta alla predication is in fact a binary relation 
between a displayer and the characteristic the displayer displays. For example, 
The stone is hot pros ta alla. 
In this case, the stone is the displayer and hot is the displayed characteristic. 
However, not all predication pros ta alla is true. For example. 
The stone is just pros ta alla. 
It is false because the stone lacks the ability to display Justice. Also, 
The Form Justice is just pros ta alla. 
This is false because Justice as a Form lacks the ability to displayjustice ( That 
Justice is just absolutely, Justice doesn't display just, but be it). In short, 
predication pros ta alla concerns the displays of features by a displayer. 
If we apply the pros heauto/pros ta alla distinction to the second half, 
intersection contradictions are resolved. That the Unity is not many pros heauto 
and that the Unity is many pros ta alla is not a contradiction. We simply look at 
the same subject at different perspectives. Further, the distinction is relevant to the 
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dilemma in the first half. That Largeness is large pros heauto and that John is large 
pros ta alla, since they belong to two different types of predication or truth, a 
regress, at least in principle, will not get cranked up and the Third Man, according 
to Meinwald, is thus gone.]() 
Also notice that pros heauto/pros ta alla distinction is also compatible with 
some scholars' distinction between being and having. Michael Frede, in his recent 
article “ Plato 's Sophist on False Statements “，suggests the distinction between 
being and having. Frede makes the distinction in connection with the Sophist 255c 
in which, he says, Plato alludes to this distinction, but does not spell it out; there 
Plato says that some beings are said to be of themselves, others with reference to 
other things.3i Nicholas P. White also has a very detail discussion on self-
^ ^ 
predication in his article “ Plato ’s Metaphysical Epistemohgy “ Finally, Allen, 
in his translation and analysis of the Parmenides, makes a very similar distinction 
that should be kept in mind in order to avoid the regress. According to Allen; 
There is a gulfbetween being and having - or ifyou will, a separation." 
Unfortunately, Allen does not apply this distinction in his analysis of the 
second half and therefore I do not know how important this distinction is for Allen. 
Notice that the distinction being/having suggested by Allen, Frede and 
White, although is compatible with Meinwald'spros heauto/pros ta alla 
distinction. White's and Frede's distinction has more metaphysical implication. 
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Unlike Meinwald who suggests that self-predication is unimformative but safe. 
White attempts to spell out the metaphysical significance of self-predication.^^ 
Finally, Meinwald discusses only a few arguments in the second half and I 
regard most of those arguments she discussed as relatively easy .�� There are some 
very difficult arguments, such as the One is not one in Hyp I, that deserves some 
attention but Meinwald offers no explanation. 
Thus, to a certain degree, Meinwald's discussion of the Parmenides is 
incomplete. The trouble for Meinwald is that she did not discuss all the arguments 
in the second half, especially those very difficult arguments, she offers no 
explanation. Certainly, no one will be convinced by such approach ifthese 
difficulty arguments are left unattended. 
Recently, Prof. Peterson, works out some of these difficult arguments based 
on Meinwald's principle and we are moving one more step closer to the truth. I 
will come back to this in my discussion ofHyp 1.^ ^ Also, Prof. Peterson clears up 
some problems regarding self-predication. In our discussion of Hyp I, I will have a 
more detail discussion ofProf. Peterson's position. Let's now tum to Chen's 
approach. 
5.7 Chen's approach 
Both Comford and Meinwald try to resolve the contradictions of the second 
half. For Comford, it is those different definitions o f a seemingly same subject that 
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creates the trouble. For Meinwald, the meaning of a subject is always the same, 
instead, it is that the same subject is conceived in different ways. Anyhow, both 
Meinwald and Cornford attempt to resolve the contradictions. Chen's approach is 
quite different, for Chen, instead of looking for resolution to the contradictions of 
the second half, we should look for confirmation. For example, that the Unity is not 
even one in Hyp I, according to Chen, is a confirmation of the trouble of the young 
Socrates. While the young Socrates maintains the separateness of Forms and gets 
into trouble, the persona Parmenides once again shows him that ifForms are 
separated from each other, he is to face all those negative consequences in Hyp I ? 
We are perplexed i fwe are expecting solution from the second halfbecause what 
we get from the second half seems to be even worse. According to Chen, we will 
be no more perplexed if we give up our hope on any middle theory and look ahead 
for a major overhaul of the Theory ofForms. Thus, those four negative sections in 
the second halfwill serve as a confirmation of the trouble in the middle theory. On 
the other hand, those four positive sections are a preliminary outline of Plato's new 
Theory ofForms. For Chen, this new Theory of Forms, strictly speaking, is not 
Platonic anymore ( i f we consider “ separation “ as a major criterion for Platonic 
38 
Forms ) because these new Forms are no more separated. 
At this point, our discussion on Chen's approach is a little vague and a 
clearer picture will emerge after we discuss Chen's notion o f " separation “ and his 
understanding of the young Socrates' Theory ofForms. According to Chen, the 
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Theory of Forms proposed by the young Socrates in the first half does not belong 
to Plato himself. So now the question is to whom does this Theory ofPhysical 
Forms belong to? Chen cannot tell exactly who proposed this theory, but Chen 
insists that it is good enough for us to keep in mind that young Socrates does not 
^ Q 
represent Plato's own position； Anyway, Chen's opinion is based on two reasons, 
let us examine each in turn; 
I) Unlike that of the Phaedo and the Republic, the young Socrates treats 
Forms as physical objects - according to Chen, although the notion “ separation “ is 
explicitly defined in both the Phaedo and the Republic, we can infer that 
separation ofForms means an ontological and epistemological priority ofForms 
over sensible objects,() For example, the one over many argument, obviously, we 
are not to understand that we have one Form up in the sky while many particulars 
are on the ground, treating the relationship “ over “ physically or spatially as such 
is certainly non-sense. Instead, we should understand “ over “ in a metaphysical 
and epistemological sense - that the Form is ontologically prior to sensibles ( recall 
that Form is but sensible is and is not) , and also. Forms are epistemologically more 
stable than sensibles ( recall that Forms do not suffer from the appearance of 
opposite but sensibles do and that Forms are the notion that fix our thought). 
Further, Chen points out that “ separation “ in the Phaedo and the Republic also 
refers to the degree ofperfection. That sensible always falls short o fF , and only F-
ness is F fully or perfectly. Yet, in the first half, according to Chen，the young 
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Socrates treats Forms physically and spatially.^^ Regarding the spatiality of Forms 
proposed by the young Socrates, Chen quotes Parmenides 131 b: 
Therefore, being one and the same, it will be present at once and as a 
whole in things that are many and separated, and thus it would be 
separated from itself. 
I am very surprised that Chen quotes this passage. First ofall, it is not the 
young Socrates who says this, instead, it is Parmenides who replies to the young 
Socrates. Secondly, and perhaps most important, the young Socrates never agrees 
with Parmenides at this point and he proposes the sail analogy trying to erase 
Parmenides' criticism. Finally, 131bdeals with the problem of participation, it is 
not a proposal ofphysical Forms, ln fact, the young Socrates makes only one 
speech regarding Forms in 129a -130a. After that, Parmenides starts a series of 
criticism regarding this version of Form and cross-examines with the young 
Socrates regarding some ambiguities in his speech. It tums out that the young 
Socrates cannot handle the issue of participation and that if the issue of 
participation cannot be understood properly, a Form will be separated from itself. 
This is Parmenides' criticism in 131b, this is not a proposal of physical Forms, 
rather, according to Parmenides, i f the issue ofparticipation is not handled 
properly, and that if participation is to be understood as some physical relation 
such as whole/part, some unacceptable consequences will follow. Further, the very 
fact that the young Socrates appeals to analogy in order to get rid of the trouble 
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suggests that the young Socrates is reluctant to treat Forms as physical object, yet, 
owing to his inexperience, he fails to provide a good reply to Parmenides, 
criticism. However, failure to formulate a reply does not mean that the young 
Socrates accepts Parmenides, invitation to treat Forms as physical object. 
II) The maker is missing in the Form as paradigm argument _ according to 
Chen, the young Socrates also offers another argument, that Forms are paradigm 
fixed in the nature ofthings and the others resemble them and are likenesses of 
them. For Chen, the major difference between this version ofForms and the Forms 
as paradigm in the Book X of the Republic is that the maker is missing here but the 
maker is mentioned in the Book X.^ ^ Further, Chen points out that the ‘‘ moving 
cause “ is vitally important in the Forms as paradigm argument. Since the maker is 
missing, the young Socrates cannot represent Plato. 
Chen believes that these two reasons are good enough to establish the fact 
that the mouthpiece young Socrates does not represent Plato's own theory of 
Forms. I found none ofhis reasons decisive. 
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First ofall, we will perhaps get very frustrated i fwe are looking for a 
Plato's Theory ofForms, perhaps we may find some common axioms in all his 
different versions ofForms, yet, as we have discussed in Chapter 2, Plato's Theory 
of Forms is always developing and every time he proposes something different or a 
theory with different implication ( For example, the extent of Forms is changing ). 
Further, if my analysis of the Republic and the Phaedo is correct that there are 
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some ambiguities in the version of Forms in these dialogues and some of these 
ambiguities do suggest a physical treatment of Forms, then there is nothing 
illogical for Plato to put forward a Theory of physical Forms under examination, in 
fact, I believe that Plato eventually rejects such treatment of Form as physical 
objects at the end of the second half. 
The fact that the Theory of physical Form, or “ whole and in “ participation 
being rejected by the young Socrates also makes Chen's argument less conclusive, 
lt is Parmenides who proposes whole and in participation and eventually, the 
young Socrates, after facing the challenges ofParmenides and aware of the 
problem o f " whole and in “ participation, shifts ground. Notice that for Chen, it 
doesn't matter whether it is Parmenides or Socrates who rejects physical Forms, 
the result is the same, namely, theory of physical Forms is demonstratively false. 
As I mentioned in Chapter 3, the Theory of Forms in the first half is only a 
cluster of understanding or misunderstanding on Forms, thus, perhaps it is not as 
what Chen has pointed out in the first half, there is really a “ theory “ at issue. 
The fact that the maker is missing in the Forms as paradigm argument in the 
first half also cannot decisively conclude that the version here is different to the 
version in Book X. Whether or not there is a maker, or who is the maker, does not 
matter. The trouble is that a perfect bed and a sensible bed share of one and the 
same character, if that is the case, another Form ofbed is required. The maker 
simply plays no role in the Likeness regress, you may try to add back the maker in 
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the Likeness regress, the result is the same. Thus, Plato has very good reason to 
omit the maker because the maker is irrelevant to the regress. 
Finally，ifit is the case that other's theory that is in trouble，there is no need 
for Plato to re-formulate his Theory of Forms and there is no need for the second 
half. In any case, i f i t is indeed the case that other's theory is having trouble, these 
troubles must at the same time relevant to Plato's own Theory ofForms, yet, Chen 
did not spell out the relevance. 
Notice that Chen's treatment of the second half is also very unique. Unlike 
those commentators so far I have discussed, Chen does not attempt to resolve any 
intersectional contradictions. Instead, Chen claims that these contradictions are 
real and therefore he accepts four deductions as more reasonable while the other 
four sections as unacceptable. For example, in Hyp I, the conclusion is that the 
Unity, if separated, is not even one. Chen sees this result as negative and thus we 
are no more stick to the beliefthat the Unity is separated from other Forms, ln Hyp 
II, the Unity-Being complexus, as Chen sees it, is the basic building block for 
further Forms attach to it. It tums out that this Unity-Being complexus is capable of 
combining with other Forms and the conclusion is more positive ( in contrast to the 
Unity is not even one in Hyp 1). Chen urges us to re-consider about this possibility 
of combination which generates more positive result. Therefore, Chen believes that 
in the Parmenides, Plato has a major overhaul o fh i s Theory ofForms. As Chen 
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puts it, “ strictly speaking, the new understanding of ‘ Forms ‘ is no more Platonic 
‘‘ 43 
Also notice that the connection between the first half and the second half, 
under Chen's approach, is a curious one, and perhaps an incomplete one. It is 
curious because while other commentators are looking for solution to the paradox, 
Chen looks for confirmation. For Chen, the Theory of physical Forms is in deep 
trouble in the first half, then in Hyp I, the conclusion is that the Unity is not even 
one if i t is separated from other Forms, at this point, Chen believes that the middle 
theory is pretty much “ finished “ and thus Parmenides invited the young Socrates 
to have a fresh start in Hyp II. ln Hyp II, it tums out that we have some more 
reasonable results and we may now move on to explore the Theory ofForms in this 
new direction. On the other hand, Chen's treatment of the second halfis 
incomplete because if i t is the case that Plato is proposing a new theory, then Plato 
must address the issue whether this new theory can avoid the criticism in the first 
half. Nonetheless, Chen does not address this issue, nor does he notice that Plato 
had ever addressed the issue, thus, I may regard Chen's approach as incomplete. 
Further, there are two pieces of external evidences that tell against a major 
overhaul of the theory ofForms: 
1) Aristotle, in his peri-ideon, never mentioned that there is such sharp 
break in Plato's Theory ofForms. Yet, it is evident that Aristotle, in formulating 
his own criticism of Forms, is deeply influenced by the paradox in the first halfof 
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the Parmenides. Therefore, it is unlikely that Aristotle is only aware of the Third 
Man and the Likeness Regress but not the new theory in the Parmenides.^^ 
Perhaps some may argue that the peri-ideon is written before the 
completion of the Parmenides and it is not the case that Aristotle is influenced by 
Plato, it is rather that Plato is influenced by Aristotle. Furthermore, one may argue 
that this is exactly the reason why we have Aristotle as the respondent in the 
second half. However, this assumption will imply that Aristotle wrote peri-ideon at 
the age of around 17, according to Gail Fine, this is unlikely given the 
philosophical depth and insight of peh-ideon^^ Also, the persona Aristotle in the 
Parmenides is a future thirty, not the philosopher. 
2) l f the Timaeus should be dated after the Parmenides, then Chen's 
approach has another embarrassment. In fact, Chen also admits in his commentary 
that in the Timaeus, Plato's Theoty ofForms has a somewhat similar outlook with 
that of the Phaedo and the Republic.^ Ifseparation can be understood as an 
ontological priority or an epistemological priority, then Forms as a perfect 
paradigm in the Timaeus certainly suggests some sort of separation. 
Anyway, I do not believe in such a major overhaul in the Theory of Forms. 
Yet, at this point it is immature to make any conclusion. The best judge to Chen's 
position, I insist, is the text itself. According to Chen, in Hyp I, the Unity, when 
separated, will destroy itself. In the next three chapters, we will look into Hyp I, 
Hyp 11 and Hyp IIA respectively. I do not believe that the result is totally negative 
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in Hyp 1. So now it is my task to explicate any positive elements in Hyp 1. Should I 
able to do this, perhaps I may have a shot to maintain a more “ Platonic “ Theory of 
Forms in the Parmenides. 
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Chapter 6: First Hypothesis: What follows for 
the Unity in relation to itself, if the Unity is 
Hyp I starts from the hypothesis that if the Unity is, since it is one, it cannot 
be many and that since it is not many, it cannot have parts. From this, Parmenides 
concludes that the Unity lacks limits, shape and place; it is neither in motion nor at 
rest, is neither the same nor different, like or unlike, equal or unequal with respect 
to itselfor others; it is neither older nor younger nor the same age with itselfor 
others, nor, on that account, in time at all; since it is not in time, it neither is, was, 
nor will be. Thus, Unity is not one, nor is subjected to name, speech, knowledge, 
perception or opinion. ( Parmenides, 137c-142a ) 
ln fact, not all the inferences are unacceptable, l fwe take “ the Unity ‘‘ to be 
the Form Unity, we are really happy to see such Form without shape, limits, place, 
motion, rest, getting older or younger, nor remaining the same age. Basically, there 
are two lines of inference that cause troubles, namely, that the Form Unity is 
neither same nor different with respect to itselfor others. To be more premise, that 
the Unity is not the same to itself and that the Unity is not different to others do 
create some puzzles. Another trouble is the inference that the Unity is not even one 
and cannot be named, nor is it an object ofknowledge, perception or opinion. That 
really contradicts what have been said in the Republic and the Phaedo, that Form 
is the object of our knowledge. 
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In my analysis of the Hyp I, I will focus on these two troubling arguments 
only because commentators differ most in these two arguments and suggest 
different ways to see through them or simply accept them as negative. 
6.1 Same/Different Argument (139b-c ) 
Parmenides divides this part ofdeduction into four sub-sections: 
1) lfUnity were different from itself, it would be different from Unity, and 
would not be one. Therefore, Unity is not different from itself. 
2) IfUnity were the same as something different, it would be that thing, but 
not itself, so it would not then be what it is, Unity, but different from Unity. 
Therefore, Unity would not be the same as something different. 
Notice that the claim that Unity cannot be the same as another or different 
from itselfmay have been accepted as obvious. Ifyou may, you can treat them as 
necessary truth. These two conclusions are indeed negative, at least in the sense 
that both are statement o f " is not “，yet, these two conclusions is not negative in 
the sense that both claim something contrary to facts. Anyway, Parmenides argues 
for these seemingly obvious conclusions, he argues that i fwe accept the claim that 
the Unity is different from itselfor the Unity is the same as others, then Unity fails 
to be one. In the next two conclusions, Parmenides must argue for it. 
3) So long as the Unity is one, it will not be different from something 
different. For it does not pertain to a thing as one to be different from something, 
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but only to a thing as different from something different, and to nothing else. Then 
by virtue ofbeing one, it will not be different. 
4) It will not be the same as itself. The nature ofUnity is surely not also that 
ofsameness. For instance, if it becomes the same as the many, it must become 
many, not one. Further, if Unity and Sameness in no way differ, then whenever 
something becomes the same, it would become one, and whenever one, the same. 
However, it is impossible for Unity, by virtue of itself, becomes many. Thus, Unity 
is not the same as itself. 
Notice that in the first two conclusions，Parmenides argues for them briefly, 
while in the last two conclusions, Parmenides has provided a very elaborated 
argument. Parmenides's arguments are based on these two assumption: 
I) The Unity, by virtue ofitself, is one. 
II) The Unity, is not by virtue ofitself, the same, or different. 
Commentators, whether they are equipped with pros heauto/pros ta alla 
distinction^ or being/having distinction^, or simply sticks to the claim in 140A that 
the Unity has no second character^. All argue that the conclusions do follow from 
the notion o f a Unity that is one and nothing else. However, the implication of 
these conclusions are quite different for each ofthese commentators 1 have 
mentioned so far. 
For Meinwald and Peterson, this part of argument, with its four conclusions, 
is obvious enough, because it is simply a demonstration ofpws heauto truth. For 
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Meinwald, according to a proper genius-species tree of nature, same and difference 
fall below the genius Many but not Unity. For Peterson, same and difference 
simply play no role when we are defining Unity.^ Both Meinwald and Peterson are 
happy to see such demonstration ofpros heauto truth, because the distinction 
between pros heauto/pros ta alla is vital in resolving the dilemma of the first half. 
For Comford, he also accepts the conclusions of this part o f the argument. 
To a certain degree，his treatment of this section is somewhat similar to that of 
Peterson: 
It is, however, because of its nature as defined at the outset that the One 
cannot have sameness, difference, likeness etc. All these words have 
meanings distinct from the meaning o f " One “； they are characters 
distinct from oneness.^ 
Though we may argue that in this particular argument Comford comes close 
to Peterson, we must always keep in mind that Cornford never equips with 
distinctions such as being/having, or pros heauto/pros ta alla. Just because he is 
lacking such coordinating system, Comford's comments should be treated with 
cautions. The claim that the Unity cannot have sameness, difference or likeness is 
very problematic. It will be more appropriate to claim that the Unity cannot ^ 
difference, sameness, or likeness. Anyway, Comford's mixing up o f " being “ and 
“ having “ is understandable because he does not equip with this distinction. 
Miller also agrees with the logic of the same/different argument. According 
to Miller, 
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At 139c3-dl, first, he establishes that being ‘ other than another ‘ does not 
follow or derive in any way from ‘ being One '. Since each Form is 
precisely a simple and unique character, being One - that is simple and 
unique - is essential to it, but being different is not entailed by being one; 
hence, being different is not, in contrast to being one, essential to the 
Form.6 
At first sight. Miller's treatment is somewhat similar to that of Comford, or 
Meinwald. However, it is not the case. In fact, his approach to the second half is 
very different. Although Miller may perhaps endorse the being/having distinction, 
he nonetheless restricts “ being “ to Forms and “ having “ to sensible particulars. 
Therefore, Miller is happy to see that the Unity is not at rest nor in motion because 
at rest or in motion suggest temporality and certainly Forms are not temporal/ 
However, in Hyp II, Parmenides argues that the Unity is both at rest and in motion. 
In the case. Miller has no way out but to claims that “ the Unity “ in Hyp II refers 
o 
to sensible particulars. While other commentators generally agree that “ the Unity 
‘‘ in Hyp I refers to a particular Form, namely. Unity, Miller believes that “ the 
Unity “ in Hyp I refers to Forms in general. In the same/different argument. Miller 
thus claims that each Form is precisely a simple and unique character.^ 
However, here comes a trouble to Miller's treatment, we can all agree that 
any Form is unique and simple, in Miller's word, uniqueness is essential to Forms. 
Yet, “ self-sameness “ may perhaps be another character that is essential to Forms. 
However, the same/different argument points out that “ the Unity “ is not same to 
itself. According to Miller; 
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But at the same time, Parmenides has not shown that sameness-with-itself 
or difference-from-another cannot belong at all to the One. What is a 
distinct character from oneness is not therefore necessarily incompatible 
with it; again, what is not essential to the Form as such is not thereby 
precluded from belonging to it inessentially. '^  
In the middle theory, Plato certainly believes that Forms in general have 
some characters such as “ unique, simple, immutable, incomposite, and self-
sameness “ Yet, according to Miller, these characters, or at least some of them, 
belong to Forms inessentially. Here comes the trouble, according to Miller, 
uniqueness certainly belongs to Forms essentially while self-sameness belongs to 
Forms inessentially, nonetheless, at what point can we draw the line that some of 
these characters are essential to Forms and some other belong to Forms only 
inessentially. It seems to me that Miller may perhaps aware of the tension I 
mentioned, he did try to somewhat resolve this difficulty, yet, his solution is not 
very convincing: 
The argument works to distinguish each one Form from every other 
character and at the same time to preserve self-sameness and difference-
from-another as characters that each one Form, even if not by inner 
necessity but only in some contingent context, may nonetheless have." 
The trouble for Miller is that he treats the subject “ the Unity “ as Forms in 
general. Miller's interpretation may perhaps work perfectly for the Form Unity, yet, 
in case of the Form Sameness, Sameness is the same and its being the same does 
not depend on circumstance. IfMiller's interpretation is correct, then we would 
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have to admit that Sameness is the same, not by inner necessity, but only in some 
contingent context may nonetheless have ( because Miller's interpretation applies 
to all Forms )• Further, perhaps the distinction necessity/contingency, or 
essential/inessential is never in Plato's mind. We have to be careful not to apply 
any distinction that Plato himselfis not aware of. 
For Chen, he also finds no fallacy in the same/different argument. However, 
the implication for the same/different argument, and any other arguments in Hyp I 
is quite different to many other commentators. According to Chen, the result is 
negative, Parmenides showed us that i f the Unity is separated from other Forms, 
then there will be no self-sameness and difference-from-another belong to the 
Unity.i2 As the deduction proceeds, it tums out that the Unity is not and therefore, 
is not one. Chen believes that in case like this, the Unity destroys i t s e l f � � Like 
Cornford, Miller and Meinwald, Chen does not find any fallacy in the deduction, 
for Chen, these contradictions are real and it is the initial assumption that Forms 
are separated that creates the trouble. For Cornford and Miller, the Unity in 
different hypotheses refers to different subject and thus these contradictions are 
only apparent. 
Notice that at this point, Chen would have treated this part o f the deduction 
as damaging to the separation ofForms. Yet，the same/different argument is not 
altogether fatal. Like Miller, he can still maintained that self-sameness and 
difference-from-another are not the essential features of Forms. The fatal blow 
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comes from the Unity is not one argument. Thus, at this point, I am not to decide 
which interpretation makes more sense. Only after 1 have finished the discussion 
on the One is not one argument, I can make more comments on Chen's approach. 
The same/different argument, and the separation issue at the beginning of 
this hypothesis, partly meet the young Socrates' challenge that: 
If someone were first to distinguish separately alone by themselves the 
characters Ijust mentioned - Likeness, and Unlikeness, for example, 
Multitude and the One, Rest and Motion, and all such similar things - and 
then show that these things in themselves can be combined and 
distinguished, I should be filled with admiration. (Parmenides, 129d-e ) 
Although in the same/different argument and perhaps all the deductions in 
Hyp I, Parmenides does not attempt to show that Forms do combine, Parmenides 
nonetheless shows the young Socrates that ifForms are separated, there shall be 
some puzzles, whether they are only apparent or indeed real. 
Anyway, let me summarize my analysis of the same/different argument: 
1) All commentators so far I have discussed detect no fallacy in this 
particular argument. 
2) Meinwald and Peterson, though they differs in some minor issue, 
believes that Hyp I deals with a particular Fonn: Unity. Hyp I is a pros heauto 
section concerning the nature ofUnity. This interpretation is further confirmed by 
how Parmenides argues his position in the same/different argument. For example: 
.....by virtue ofbeing one it will not be different. ( Parmenides, 139c ) 
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3) Comford's analysis is somewhat similar to that of Meinwald or Peterson. 
However, Comford never has distinction such as pros heauto/pros ta alla, or 
being/having in his discussion. For Cornford, it is the definition ofUnity at the 
beginning of Hyp I as bare one and that given a bare one as such, we must admit 
that Unity is neither same nor different. 
4) Miller believes that Hyp 1 deals with Forms in general. His analysis 
sound promising until the same/different argument. That uniqueness belongs to 
Form essentially while self-sameness only belongs to Forms inessentially is not 
convincing. Although Miller does attempt to argue for his case, his attempt is not 
successful. 
5) Chen points out that we have only negative conclusions in Hyp 1. These 
results are negative in a sense that they are unreasonable or contrary to facts. To 
say that the Unity is not same to itself and different from another is certainly a 
puzzles. For Chen it is the assumption that Forms are separated that causes all 
these puzzles. Therefore, we are to reconsider whether Forms are indeed separated. 
However, as 1 have mentioned above, same/different argument is not totally 
unreasonable. The argument is divided into four parts, at least the first two results 
are obviously true. Anyway, the same/different is not as fatal as the One is not one 
argument and this is where Chen has the strongest claim that Hyp I is negative and 
that we are to give up the separation ofForms. 
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6.2 The One is not One Argument (141e-142a ) 
Peterson summarizes the argument as follows: 
a) The Unity does not partake ofBeing in any way. 
b) It is not the case that the Unity is in any way. 
c) lt is not the case that the Unity is so as to be one. 
d) It is not the case that the Unity is one. 
e) It is not the case that anything is [ i.e. belongs ] to or of the Unity. 
f) It is not the case that there is a name of the Unity, or account of the Unity, 
or knowledge or perception or opinion of it. 
g) It is not the case that it-is-named, that it-is-spoken-of, that it-is-believed-
about, that it-is-known, or that there-is-perceived ofi t anything among things 
which are.i4 
This is the toughest argument in Hyp I. In those previous arguments, not 
much effort is required to see through the difficulties. We are happy to see a 
particular Form, in this case, Unity, is not in motion or at rest, is neither in itself 
nor in another There may be some puzzles in the argument of same/different. 
Yet it is true as long as we stick to the principle that. Unity, is not by virtue of 
itself, the same or different. Once we accept this, there is no problem to accept the 
argument ofequal/unequal, likeness/unlikeness, and younger/older, because these 
three arguments are pretty much a further elaboration of the same/different 
argument. At this point, we ask ourselves if the Unity can be any ofthese 
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characters we have discussed so far, it is clear that Unity be not any ofthese 
characters. 
However, here comes the trouble, if we accept that the Unity cannot be，or 
become, older or younger than, or ofthe same age as, itselfor another, then we 
must accept that Unity cannot be in time at all. IfUnity is not in time, then Unity is 
m no sense ‘‘ is “ Thus we must accept that: a) The Unity does not partake of 
Being in any way. Once accepting a), we will also have to accept b), c) and up to 
g), we are at the brink of destruction. 
Miller offers a comparatively easy solution to the One is not one argument: 
But it is also dear that Aristotle, the youngest person present and a future 
tyrant, is conspicuously not that man ‘ of wide experience and natural 
ability ‘ who will be able to ‘ follow through host of very remote 
arguments ‘. Aristotle's desire to reject rather than reflect upon the 
contradictions within Hyp I should therefore spur the hearer to dojust the 
opposite the key step in establishing the contradictions is made by 
Aristotle, not by Parmenides. To be sure, Parmemdes does the pedagogical 
work. He sets the stage, putting Aristotle to the test as he did to Socrates 
earlier; and he goes out ofhis way to develop the contradictions out of 
Aristotle's error.'^ 
Thus, instead of accepting the conclusion as what Aristotle had done, we 
should inquire into Aristotle's reasoning and detect what went wrong. Here is what 
we should find, according to Miller, 
Aristotle's answer at 141e8 ( ‘ It is not possible ‘ ) represents the most 
extreme form of Socrates' earlier error: Aristotle assumes that the sort of 
being proper to things - being that, in association with becoming, is either 
past, present, or future - is universal. More particularly, he fails to 
recognize the difference between the ‘ is ‘ of time present and tenseless ‘ 
is ‘ of what transcends temporal detennination.'^' 
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For Miller, it is the Aristotle to be blamed for the contradictions. Yet, these 
contradictions are philosophically illuminating. Parmenides' intentional 
manipulation of two different kinds ofbeing, although Aristotle identifies with the 
wrong kind ofbeing with Forms, we are not to repeat Aristotle's error. However, 
Miller's interpretation must assume that Aristotle is totally unfamiliar with the 
middle theory and this assumption is really questionable. At least, in the 
methodological remarks, Parmenides points out that: 
I realized that yesterday when I heard you discussing with Aristotle here. 
Believe me, your impulse towards argument is noble, and indeed divine.( 
Parmenides, 135d) 
Therefore, it is quite reasonable to believe that Aristotle should have at least 
some understanding o f the middle theory. You may argue that the Parmenides is a 
piece ofdrama and there is no such historical meeting between Aristotle, Socrates 
and Parmenides. It is certainly true that Plato, in writing this dialogue, does portray 
Aristotle as philosophically immature because according to Plato, this Aristotle is 
going to be one o f the future thirties. However, this dramatic effect, to a certain 
degree, is counter-balanced by what gets said in 135d that the persona Aristotle 
does in at least one occasion discuss with the Young Socrates about the Theory of 
Forms. Further, his impulse towards arguments is indeed divine. 
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In addition, ifF-ness is F, unique, transcendent, or self-same, then sensible 
particulars, when partaking in F-ness, should also become F, unique, transcendent 
and self-same. However, when Helen partakes Beauty, she only becomes beautiful. 
She is certainly one person. Yet, Helen is one, not by virtue of an unique or one 
Form: Beauty, rather, Helen is one by virtue of the Form Unity. I believe that some 
sort ofdistinction is needed here, ln fact, Miller did make some sort of distinction. 
His distinction between essential/inessential characters is an attempt to explain 
some puzzles in Hyp I. Nonetheless, his distinction cannot explain in what way 
when Helen partakes in the unique Form Beauty, she only becomes beautiful but 
not unique. 
Furthermore, Miller's distinction may not agree with Plato's later discussion 
of Forms. In the Sophist, according to Plato, 
....when we speak of a man we give him many additional names - we 
attribute to him colors and shapes and sizes and defects and good 
qualities, and in all these and countless other statements we say he is not 
merely a ‘ man ‘ but also ‘ good ‘ and any number of other things. And so 
witb everything else. ( Sophist, 251b ) 
For Plato, not only that man has many additional names, in fact, this is also 
true for many other things. Plato next moves on to discuss whether this also applies 
to Forms, it turns out that Forms also have many additional names. In the Sophist, 
Plato discusses extensively on the relation between the Form Rest, Motion, 
Sameness, Difference and Existence. First ofall , these five Forms are not identical 
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with one another, yet, in the case of the pair Sameness and Difference, Plato points 
out that they are distinct from those other three Forms, yet Sameness and 
Difference always necessarily blend with the other three Forms because Existence, 
Motion and Rest are different to one another and yet same to itself. 
Notice that the Helen's problem will no more be a problem in the Sophist 
because when Helen partakes in the Form Beauty, she really can only become 
beautiful, although the Form Beauty is also one, eternal, ...etc., these characters the 
Form Beauty displaying is the result ofparticipation in other Forms. On the other 
hand, not only that Miller's approach will face the Helen's problem, it also 
disagrees with the Sophist. Notice that according to Plato, the Form Sameness 
blends with other Forms necessarily, (Sophist, 254e ) this tells against Miller's 
understanding that self-sameness belongs to Forms inessentially^^. 
Thus, it tums out that under Miller's approach, we can divide Hyp I into 
three phase, ln the first phase, that the One ( Forms in general) is not at rest or in 
motion and does not have shape, Miller will be very happy to see such conclusions 
because these conclusions agree with Plato's Theory ofForms in the Republic and 
the Phaedo. In the next phase, when it is argued that the One is not the same, 
different, like, nor unlike, Miller is already in trouble and therefore according to 
Miller, these characters may nonetheless belong to Forms inessentially. In the last 
phase, it is argued that it is not the case that the One is, was and will and thus it is 
not the case that the One is one. Facing such deep perplexities. Miller argues that it 
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is Aristotle who assumes the temporality ofForms and thus getting into such 
trouble and the readers therefore once again have a chance to re-affirm the non-
temporal or tenseless “ is “ Perhaps it is not most accurate to say that there are 
three different meanings of ‘‘ is not “ under Miller's approach, yet, it is at least 
true that under Miller's treatment, each ‘‘ is not “ conclusion in Hyp I will have one 
ofthese three different implications. From my point of view. Miller's approach is 
argument by argument and lacks a unitary treatment. 
Also, when Miller discusses the tenselessness ofForms, he does not 
explicitly say whether tenselessness belongs to Forms essentially or inessentially. 
This certainly gives Miller some convenience for not getting into another trouble. 
Yet, when we pursuit the case further, we will see that ifMiller assumes either 
essentially or inessentially, he will once again go back to the loop and he still has to 
justify his distinction between Forms having some characters essentially while 
having other characters inessentially. 
In fact, in the One is not one argument, we are facing a very subtle form of 
perplexity. It seems to me that Miller can't capture the subtlety ofthis argument. In 
this regard, Comford does capture the subtlety: 
The conclusion itself - that the One can have no sort ofbeing - is sound, 
and could be deduced directly from the definition in the first paragraph of 
the Hypothesis. If we conceive the One as one and nothing else whatever, 
it cannot have any second character that could be meant by the word ‘ is ‘ 
in any ofit senses, 
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At this point, Cornford points out that the One cannot have any second 
character that could be meant by the word ‘ is ‘ in any of i t senses. No matter 
whether ‘ is ‘ oftemporal sense or ‘ is ‘ of tenseless sense, neither can apply to the 
One, otherwise，the One will have a second character. Furthermore, according to 
Cornford: 
Neither ofthe two inferences: ( 1 ) that the One does not exist, ( 2 ) that 
the One is not even an entity and therefore cannot be the subject of a true 
statement that it is one, appears to follow from the previous conclusion 
that the One is not in time. A Platonic Form is an entity that is not, and 
does not come to be, in time, and yet has many characters and can be 
known. Also, it will actually be demonstrated in Hyp V that an entity 
which does not exist at some time nevertheless is an entity, can have many 
characters, and can come into existence. At the present stage, however, 
these distinctions are not yet drawn and they are not strictly observed here. 
Plato is content to draw a true conclusion from premises that hardly 
sustain it. But the premises themselves are true; and to represent a true 
conclusion as following from true premises, which do not by themselves 
entail it, in not sophistry in the usual sense. It is rather taking a short-cut, 
to avoid entering on explanation which will be more in place else-where. 
Plato could not explain everything at once; the ambiguities o f ' being ‘ are 
reserved for the later hypothesis/^ 
Although 1 may not agree with Cornford's claim that the One in Hyp I 
should be identified with the Parmenidean homogeneous sphere and that there are 
many different meanings of the subject _ the One, 1 must admit that Comford's 
analysis in the One is not one argument is most true. Since the One defined as such 
has no second character except being one, temporal ‘' is ‘‘ or tenseless “ is ‘‘ 
certainly will not belong to the One defined as such, lt is indeed the case that Plato 
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is taking a short cut, he can certainly repeat the deduction one more time and the 
result will still be the same - it is not the case that the One is (tenseless is ). 
Therefore, for those who advocate the dialectical approach in the second 
half, they may perform some sort of dialectical activity in order to see through 
these perplexities. However, options are rather limited. IfPlato did not leave us any 
clue, perhaps we are more free to see through these perplexities in many different 
ways. The problems o f " being “ are reserved for later hypotheses. Especially in 
Hyp V and VI, once we are able to distinguish two senses of “ is not", it will 
throw light on our understanding o f " is “ In the Sophist, Plato discusses 
extensively on the problem o f " is not “ and he states explicitly that the problem of 
“ is not “ is also a problem o f “ is “ Further, his treatment o f " is not “ in the 
Sophist is very similar to that of the second half of the Parmenides. Although the 
One is not one argument has generated enough perplexities and we are eager to see 
through it, yet, when performing any dialectical activity, we are guided by what is 
going to say in the next seven hypotheses and perhaps Plato's view in the Sophist. 
Thus, we are to avoid any tailor-made insight that only fits this hypothesis only. 
So far, we see that the arguments in Hyp I are not obviously false, neither 
are they obviously true. lfPlato is indeed making such a short cut, what makes him 
arguing this way? If Plato is taking such a short cut to reach his conclusion, then he 
is deliberately manipulating on the ambiguity o f " being “ The conclusion that the 
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One is not even one and is not the object ofour knowledge, opinion, and 
perception does call upon our reflection on different sense o f “ is “ 
In fact, pros heauto/pros ta alla distinction is an attempt to sort out these 
different senses o f " is “ Unfortunately, according to Meinwald: 
I am not sure whether this (pros heauto/pros ta alla distinction ) applies 
to the final lines of the section, roughly 141e ff, but the increasing 
uncertainly and rejection of conclusions by the interlocutor set these lines 
apart from the rest in my case.^^ 
We must appreciate Meinwald's academic honesty, yet these few lines also 
tell us some weakness ofMeinwald 's approach. Meinwald admits that her pros 
heauto/pros ta alla distinction breaks down at the end of Hyp I. She does point out 
that in the final argument, Aristotle is indeed giving some unusual responses. He is 
showing some signs ofdoubt ofboth the reasoning and the conclusion of the final 
argument. ( In fact, Comford is also aware ofthis, although he omits most of the 
Aristotle's response, Aristotle's response in this part of the argument is preserved 
and Cornford also points out Aristotle's uncertainty. In addition, Allen and 
Peterson also notice the unusual response ofAristotle. Plato is perhaps trying to tell 
us that he is making some unusual move in his reasoning and that we are not to 
trust the final argument, or at least, we should reflect before accepting the 
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conclusion. ) However, the fact that Aristotle is showing some signs of doubt 
does not decisively tell us that we should set the final argument apart. Notice that 
the One is not one argument begins with the premise that the One does not partake 
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of Being in any way, and this premise is based on the previous result that the One 
is not older, younger, nor the same age to itself and to another. Given the fact that 
the One is neither younger, older nor the same age, it is not the case that the One 
is, was, and will be. Thus, the One is not in time. If to be is to be in time, then the 
One does not partake of Being. Further, the One is neither younger, older, nor 
same age is based on the same/different argument, ln fact, younger, older and same 
age is a special case of same/different. Same age is a special case of same to 
another/itself while younger and older is nothing but different in age. Therefore, 
the older/younger/same age argument is also connected with the same/different 
argument. The point is, as Comford puts it, the premises themselves are true and a 
true conclusion does follows from these true premises. Since different conclusions 
are connected in this way in Hyp I, we simply cannot set any part ofthe deduction 
apart. To set the final argument apart as Meinwald suggested will only seriously 
jeopardize her attempt to solve the puzzles in the second half. IfMeinwald'spros 
heauto/pros ta alla distinction cannot pass the final test, perhaps the distinction is 
irrelevant to the second half. 
Recently, Prof. Peterson proposes a solution to the final argument and the 
pros heauto/pros ta alla distinction does pass the final test. According to Peterson, 
the clue for the final argument, and also all the arguments in Hyp 1, is to 
distinguish two kinds o f " is-not “ pros heauto statement: 
It seems most natural to take pros heauto as sentential operator which 
attaches to sentences to form new sentences. The word ‘ not ‘ also acls as 
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a sentential operator. Since both operators occur - ‘ not ‘ occurring 
explicitly and pros heauto to be supplied by the reader - in connection 
with each sentence expressing a result, we need to decide which operator 
goes within which, that is, which has narrower scope.^^ 
Thus, to put it shortly, the difference is between “ being not “ and “ not 
being “• However, the phrases “ being not “ and “ not being “ sound very 
unfamiliar to English reader, a more convenient translation or replacement is - “ 
By definition, it is not “ and “ It is not by definition “• ( As I will discuss in the next 
few paragraphs the replacement o f " by definition “ for “ by nature “ or “pros 
heauto “ is for the sake of convenience, for Peterson, the phrase “ by definition “ is 
equivalent to “ by nature “ and “ pros heauto “. ) Taking the example of 
same/different argument, since both operators are operating, we have two possible 
readings: 
R l ) By definition, the Unity is not the same with itself. 
or 
Rla) According to the definition ofUnity, not the same with itself is part of 
the definition ofwhat is Unity. 
Another possible reading is 
R2) The Unity is not by definition the same with itself. 
or 
R2a) According to the definition ofUnity, the same with itselfis not part of 
the definition of what is to be Unity. 
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Perhaps this is the best I can formulate the distinction. In fact, we can 
replace “ by definition “ with “ by nature “ and still get the same meaning though 
the sentence becomes somewhat unfamiliar to English readers. Further, we can 
also say that the Unity being not self-same or the Unity not being self-same. 
However, the difference ofnot being and being not in English is probably not so 
obvious. Thus, according to Peterson, she takes “ by definition “ as a more 
convenient translation. 
Anyway, R1) and Rla) are obviously false because it is not the case that not 
self-same is part ofwhat is to be Unity. On the other hand, R2) and R2a) are 
obviously true. It is indeed very true that when defining Unity, we do not need to 
mention self-sameness. 
Thus, when applying Peterson's principle, we solve most of the puzzles in 
the final argument. Neither having name, nor having an account, nor having 
H 
knowledge or opinion about the Unity, are required in the definition o f U n i t y . ( 
Although Peterson believes that “ by definition “ is a very convenient translation, 
this term seldom appears in the middle and late dialogues. In fact, this term, to a 
certain degree, is quite Socratic because as I have mentioned in Chapter 2, the 
historical Socrates is interested in definition while Plato, starting from the Meno, 
departs from this. I suggest that we can replace “ by definition “ with “ in itself, by 
itself". For example, the statement: Unity in itself, by itself is not the same and the 
other statement: Unity is not in itself, by itself the same; are clearly two different 
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statements. Notice that the term 1 suggest will have certain advantage, for one 
thing, the term “ in itself; by itself" is more Platonic, also, it won't create any 
unnecessary confusion or ambiguity like the term “ by nature “• However, since 1 
am discussing Peterson's method, her terminology will still be used.) 
Still we have one last obstacle to be removed; that the Unity is not one. 
According to Peterson; 
It is not the case that being ( past, present or future ) figures in the 
explanation of what it is to be one. It is not the case that an account of 
what it is to be one will include the comment: ‘ and what is one also is (in 
past, in present, or in future ) '.^ ^ 
Further, Peterson points out that: 
The notion ofbeing may seems to enter into definitions with the word ‘ is 
‘ - the copulate ‘ is ‘ - which occurs, for example, in the definition ‘ Man 
is biped terrestrial animal'. But the ‘ is ‘ does not introduce the notion of 
being as part of the definiens, any more than, in formal language, 
parentheses and the device ofjuxtaposition bring into every definition 
therein expressed. Possibly the point is even more obvious in Greek, in 
which the copula ‘ is ‘ is often omitted; when it is omitted, there would be 
no visible trace of the notion ofBeing.^^ 
Thus, the claim that the Unity not by definition “ is “ is also true. 
Based on this conclusion, Parmenides argues that: 
Then it is not so as to be one. 
The way Parmenides argued clearly indicates that he based on the 
conclusion that the Unity not in itself, by itself" is “ or that Being is not part of 
definition of the Unity. For this reason, it is not because of Being or by Being or 
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requiring Being that the Unity is one. Thus, the only claim which is true so far is: 
the Unity, by virtue of itself, one. It is not the case that: the Unity, by virtue of 
Being, one. Perhaps it is preferable to say that: The Unity one, rather than the 
Unity is one. 
Now, we have removed the last obstacle and every arguments in Hyp I is 
true when we correctly apply the operators “ is-not “ and “ pros heauto “ 
However, the conclusion that the Unity is not the object of our knowledge, 
opinion, and perception clearly departs from Plato's Theory ofForms. Then why 
does Plato argue this way? 
Notice that we are facing the most subtle form ofperplexities. Every 
arguments in the first halfis true when applying Peterson's principle. However, the 
final conclusion, though follows from the original premise, is unacceptable. The 
clue to the puzzle is the distinction between being/having. As we shall see in other 
hypotheses, for example, in Hyp III and IV, though Forms other than the Form 
Unity, is not by virtue ofthemselves, become one, they nonetheless must relate to 
the Form Unity, otherwise, without such limiting factor, the result is a indefinite 
mess. Thus, being cannot without having and having cannot without being. When 
applying Peterson's principle, it is indeed true that knowability is not part o f the 
definition of Unity ( Or in my terminology. Unity is not in itself, by itselfknowable 
).Yet，although knowability plays no role in the definition ofUnity, the Form 
Unity nonetheless has such feature ( otherwise, how can we define “ Unity “ � . ln 
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the next hypothesis, we shall see that when Unity is related to other Forms, it is 
indeed knowable. 
Therefore, in Hyp I, Plato is pushing his pros heauto inquiry of Unity into 
the extreme. The results, at first sight, are unacceptable. This calls upon our 
reflection. Peterson's principle is an attempt to resolve the difficulties in Hyp I. It 
turns out that Peterson's principle is partly a solution and partly a challenge, lt is a 
solution because Hyp I is no more difficult as long as we keep in mind that Hyp I is 
a sole pros heauto analysis. It is partly a challenge because there are some 
problems left unanswered. Although it is true that Unity, is not in itself and by 
itself, get said, or named, or known, it nonetheless is known and named by us. In 
fact, it is the job of Hyp II to meet this challenge. Anyway, before I move on to the 
next hypothesis, I have a couple ofremarks on Chen's approach to the final 
argument of Hyp I. 
Chen's approach re-examine - Interestingly enough, Chen points out in his 
analysis of Hyp I that the original hypothesis should read as “ if the One one “ 
rather than “ if the One is one “ because the original hypothesis does not suggest “ 
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being “ in any sense. Starting from this “ if the One one “ hypothesis, we 
eventually reach the conclusion that the One is not one. According to Chen, 
separation of the One destroyed itself and therefore Forms should not be 
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separated. However, the final result is that the One is not one while the original 
hypothesis, according to Chen, is “ the One one “ The final result in fact does no 
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damage to the original hypothesis ( the final result will do damage if the original 
hypothesis is read as “ if the One is one “ ) because the original hypothesis never 
gets involve with being. 
Furthermore, from the claim that the One is not in temporal sense and jumps 
to the conclusion that the One is not in any sense seems to be a very big leap of 
faith for Chen, ln fact, Chen himself is puzzled by this move because a Platonic 
Forms are tenseless entity. Yet, Chen quotes the Symposium 212a to support the 
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view that Forms are in time. I have read this passage several times and I can't see 
how Forms are in time according to that passage. If Chen's approach is correct, 
then in order to destroy the One, Plato must argue for both that the One is not 
related to temporal Being and tenseless Being, and that there is no short cut for 
Plato. Yet, Plato only argues for the temporal case but not the tenseless case. The 
fact that Plato is missing such important step i fhe wants to destroy the One 
strongly tells against the belief that Plato wants to destroy the One in Hyp I. 
Also, the fact that both Aristotle and Parmenides are showing some signs of 
doubt on the final conclusion and its reasoning suggests that we are not to accept 
the conclusion without further reflection. 
Thus far, we have finished our discussion on Hyp I and we may now move 
on to Hyp II. 
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Chapter 7: Hypothesis 11: What follows for 
the Unity in relation to others, if the Unity is 
ln Hyp II, the conclusions are equally intolerable. This time Parmenides， 
argument are almost all positive; the Unity is shown to take on all possible 
characters at once. Thus, the Unity which is is both the same and different with 
respect to itselfor others etc. The Unity seems intemally contradictory at many 
turns. 
To begin with, the Unity is both one and many, a whole and parts, and 
limited and infinitely many ( 145a ), both in itself and in another ( 145b-e ), both at 
rest and in motion ( 146a ), both same and different ( 147b )� l ike and unlike itself 
and others ( 148c-d ), both in contact with and not in contact with itselfand others 
(149d ), both equal to and greater and smaller than itselfand others ( 151b ), both 
equal in number to and more and fewer than itself and others ( 151 e ) , both older 
and younger and of the same age and not each ofthese, in being and in becoming, 
with regard to itselfand others ( 155c )• Finally, there would be knowledge, 
opinion and perception of it ( 155d ). 
The conclusion thus generated, is between tears and laughs, l fwe take the 
Unity in Hyp 11 as the Form Unity, we are very happy to see that we have opinion, 
knowledge, or perception of it. Yet, we are very upset by the fact that the Unity has 
shape or in motion or at rest. 
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As a result of these difficulties, multi-subject approach once again becomes 
a very attractive proposal. Further, the multi-subject approach is confirmed by the 
seemingly different formulation of the initial hypothesis. According to Chen, the 
initial hypothesis o fHyp I, if more carefully formulated, should be - if the One one. 
In Hyp II, the initial hypothesis is: if a One i s � I n fact, Parmenides argues for the 
different formulation: 
Now, the being of Unity is not the same as Unity; otherwise, it would not 
be the being of it, nor would Unity have a share ofbeing; rather, to say 
that Unity is would be like saying that Unity is Unity. But as it is，the 
hypothesis is not what must follow ifUnity is Unity, but what must follow 
ifUnity is.( Parmenides, 142c ) 
Judging from Parmenides' proposal, it looks as if it is indeed a new subject 
being discussed. However, precisely what sort o fnew subject is discussing in Hyp 
II, scholars do not reach any consensus. 
For Cornford, we have a new definition(s) of the One in Hyp II. Comford 
believes that there are ambiguities in terms such as “ One “, “ is “, or “ others “� 
and that the Parmenides is written to clear up these ambiguities. In Hyp I, the One 
is defined as simply one and nothing else. According to Comford, the One in Hyp I 
is also “ the One “ in the historical Parmenides' the Way ofTruth, however, 
starting from this bare One or Parmenidean One, it leads to intolerable 
consequences. Therefore, Cornford maintains that Hyp 1 is a refutation of 
^ 
Parmenidean thesis. In Hyp II, we will have a fresh start. According to Comford, 
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the definition of the One in Hyp II is different to that of Hyp I. In Hyp II, the 
hypothesis is a One which is. For Comford, it is any one entity, lt may be a 
number, a thing, a physical body....etc.^ 
However, here comes the trouble, if Comford's multi-subject approach is 
correct, it tums out that the One which is in Hyp 11 has a lot of different meanings. 
Starting from “ One entity “, the One which is quickly evolves into “ One 
magnitude “� then “ One physical body in space “ According to Comford: 
Plato has now restored the whole course of the Pythagorean evolution of 
manifold world from the One, through numbers and geometrical 
magnitudes, to physical body in space ..... ^ 
The problem is that although we may have some better understanding on 
the notion - the One, we are still not able to solve the puzzles in the first half. In the 
second half, if i t is indeed the case that it offers a brilliant refutation of 
Parmenidean thesis and also a restoration of the Pythagorean evolution, I can't see 
how these refutation and restoration is relevant to the Third Man. 
Miller also adopts the multi-subject approach to Hyp II. According to 
Miller: 
In 11, ‘ the One ‘ must refer to each of the many composite things, 
considered in its purely exemplary character as a typical physical-sensible 
unit or one. In I, by contrast, ‘ the One ‘ must refer to Forms, taking each 
in its exemplary character as a simple, unique one.^ 
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Notice that both Miller and Cornford treat the dialogue as dialectical ( 
although dialectical elements are more explicit in Miller's analysis ). Both tell us 
what sorts ofinsight they grasp when seeing through the perplexities in the second 
half. Unfortunately, Comford sees through something which is irrelevant to the 
puzzles in the first half. On the other hand. Miller does grasp something which is 
relevant to the first half. Miller can argue that Forms and things are two distinct 
sorts ofentity. Forms are incomposite and simple, while things are composite. He 
can point to the fact that F-ness is different to something that is F, thus, there will 
be no Third Man. 
However, ifit is indeed Plato's solution to the Third Man, from a 
development's point ofview, it is a big leap backward. The incomposite Forms and 
the composite sensible particulars are the theme in the Phaedo. As 1 have 
mentioned in Chapter 2, Plato offers more elaborated analysis on the status of 
Forms and things later in the Republic. In the Phaedo, the focus is on the 
composition ofForms and things, the discussion of self-predication is minimal, ln 
the Republic, Plato offers a more detail analysis on self-predication, that F-ness is F 
absolutely should be distinguished from things that are F while the latter rolls 
between F and not F. IfMiller's approach is correct, then Plato does not even 
address the issue ofself-predication in the second half. Yet, it seems to me that the 
problem ofself-predication is the key to crank up the engine ofregress. Thus, Plato 
only offers a very general and vague solution to the Third Man in the second half. 
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However, repeating what have been said in the Phaedo can't help us to get rid of 
the Third Man, it is because as I have mentioned in Chapter 2, Plato did not settle 
some issues in the Phaedo and the Republic, that these issues are the source of 
trouble in the first halfof the Parmenides. Simply repeating what have been said in 
the Phaedo while leaving those unsettled issues unattended cannot keep Plato's 
opponents silent or convince the students in the Academy. 
Chen, to a certain degree, though he does not state it explicitly, adopts a 
multi-subject approach in the second half. In Hyp I, the subject is a Platonic Form ( 
at least, Chen's understanding of Forms in the middle dialogues ), namely, the 
Form Unity which is separated, ln Hyp 11, the subject is a new version ofForms, 
under this new version ofForms, Forms are no more separated but necessarily 
related with one another. Further, according to Chen, 
ln Hyp 11, Plato has given up the distinction between Form being 
absolutely and sensibles roll between is and is not. Also, he has given up 
the distinction between Forms as object of knowledge and instance of 
Forms as object of opinion which are advocated in both the Republic and 
the Fhaedo^ 
Thus, Chen believes that this new version of Forms denies the ontological 
and epistemological priority ofForms. In short, although the subject is seemingly 
the same under Chen's analysis, in fact it is not. Although the Unity in different 
hypotheses always refer to Form, nonetheless, there are two versions of Forms in 
discussion. 
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Notice that since there are two versions of Forms in comparison, Chen's 
approach must argue that the old version is more vulnerable while the new version 
is more convincing and in fact this is what Chen has been arguing. Chen's 
approach will be very convincing if it is indeed the case that the old version in Hyp 
I is completely non-sense while the new version in Hyp II does generate happy 
ending. However, as we have seen in the last chapter. Hyp I does survive the 
destruction that Chen has expected under Peterson's interpretation. Further, as we 
shall see in this chapter, not all conclusions in Hyp II are acceptable. If we expect 
that Plato is selling this new version in Hyp II, then I must say that Plato's selling 
technique is rather poor. For example, the deduction that the Unity is same to 
others is very problematic ( Parmenides, 146a-147b ). In fact, even the respondent, 
Aristotle, is showing some signs ofdoubt regarding the inference that generates 
this conclusion. Thus, this new version ofForms ( i f there is any) does not always 
have happy ending. 
In my analysis of the Hyp II, I shall selectively discuss some arguments. 
Generally speaking, most commentators find the arguments in the Hyp II much 
easier to tackle. Although we are facing contradiction in each deduction - that the 
Unity is F and is not F; the contradiction is only apparent because the conclusions 
that the Unity is F and the Unity is not F are reached in different ways. Basically, 
we can trace two lines ofreasoning, one concludes that the Unity is F and the other 
concludes that the Unity is not F. Although we start from the same subject, in Hyp 
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II, Plato discusses the same subject from different aspect, thus, we have: the Unity 
is F and is not F. 
Therefore, with the proper qualification applies to each of the conclusion, 
the result seems unproblematic. A typical example ofthis is the Unity is older, 
younger and the same age with respect to itself or the others. ( Parmenides, 151e-
155c) 
Yet, occasionally, even with the qualification applies to them, the arguments 
still look bad, for example, the argument that the Unity is the same to the others. 
Furthermore, we have two proofs of the Unity is unlimited in Hyp II, and this 
redundancy becomes a battlefield for many commentators. Some says that the first 
7 
one is bad but Plato supplements it with a more accurate argument, some says that 
the two arguments are mutually dependent^, some claims that these two arguments 
prove two different sorts ofUnity, or Unity conceives in different ways^. 
Therefore, in my analysis of the Hyp II, I will focus on these two 
problematic areas, I will discuss the redundancy of the Unlimited Arguments and 
also the troublesome same/different arguments. In addition, I will touch on briefly 
the beginning ( Parmenides, 142b-c ) and the end ( Parmenides, 155c-e ) ofHyp 
11. 
7.1 (143 b - c ) The End o fHyp I and the BeginningofHyp 11 
Shall we return to the hypothesis and go over it again from the 
beginning, to see if some other result may appear? 
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By all means. 
Now, if unity is, the consequences that follow for it must accepted, 
whatever they happen to be? 
Yes. 
Then examine from the beginning. IfUnity is, can it be, but not 
have a share ofbeing? 
It cannot. 
Now, the being ofUnity is not the same as Unity; otherwise, it 
would not be the being of it, nor would Unity have a share ofbeing; 
rather, to say that Unity is would be like saying that Unity is Unity. But as 
it is, the hypothesis is not what must follow ifUnity is Unity, but what 
must follow ifUnity is. Not so? 
Certainly. 
So “ is “ signifies something other than “ one ‘‘？ 
Necessarily. 
So when someone says in short that Unity is, that would mean that 
Unity has a share ofbeing. 
Of course. ( Farmenides, 143b-c ) 
In this short exchange between Aristotle and Parmenides, Parmenides 
points out that Unity not “ is ‘‘, ‘‘ is “ not Unity, but “ is “ and Unity are necessarily 
combined or related. Thus, the original hypothesis is a Unity-Being complexus. 
This is the beginning of Hyp II, it is also the end of Hyp I，in Hyp I，Parmenides 
concludes that the Unity is not, therefore, the Unity is not even one. Readers are in 
a hopeless condition, however, at the beginning of Hyp II, Parmenides has 
provided some hint for the puzzles in Hyp I - “ is “ is different from Unity. Thus, 
Unity one. Unity not “ is “, “ is “ is, “ is “ not one. 
Recalling the methodological remarks that we are to consider what follows 
for the Unity in relation to itselfand in relation to others. At this point, it is clear 
that Hyp I considers Unity in relation to itself ( that is to say, we are not to consider 
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any further relations between Unity and others ), at the beginning ofHyp II, 
Parmenides considers a fundamental relation between “ is ‘‘ and Unity, thus, it is 
likely that Hyp II is considering Unity in relations to others. At this point, Unity is 
related to one of these others - “ is “ 
However, there are further puzzles that perhaps we should resolve it before 
we proceed to any other argument. The problem is whether we have a new subject 
such as a one entity, or things in general, or that we are still discussing the Form 
Unity. 
As I have mentioned in my discussion of the methodological remarks, I 
cannot tell whether Comford's or Allen's translation is more closer to the original. 
Nonetheless, I believe that the subject ofHyp II is still Form - the Unity. In 136a-b, 
according to Parmenides, 
Still again, should you hypothesize iflikeness is, or if it is not, what will 
follow on each hypothesis both for the very things hypothesized and for 
the others. The same account holds about unlikeness, and about motion 
and about rest..… 
Presumably, the examples that Parmenides mentioned are all Forms. In fact, 
to take the subject ofHyp II as Form is not altogether incompatible with 
Cornford's one entity or Miller's things because whether it is a thing or one entity, 
they both “ is “ and one, thus, a thing or a one entity participate in both Forms: 
Unity and Being. Further, to treat the Unity which is in Hyp 11 as a complexus of 
two Forms: Unity and Being; has one more advantage over Comford's one entity. 
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It is that we can avoid the identification of the One as one physical object or one 
number, or one magnitude in different deductions in Hyp II. Rather, we are 
considering how Unity is related to different Forms. When Unity relates to 
Squareness, a typical example ofthis complexus is a square - that is a physical 
object. IfUnity is related to Largeness/ Smallness, a typical example of this 
complexus is a large or small object - that is a magnitude. We no more need to 
introduce different subject to the Unity, instead, it is that when Unity is related to 
different Forms, we are to think ofas perhaps a physical object, a magnitude, or a 
number; yet the subject, after all, may remain the same. 
Notice that there are two kinds ofrelation between Forms. That the Form 
Beauty is one Form and so Beauty is related to the Form Unity, or that Beauty has 
a share ofUnity. On the other hand, that Helen is beautiful is a little complicated. 
For one thing, Helen must have a share ofBeauty in order to be beautiful. Yet, 
Helen is one person and therefore she is also one - that is to say, Helen also has a 
share ofUnity. In this indirect way. Beauty and Unity are related. In the Sophist, 
Plato had a very long discussion on such relation. Plato points out that the Form 
Existence is related to Motion and Rest. It is not the case that Forms move or is at 
rest such that Existence is related to Motion or Rest. Rather, according to Plato in 
the Sophist, it is that since whatever sensible particular exists, it must either move 
or at rest, thus, when sensible particulars partake in the Form Existence, they 
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necessarily partake either one of the Form - Motion or Rest, but not both. ( Sophist, 
249c-d) 
Thus, Forms are related when any F-ness, besides being F，also has features 
such as one, etemal... etc. In this case, F-ness is related to Unity, Etemity ... etc. 
On the other hand. Forms are also related for the sake ofparticipants, thus, when a 
participant participates in the Existence, it exists, but at the same time, it must 
either move or at rest, as a result, this participant must also relate to either one of 
the Form: Motion or Rest. Anyway, for a more fluent discussion, I shall regard the 
former relation as type I and the relation between Forms for the sake ofparticipants 
as type II relation. 
7.2 First Unlimited Argument (142 d - 1 4 3 a ) 
The 1st Unlimited Argument is relatively simple. Parmenides in the 
whole/part argument concludes that the Unity which is, when considering as a 
complexus, is a whole. On the other hand, consider its components, it has two 
parts, namely, being and unity. Based on this analysis, we can already conclude 
that “ the Unity which is “ is two for it consists of two parts. It is two and thus a 
Unity which is, is many. Nonetheless, Parmenides proceeds further; if we now 
simply consider one of these two components, say, being, since it is g m of the two 
components of the “ One which is “ complexus, it tums out that ‘‘ being “ also 
processes ofUnity. On the other hand, consider the other component - unity, since 
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it is one of the two components of the Unity-Being complexus, it also tums out that 
Unity must process ofbeing. According to Parmenides, the same account is always 
true: whatever becomes a part contains those two parts and thus the Unity which is 
would be unlimited in multitude. 
In this argument, Cornford gets into deep trouble and he is certainly aware 
ofit. IfHyp 11 is indeed a Pythagorean evolution, then we should expect that Plato 
would have started from the One as the first principle, from the One came an 
Indefinite Two, then numbers, from numbers, points; from points, lines; from lines, 
plane figures; from figures, solid; from solid, sensible bodies. However, in the 1st 
Unlimited Argument, there is no discussion ofnumbers, instead, only multitude is 
mentioned. Furthermore, it turns out that the One which is is divisible, and 
numbers or pluralities are “ generated by division. However, as we shall see, in 
Greek mathematics, One is not a number, rather, it is a unit, to be more precise, a 
unit that permits no further d iv i s ion . If it is indeed a Pythagorean evolution, then 
Plato should have skipped the first proof andjumped directly to the 2nd Unlimited 
Argument. In the second proof, as we shall see, numbers, to a certain degree, are 
generated. Cornford is certainly aware ofsuch difficulties and therefore he 
suggests that the division in the first argument is somehow mental rather than real -
it is shown that we can think ofUnity as infinite, not that it is infinite. Further, 
Comford believes that we should separate this part of deduction from the rest, for 
one thing, it is only mental, secondly, this part of deduction is valid against 
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historical Parmenides' thesis that the Unity is many is unthinkable." Therefore, 
Cornford believes that the real Pythagorean evolution will start from the 2nd 
Unlimited Argument, in the 2nd Unlimited Argument, numbers are deduced and 
thus the first step of the evolution is completed. The 1st Unlimited Argument, on 
the other hand, is only preparatory in a sense that it does not crank up the 
evolution, yet, it points out that unlike the Parmenidean homogeneous sphere 
which is one and not many, a One can be conceived as many. However, this sort of 
downplaying the importance of the 1st argument in order to explain away the 
redundancy is not very successful. Cornford has also said that it is possible to 
conceive One as many and that would re-open up a possibility that is being denied 
in Hyp I Yet, Comford's promise is only a blank cheque because the possibility to 
conceive the One as many belongs to the One which is, not the bare One in Hyp 1 -
they are two different subjects. 
I f the 1st Unlimited Argument cannot deny that the bare One is unthinkable, 
then the redundancy still exists. Perhaps we will have to accept the 1 st argument as 
mental. Yet, this suggestion is very unlikely because there is nothing in the text 
suggesting that this part is mental. Rather, the text suggests the opposite - whatever 
becomes a part contains those two parts ( Parmenides, 142e ). Not that we can 
think ofit , it is that it contains two parts. Therefore, Comford is facing difficulties 
in this part ofdeduction and his solution to those difficulties sounds not very 
convincing to me. 
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The trouble for Cornford is that this is only the beginning of the evolution 
and the One is not yet a magnitude. Therefore, division seems to be impossible. 
Cornford thus has no option left but to argue that this sort of division is only 
mental. Miller, on the other hand, argues in the opposite direction. According to 
Miller, this sort ofdivision is only possible in sensible things. Further, Miller 
points out that it is only the inexperienced Aristotle who allows such division on 
Forms and the readers are spur to do just the opposite. For Miller, the 1st argument 
offers an opportunity for the readers to see through the puzzle and re-affirm the 
distinction between Forms and things - Forms are incomposite, while things are 
composite and can be divided infinitely. Thus, the totally different conclusions 
from Hyp I and Hyp II play a very important role - to pinpoint the difference 
between incomposite Forms and composite things.'^ The trouble ofthis kind of 
dialectical activity is that the insight we grasp in the 1 st argument may not apply to 
other argument, lf the One in Hyp 11 must refer to concrete things, it is too 
concrete; because only numbers are discussed in the 2nd Unlimited Argument and 
certainly we are not to divide a number infinitely. The most serious problem for 
Miller's interpretation is that it makes the methodological remarks unintelligible. 
According to the methodological remarks, we are to consider ifUnity is, what 
follows for Unity in relation to itself and in relation to others .... and so on, 
however, treating the Unity in Hyp I as Forms and the Unity in Hyp II as things has 
nothing to do with the “ in relation to ‘‘ qualification. 
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Therefore, in light of the methodological remarks and also the difficulties of 
the multi-subject approach, I believe that Hyp II also deals with the same Form -
Unity, ln Hyp I, we have considered Unity in relation to itself, and by virtue of 
itself. Unity is one. I f " is “ signified “ being “�perhaps the best pros heauto 
statement that we can make is “ The Unity one “ In Hyp II, since we have already 
considered what follows for the Unity in relation to itself, we are to consider what 
follows for the Unity in relation to others ( other Forms ). Under what condition. 
Unity is related to some Forms, and also under what condition Unity is not related 
to other Forms, recall that in the Sophist, “ some blend, but some do not “ 
At the beginning ofHyp 11, Parmenides points out that the Form Unity is 
necessarily related to the Form Being. Starting from this original hypothesis, the 
1st Unlimited Argument seems to be straightforward enough. The 1st Unlimited 
Argument argues that under what condition the Unity is related to the Form Many. 
In the 2nd Unlimited Argument, Parmenides tells us how the Form Many is related 
to the Form Unity. In the 1st Unlimited Argument, since Unity is related to Being, 
we have a “ Unity-Being complexus “ Consider each of its component. Unity 
processes ofbeing because it js a part of the complexus. Being also processes of 
unity because it is o m part of the complexus. Thus, starting from the Unity-being 
complexus, as a whole, it is one complexus, yet, it contains two components and 
each components contains further sub-components. As a result, the Unity-being 
complexus contains many parts or components, it is many. 
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However, here comes a small puzzle. Starting from the Unity-being 
complexus, we have two parts - being and unity. Let us assume this as level 1 
division and thus we have beingl and unityl,then we proceed further and analysis 
each ofthese level 1 parts. It tums out that unityl, since it is, processes ofbeing. 
Let us take this being ofunityl as level 2 division, thus we have being2. This 
being2, since is one part of unityl, also processes unity, let us take this as unity3. 
Eventually, we will get unityl-being2-unity3-being4.... and so on. If we analyze the 
other component of the original unity-bemg complexus, we will get the series 
beingl-unity2-being3-unity4.... and so on. Obviously, we will have a unity-being 
complexus which consists ofmany. Yet, the trouble is that it seems there will be 
infinite numbers of unity and being. This violates the uniqueness ofForms. We 
may want to argue that at level 1, level 2 and so on, it is the same Unity that is 
related to being, lf that is true, then we will have to admit that unity is a 
component, a sub-component, a sub-sub-component.... and so on, or that Unity is 
divided, yet to admit this is problematic. 
In the Sophist, this puzzle is solved. Suppose we have a lot of Forms, say 
Beauty, Unity, Motion, Rest... etc. Each Form is different to others. In the Sophist, 
Plato argues that ifBeauty and Unity are different, it is not the nature ofBeauty 
that makes it different from Unity, nor it is the nature ofUnity that makes it 
different, rather, it is because these two Forms are related to a third Form, the 
Difference, that they are different. Suppose there are n Forms, then we have n ( n -
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1 )/2 pairs of Form, and the Form Difference has been related n ( n - 1 )/2 times. 
Further, the difference between Unity and Beauty is not the difference between 
Beauty and Motion. According to Plato, the Difference is thus parceled out,just 
like we have different branch of Knowledge ( Sophist, 258e-259c ). ln addition, 
Plato points out that the blending of Forms is somewhat like the alphabet system 
that some Forms are related frequently (like the vowels in the alphabets system ) [ 
Sophist, 253a ]. Consider the English alphabet system, if you ask me how many “ p 
“ is in the English alphabet system, my answer will be - there is one “ p “. Yet, if 
you ask me how many “ p “ appears in the word ‘‘ apple “, the answer is two. Thus, 
in such a curious way, Plato handles the One over Many problem or the Form and 
the immanent character problem in the Sophist. 
Therefore, there is only one Form for Unity and Being, but the Form Unity 
and the Form Being are related many times and also in many different ways. As we 
shall see in the 2nd Unlimited Argument, not only that Being is related to Unity; 
Numbers are also related to Unity and Being. 
7.3 The Second Unlimited Argument (143a-145a ) 
The 2nd Unlimited Argument is more complicated and it proceeds in three 
stages. 
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7.3a The First Stage: Being and Unity are different and thus they related to the 
Difference 
According to Parmenides, since Unity is not Being, but as one, gets a share 
ofBeing, the being of i t must be one thing, and it must be another. Further, Unity 
is not different from its being by virtue ofbeing one ( recall the argument of 
same/different in Hyp I) , nor is its being other than unity by virtue ofbeing; they 
are different from each other by virtue ofDifference. In the Sophist, Plato points 
out that Difference is the most prevailing Form, and we have a very similar reason 
here. 
7,3b The Second Stage: IfUnity is, number must also be 
According to Parmenides, it is possible to pick out, say, being and 
difference, or being and unity, or unity and difference, in this case, we pick a pair 
or a couple. Each is one and they are two. When two is added to one, the sum 
becomes three. Three is odd, two even. By multiplication of the first odd and the 
first even number, we have all numbers. Therefore, the second stage concludes that 
if Unity is, numbers must also be. 
7.3 c The Third Stage: IfUnity is, Unity itself must be many 
Ifnumber is, all numbers have a share ofbeing and each has a share, too. 
Since it is “ each “’ it is one. Thus, each number is one number. Since there are 
many numbers, each is and is one. Not only that being is related to limitless，so is 
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unity. In fact, both Being and Unity are related to each number, both Being and 
Unity are equally many. 
At this point, the 2nd Unlimited Argument is completed. Commentators 
generally agree that the 2nd argument is more acceptable. However, this seemingly 
good argument has different implications for different scholars. 
According to Comford, the 2nd argument generates numbers. Thus, this is 
the first step of the Pythagorean revolution. Once numbers are generated, more 
concrete elements, such as a magnitude, line, shape and physical bodies are 
evolved.i3 However, it is quite problematic that Platonic Forms can be generated as 
such. Nevertheless, this argument offers one ofthose rare opportunities for 
Cornford to connect the second half and the first half. According to Comford: 
We must not, therefore, shrink from the second hom of Parmenides' 
dilemma, or be afraid ( as Socrates was, 131c ) to say that a Form can be 
portioned out among things and still be one. In some sense this is 
demonstrably true, though not in the sense Parmenides suggested, that the 
Form is cut up into pieces, each of which would be smaller than the 
whole.i4 
Notice that in the 2nd Unlimited Argument, since each number is one 
number, all participate in the Form Unity, thus, the Form Unity are divided. In the 
1st Unlimited Argument, it is rather like a zoom in lens that we look at the Form 
closer and closer and eventually we find that the Unity-which-is contains many 
parts and thus it is many. On the other hand, in the 2nd Unlimited Argument, we 
have a zoom out lens that we first find one Form that has a share of Unity and 
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eventually we find many Forms that have a share ofUnity. In this regard, there is 
no redundancy, rather, Plato has offered us a more completed analysis of the Form 
Unity. However, Comford's treatment of the 1st Unlimited Argument as mental 
may miss a very important discussion on the Form Unity. 
On the other hand. Miller offers a totally opposite interpretation. Precisely 
because Forms cannot be portioned out, the One in Hyp 11 must refer to things. 
According to Miller, the phrases such as “ parceled out “, “ portioned out “, or “ 
distributed “�suggested spatial temporal relations and exactly at this point, Plato 
wants us to see through this spatial temporal limitation and grasp the unique and 
simple Form while letting this “ portioned out “, or “ parceled out “ confined to 
things.i5 (Interestingly enough, in the Sophist, Plato points out that Difference, 
like Knowledge, is parceled out, it seems if i t is the indeed that case that Plato 
wants to give up terminology such as “ parceled out “ in the Parmenides, he 
nonetheless re-uses it in the Sophist.) 
However, even if we see through the puzzle and re-affirm the simplicity and 
the uniqueness of Forms, the trouble still remains. If it is indeed that case that each 
number is one number, we still have to face the trouble: uniqueness of Unity vs 
many instance of unity in the numbers. Basically, we don't have difficulties when 
dealing with the difference between the unique Form and the composite things. 
The problem is their relations and if there is participation, then the uniqueness of 
Forms is at stake. According to Miller, Plato's discussion of Forms, up to the point 
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of the Republic, cannot altogether be free from the spatial-temporal determination 
and it is the task of the first half o f the Parmenides to make such limitation 
conspicuous.i6 Further, Miller believes that in the second half, Plato is offering us 
an opportunity to see through these puzzles and transcend ourselves from this 
spatial-temporal limitation.'^ Notice that the sub-title ofMiller 's book is “ The 
Conversion of Soul “ and such conversion is made possible by the philosophical 
depth of the Parmenides. IfMiller 's interpretation is correct, then Plato must have 
a new principle of education - if you cannot convince them, convert them. As I 
have mentioned earlier, Plato discussed the issue regarding the distinction between 
Forms and things in the Republic and the Phaedo and it is perfectly all right for 
Plato to once again stress the importance of such distinction. However, the more 
subtle problem in the middle theory is the problem of participation. As we have 
seen in our discussion o f the first half, the difficulty is that Forms will be divided if 
each participant gets a share ( The Paradox ofDivisibility f^ . The difficulty is not 
that we do not fully understand the Form-Thing distinction, it is rather that given 
the distinction as such，how can Forms not be divided or how can we preserve the 
uniqueness of Forms. In the 1st Unlimited Argument, Miller may have a case to 
support his Forms-things distinction because he can treat the division as actual. 
However, in the 2nd Unlimited Argument, there is no mention ofsuch division 
regarding numbers ( unlike things, each numbers cannot be divided ), instead, 
Plato tells us that each number is one number and therefore each has a share of 
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Unity and thus Unity is parceled out. Thus, when it comes to the issue of 
participation, simply re-affirming the distinction between Forms and things will do 
no good to the puzzles in the first half. As a result, I think Miller's interpretation 
can get through the 1st Unlimited Argument, but he is facing some big difficulties 
in the 2nd Unlimited Argument. Therefore, I find Miller's approach not very 
convincing and I am not able to be converted by him at this point. 
However, although 1 was not converted by Miller, I do find the 2nd 
Unlimited Argument convincing in another sense. For me, the 2nd Unlimited 
Argument is also straightforward and clear enough, ln the 2nd Unlimited 
Argument, Plato tells us that under what condition the Form Many, or Plurality, is 
related to the Form Unity. According to the methodological remarks, we are to 
consider ifUnity is, what follows for the Unity in relation to itselfand in relation 
to others ( other Forms ). ln the 1st Unlimited Argument, Plato works out how 
Unity is related to Many, or how Unity has a share ofMany; in the 2nd Unlimited 
Argument, Plato attempts to work out how Many or Plurality can have a share of 
Unity. Therefore, there is no redundancy regarding these two seemingly similar 
arguments (indeed, they are altogether different). The intention of Plato is clear 
enough but the 2nd Unlimited Argument is comparatively much longer than the 1st 
Unlimited Argument. Some steps do require a closer scrutiny. 
There is a dispute over whether numbers are generated in the 2nd Unlimited 
Argument. I find Allen's analysis in this regard most convincing. According to 
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Allen, the two arguments of unlimited are not redundant because Plato is dealing 
with two different kinds ofinfinity or Many: a dense infinity allied to that of 
continuity, typical of extensive magnitudes, and the infinity ofsuccession, typical 
of numbers.卜)Notice that such distinction may be of great value to Mathematician 
or for those who are interested in Greek philosophy of Mathematics. I am not 
denying that Plato might have been influenced by such Mathematical tradition, yet, 
such distinction can't help those who are puzzled by the Third Man, or any other 
puzzles in the first half. Anyway, although Allen's distinction between different 
kinds of infinity seems to be irrelevant to the Unlimited Argument, Allen's detail 
discussion of Greek number theory is very helpful in our understanding of the logic 
of the 2nd Unlimited Argument. 
Allen points out that Euclid defines numbers as “ a multitude of units “ and 
the definition has consequences. In the first place, it excludes zero as a number. 
According to Allen, 
It is natural to think of number as what answers to the question;‘ 
How many? ‘ and if you are asked how many books are on the table, the 
answer ‘ none ‘ is quite as appropriate as the answer ‘ ten ‘. The modern 
mathematician will think of ‘ none ‘ as by implication introducing zero, an 
interesting number with important properties. The Greek mathematician, 
along with untutored common sense, will think of ‘ none ‘ as denying that 
there is any number ofbooks on the table - not even one. It is not by 
accident that the verb arithmein, corresponding to the noun arithmos, 
number, means ‘ to count'. Zero, since it is not a counting number, is not 
a number. 
The definition has other consequences. If number is a plurality of 
units, fractions will not be numbers: 2/3 represents the ratio of two to 
three; it cannot represent a number smaller than one, the unit, for the unit 
is indivisible.2() 
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According to Allen, given the understanding ofnumbers as such, there will 
be no negative number, irrational number, and complex number. Furthermore, it 
tums out that one is not a number. According to Aristotle ( Meta XIV, 1088a ), 
‘The one ‘ means the measure of some plurality, and ‘ number ‘ means a 
measured plurality and a plurality measures. 
Therefore, for the Greek, the number series starts from 2. The first even 
number is 2 while the first odd number is 3. 
The questions remain, how do we conceive mathematical operation such as 
addition or multiplication and also, how do we conceive Form ofNumber, such as 
Twoness, Threeness,... etc. Regarding the second question, Allen has a long 
quotation from Cook Wilson: 
Plato's idea is of course the Universal. ( According to the One over many 
principle, since we have one Form over many instance of it, it is universal, 
at the same time, since there is only one F-ness, it is particular, therefore, I 
think Cook Wilson's ‘ Universal ‘ does not have any Aristotorean 
connotation.) We are not concerned here with what is peculiar to his view 
of its nature, but with part of it, which all must accept, and upon which 
Plato laid great stress: namely, the assertion that the Universal is one - a 
unity, that is, in contrast with the manifold to which it corresponds. This 
means that whereas there are many circles, for instance, Circularity, the 
Universal, is one - there is only one Circularity .... ‘ The Number Two ‘ � a s 
we call it, is a Universal: it is ‘ Twoness ‘ in general, and there is only one 
‘ Twoness ‘ ..... Now, ‘ the Number Two ‘ thus accurately understood, 
cannot enter into a process of summation like a particular two. ‘ Two and 
two make four ‘ means two things added to two other things of the same 
kind amount to four things. The proposition is a universal one because it 
stands for ‘ any two things added to any other two things, etc. etc.,' but not 
because it means an addition of universals. It does not mean, that is, that 
twoness added to twoness is foumess ..... Thus ‘ the Number Two ', ‘ the 
Number Three ', etc., do not consist of units and are not capable of 
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i 
numerical addition in the same sense as a two and a three, by the 
21 
combinations of units. 
Based on the quotation, Allen concludes that these Ideas ( Numbers ) are 
not pluralities of units, but the number-properties of such pluralities. Therefore, we 
are not to find two Forms “ Unity “ adds up in Twoness. On the contrary, Twoness 
and Threeness refer to different properties. However, if that is the case we 
conceive Number, and each Form denotes some different properties, what makes 
mathematical operation possible? ln reply to this question, Allen relies on some 
unpublished notes on Plato's philosophy ofmathematics written by professor 
Harold Chemiss. According to Allen, 
Thus, for example, 2 < 5 does not imply that there are fewer units in 2 
than in 5, since each ofthose numbers is itself a single unit, lt rather 
expresses the fact that 2 is prior rather than posterior to 5 in the series of 
integers. It implies, of course, that there are fewer units in a plurality that 
partakes of 2 than in a plurality that partakes of 5, for 2 and 5, remember, 
are Ideas - but it is the order of priority and posteriority, or positions in the 
series, that explains arithmetical operations. Thus, 2 + 2 = 4 means that 
we start from the first number in the series ( 2 is the first number ) and 
count 2 places forward, it is 4. Therefore, what makes 2 + 2 = 4, it is the 
position ofTwoness and Fourness in the series that makes it.^ ^ 
Having equipped with the necessary historical background, we can now 
discuss the 2nd Unlimited Argument. 
Stage I is straightforward. We only need to notice that the Form, Difference, 
and its relation to the Unity and Being, these will be discussed in the 
same/different argument again. Anyway, stage I correctly points out that 
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Difference is related to Unity and Being. It is not the case that by virtue of Being 
or Unity that makes Being different from Unity, it is rather by virtue of Difference 
that makes Being different from Unity. 
Since we now have three Forms, namely. Unity, Being and Difference, we 
can select any of the two and group them together. Thus, we have three couples: 
Unity - Being, Unity - Difference, and Being - Difference. Consider what they 
have in common - they are all couples or a group of two. 
Without any historical background, the reasoning here seems redundant and 
excessive. Starting from the Unity which is, as a whole, it is one. Consider each 
part, it has two parts. Further, Difference is introduced, we then have three,... and 
so on, we can in fact generate numbers this way. Why then Plato makes such a big 
loop to reach two? 
The question can be answered in two steps. First ofall, we can argue that 
since one is not a number, Plato doesn't start from the One-is complexus as a one 
whole. However, this only answer part of the question. We still not able to explain 
why Plato troubles himselfso much to make three pairs. 
The answer, I believe, is that according to Plato's philosophy of 
Mathematics, Twoness is conceived as property which is different to Unity or 
Threeness ... so on. Rather than simply pointing out Unity and Being as two parts 
and giving us a misconception that Twoness is two things or two “ ones “ add up, 
Plato arranges three pairs, each pair consists ofdifferent components and thus they 
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are different pairs. In this way, Plato can pinpoint the number properties ofthese 
different pairs; namely, they are a “ dual “ Further, when we look at these three 
different pairs, what is common to them is the property of twoness - that these 
three pairs display the one and the same property, namely, twoness. Thus, the three 
pairs arranged as such provides us an opportunity to grasp the notion “ Dual “ or “ 
Twoness “ as distinct from Unity. In addition, we see that there is one single 
property denoting such pairs. At this point, we have the first number, two, or the 
first number Form, Twoness, in fact, to be more precise, we grasp the number 
property ofTwoness and that Twoness is a single property (that every group of 
two will display such very same property ). Consider Parmenides' challenge to 
Aristotle, 
But for whatever is rightly called both, is it possible that they should be 
both but not two? 
It is not. 
But for whatever is rightly called both, is there anyway in which each of 
two is not one. 
No. (Parmenides, 143d ) 
Notice that Parmenides' emphasis here, instead ofpinpointing that there are 
parts in a pair, Parmenides paid his attention on the “ each ‘‘ aspect - that these 
pairs are a both, a pair, or a dual. 
Parmenides next proceeds to consider more new groups: 
But if each if them is one, then when any one whatever is added to any 
couple whatever, does not the same become three? ( Parmenides, 143d ) 
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According to Parmenides, we may start from any couple. Let us consider 




As I have mentioned above, when we see these three pairs, we grasp the 
number property oftwoness. We now add one more component to this couple ( at 
this point, Parmenides does not specify what sort ofone we are to add to the 
couple), assume this time we add a component call “ X “ Then we have three new 
groups: 
( X , Unity, Difference ) 
( X , Unity, Being ) 
(X，Being, Difference ) 
Now we ask the same question - what is common to all these new groups. 
We look at them and think hard enough. Bingo! We get it, they are all a “ trio “ � 
thus we grasp the notion o f " Threeness “ and we have the first odd number. 
Thus far, we grasp the first odd number and the first even number. But to 
accept any mathematical truth is to accept every mathematical truth; the existence 
ofany number implies the existence ofevery number. Therefore, Parmenides 
concludes that “ ifUnity is, Number must also be “ 
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Notice that if my interpretation is sound, the 2nd Unlimited Argument does 
not generate numbers. Instead, the stage 11 of the 2nd Unlimited Argument is a 
setup to provide us an opportunity to conceive the property ofdifferent numbers or 
pluralities. With components grouped in different ways, we eventually grasp the 
properties ofTwoness and Threeness. Thus, according to Allen, Parmenides has 
presented, not a generation, but an existence proof?; Notice that the existence 
proofhas very important philosophical implication, not only that it provides us a 
chance to grasp these number properties, it also shows us that each number 
property is a single property. Although we have seen three different pairs, they 
nonetheless display a single property. Eventually, Plato could argue that each Form 
ofNumber is one because it is indeed the case that there is only one and the same 
property twoness displaying by those three different pairs. 
Once we grasp the notion ofNumbers - Twoness, Threeness .... and so on. 
Since each Form is, and is one (that Twoness is one because we do see three 
different pairs displaying the same and one property and that Twoness is because 
we are able to grasp such property ), each Number is related to Being and Unity. 
Thus, we have infinite number of the Forms of Number that are related to the 
Form, Unity. Therefore, Parmenides concludes that Unity itselfmust be many. 
In the 1 st Unlimited Argument, Plato argues that the Form Unity has a share 
of Many because the Form Unity also displays the feature ofmany for it consists of 
parts. In the 2nd Unlimited Argument, Plato is arguing that there are many Forms 
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that have a share ofUnity, thus. Many has a share ofUnity. In fact, both Peterson 
and Meinwald endorse such interpretation but precisely how Plato reaches this 
conclusion, they haven't said much.^^ Therefore, my analysis of the 1st and the 
2nd Unlimited Argument does not offer anything innovative, rather, with the help 
ofAllen's detail analysis of the Greek philosophy ofMathematics, I have tried to 
explicate the logic of the 1st and the 2nd Unlimited Argument. 
7.4 Same & CHfferent (146 a - 147 b ) 
Basically, like the same/different argument in Hyp 1, we are to consider four 
possibilities: 
a) The Unity is the same as itself. 
b) The Unity is different from itself. 
c) The Unity is different from others. 
d) The Unity is the same as others. 
In Hyp I, we are unhappy with the result because we want to preserve self-
sameness and difference from others. In Hyp II, we are equally unhappy because 
Parmenides has accepted all four possibilities. We simply do not want self-
difference and others-sameness. 
Notice that the proofs in Hyp II are more complicated than those of Hyp I. 
In Hyp 1, Plato had argued that Unity, is not by virtue of itself, the same, or 
different to itselfand to others. In Hyp II, we are to consider four alternatives, 
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namely, same, different, part to whole, and whole to part. Since these four 
alternatives are seemingly exhaustive, some commentators believe that conclusions 
are reached by the method of reduction. According to this approach, we are to 
cross out three alternatives as impossible, we thus have no option left but to accept 
the last one. 
a) The Unity is the same as itself - The conclusion that the Unity is the same 
as itselfis reached by reduction. Parmenides first argues that Unity is not part of 
itself, nor Unity is the whole of itself. Thus, two alternatives are rejected. Next, 
Parmenides moves on to point out that Unity is not different from itself. Notice that 
Parmenides does not argue against the third alternatives, rather, he takes it as 
obviously true. In this way, three alternatives are crossed out and we must accept 
that the Unity is the same as itself. 
b) The Unity is different from itself - The conclusion that Unity is different 
from itself is not reached by reduction. Rather, Parmenides specifies the conditions 
under which the Unity is different from itself. Part of the conclusion is based on 
the previous conclusion that the Unity which is, is either in motion or at rest. If it is 
in motion, then it is in another because what is always in another must never be in 
the same, and therefore never at rest. On the contrary, the Unity which is is also at 
rest because it is also in itself. 
In fact, Cornford's Pythagorean evolution is quite correct but its meaning to 
the Hyp II must be carefully specified. It is not that we have several notions o f " 
165 
the One ‘‘ and that a physical body or a one thing is evolving. Rather, it is that the 
relation between Unity and Being is an appropriate relationship in case o f a one 
entity. As the argument proceeds, Parmenides is considering whether other Forms 
can also relate to the Unity and Being. In case ofNumbers ( which is a sub-class of 
one entity), then relation to the Form Many is also appropriate, ln case o f a 
physical body, the relation to Shape is appropriate, and so on ..... 
Therefore, in b), Parmenides is considering whether the Form Difference is 
related to Unity. According to Parmenides, the relation between Difference and 
Unity is appropriate in case of a physical body. Such physical body is certainly a 
one-which-is, Parmenides in the previous argument had argued that such body will 
be in itselfand in another. It is also in motion or at rest. Furthermore, such one-
which-is is located in space, therefore, Parmenides argues that the One-which-is is 
different with respect to itselfbecause what is in something must different from 
itself. 
However, my analysis of the One which is and its relation to the Form 
Difference is not a evolution, there is no physical body evolving from a magnitude, 
rather, Parmenides is trying to specify under what circumstance that Unity is 
related to the Form Difference with respect to itself. It tums out that in case o f a 
physical body, it is one body, therefore, it is a one-which-is, such complexus also 
related to the Fonn Difference because the One-which-is is located in space, that 
is, in something that is different. 
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c) The Unity is different from others - Parmenides only argues briefly for c), 
and he has very good reason to do so. Notice that he had argue in detail in 142b-c 
that Being and Unity are different. Their difference is not by virtue ofUnity, nor 
Being, instead, it is by virtue of Difference that Being and Unity are different. In 
the Sophist, Plato points out that Difference is the most prevailing Forms.( 
Sophist, 259a) The reason is obvious, since there are so many different Forms and 
each different to others. Also notice that the One in b) may be confined to physical 
objects, yet in c), the One can refer to Forms, not only that any one entity may be 
different to other entity and therefore they relate to the Form Difference, in fact, 
this is also true in case ofForms because Forms also partake in the Form 
Difference in order to display difference. Recall that Plato had argued for this 
position in the beginning of Hyp II. For Comford, he may face some 
embarrassments here because the evolution he proposed is not so smooth as he 
might expect. First of all, that the One had already been evolved into a physical 
body in the previous motion/rest argument, and then once again, the One evolved 
into a physical body in b), then all o f a sudden, in c), according to Comford, the 
One should refer to Numbers. However, the trouble is, that the One in c) seems to 
have a much larger scope than that ofb) , Cornford also admitted this: 
The difference here defined is ( referring to the argument Parmenides 
proposed that the One is different from the others ), as we have remarked, 
numerical difference, or at least primarily that, though the argument 
would apply equally to conceptual difference.�^ 
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It seems to me that Comford gets into deep trouble when he attempts to 
incorporate the Pythagorean Evolution into the interpretation ofHyp II. As we 
shall see in the last part of the same/different argument, Comford is having big 
difficulties. 
d) The Unity is the same as others - This is perhaps the most troublesome 
argument in Hyp II. The conclusion is reached by reduction. The argument 
proceeds in three steps. Parmenides first works out the relation between Sameness 
and Difference. Then, Parmenides argues that since Unity is related to Sameness, 
given the fact that Sameness is not related to Difference, Unity is not related to 
Difference. Finally, Parmenides argues that Unity and Others are not related as 
parts ofwhole, or whole ofparts, three alternatives are rejected, we have no option 
but to accept the last alternative; that is - Unity is the same to others. 
In step I, Parmenides argues that Sameness and Difference are opposites 
and thus Sameness will never be in what is different, nor Difference in what is the 
same. Thus, Difference cannot in anything for any length of time. According to 
Chen, if i t is the case that Difference is in X from T1 to T2, then Difference is in X 
starting from T1 and also in X at T2. In this case. Difference is in the same X from 
T1 to T2. It turns out that Difference is in what is the same.^^ Therefore, 
Parmenides argues that it is not possible for Difference to relate to anything 
whatsoever, without relating to Difference, Unity and others cannot be different, 
because Unity, by virtue of itself, will not make it different, and others, by virtue of 
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themselves, will not make them different also. As a result, it is impossible for the 
Unity and others to be different from one another. 
However, Parmenides' argument can go either way, 1 can also argue that 
sameness will never be in what is different, let say sameness is in X from T1 to T2, 
since T1 and T2 are different time, sameness cannot be in X. Furthermore, 1 think 
Parmenides had made a very curious move in this part of the deduction, ln the 
Phaedo, Plato had a lengthy discussion on opposite properties, that hotness 
withdraws when coldness is approaching and also that tallness never permits 
shortness and so on ( Phaedo, 102c-103a )• Nevertheless, as we have seen in the 
1 st and 2nd Unlimited Argument, Parmenides argued that. Unity must relate to the 
Form Many and Many also relates to Unity, presumably. Unity and Many are 
opposite to each other. It tums out that some Forms do permit their opposite. Yet, 
in the Sophist, according to Plato: 
So too, supposing Motion itself did in any way participate in rest, there 
would be nothing outrageous in speaking of it as stationary. But it does not 
in fact participate in rest at all. ( Sophist, 256b-c ) 
Notice that in the Sophist, Plato is willing to point to the fact that Motion 
does relate to Sameness and Difference in different circumstance, yet, Plato, in the 
above quotation, seems to deny any relation between Motion and Rest, though the 
Form Motion is seemingly stationary. Thus, it seems to me that regarding 
participation，Plato had achieved a major breakthrough in the Sophist and that 
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Plato is modifying his view such that Forms also participate in other Forms so as to 
display certain features. Yet, regarding relation between opposite Forms, it seems 
to me that Plato yields no ground. Notice that Plato's insistence on non-relation 
between opposite Forms is a potential trouble for both his middle theory in the 
Phaedo and his modified view in the Sophist. 
Thus, the way Parmenides is arguing in d) is understandable because the 
view that Forms do not permit their opposites is the stronghold that Plato never 
gives up in both his middle and late dialogue. Yet, such view is problematic and in 
fact, such bigotry has already caused some embarrassments to Plato and Plato is 
forced to admit that though Motion is stationary, it does not partake in Rest - a very 
curious admission. 
Next Parmenides argues that since difference is neither in Unity and others, 
then it is not by virtue ofDifference that Unity is different from others and vice 
versa. Further, they are not different from each other by virtue ofthemselves. Thus, 
Unity and others are not different. At this point, the first alternatives is crossed out. 
In step 2, Parmenides moves on to deny any whole/part relation between 
Unity and others. According to Parmenides, we have on the one hand. Unity; and 
on the other hand, things and Forms other than Unity. Thus, things not one do not 
have a share of Unity, for then they would not be not one, but somehow one. ln 
this case, the others are not even numbers, for it has been shown in the 2nd 
Unlimited Argument that Numbers also partake in the Form Unity. Since we have 
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Unity on one side and the others which are in no sense one on the other side. Unity 
and the others defined as such would not get involve in any whole/part relation, 
thus, two more alternatives are crossed out. As a result, we will have to admit the 
last alternatives, that Unity is the same to others not one. 
Notice that step 2 is also problematic. In the 1st and 2nd Unlimited 
Argument, Parmenides had already shown us that Unity does have other Forms as 
parts and also that other Forms also participate in the Form Unity. These are not 
simply some empty claims from Parmenides, in fact, Parmenides had demonstrated 
to us that when looking at different pairs, we do grasp the number property of 
Twoness - that these pairs are a duel and we grasp a single property, therefore, we 
see that Twoness is a single property and therefore Twoness is one pros ta alla. 
However, in the same/different argument, Parmenides claimed that the others are 
completely not one because they are not related to Unity, precisely what these 
others are and how they look like when they are perceived without unity as part, 
Parmenides did not mention. 
According to Comford, the reduction proceeds in two steps, Plato is arguing 
that the Unity and the others are not different, next, Plato moves on to reject 
whole/part, thus we have no option left but to accept the last one. Further, 
Cornford points out that the two steps are independent of one another. In the first 
part, the One means one thing and others means other one thing. Thus, the One 
and others are numerically different but conceptually the same, ln step 2, according 
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to Cornford, we have a different notion o f " One “ and “ others “ Thus, we have a 
“ One “ that is one in every sense and the others as an indefinite multitude, and 
numerical difference vanished.^^ 
However, there are two criterion for a successful reduction. The first is that 
the alternatives we are considering are really exhaustive. Let us assume that it is 
the case in the same/different argument. (In fact, those four alternatives 
Parmenides proposed is problematic because although those four alternatives are 
exhaustive, they are not independent to one another, let say i fwe by reduction 
prove that Unity is different to others, then Unity and others must also relate as 
whole/part because ifi t is the case that Unity and others have a share of 
Difference, then both Unity and others will have one part of difference as their 
parts, since others have one part ofdifference, others also display unity, thus, 
others also have unity as their parts. This is the logic of the 1 st Unlimited 
Argument. Thus, we see that there are certain overlapping in those four 
alternatives.) The second criterion for a successful reduction is that we are 
actually doing reduction on the same subject. Let's say George is either a doctor, a 
lawyer, or driver. First ofall, George is not a doctor, next’ we found out that 
George is not a lawyer, so we have no option left but to admit that George is a 
driver. However, if according to Comford's interpretation, then there are certain 
ambiguities in the term “ George “ � i t tums out George Bush is not a doctor and it 
is only the case that George Washington is not a lawyer, in this case, we prove 
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nothing because the subject does not remain the same. Precisely because Comford 
treats the two steps as independent, that the others in step 1 refer to some other one 
thing and the others in step 2 refer to others totally not one, there is no hope that he 
will have a successful reduction. 
The conclusion that the Unity is the same to others completely not one also 
causes embarrassment to Chen's interpretation. It tums out that although most 
results in Hyp II are “ positive “ or acceptable, at least in the final part of the 
same/different argument, the conclusion is unacceptable. Instead ofdownplaying 
the difficulties，Plato, in the last part of the same/different argument, makes it even 
worse. Plato might simply argue that the Unity is the same to others, yet, Plato 
argues that the Unity is the same to others completely not one. 
1 do admit that the last part of the same/different argument is problematic. 
Especially for those people who treat any deduction as a proof. In fact, as we shall 
see in Hyp 111 and Hyp IV, if we treat any deduction as a proof, then Plato is 
proving that the others is a indefinite mess prior to their relation to Unity. The fact 
is, Plato is not trying to prove that there is such a unlimited multitude in Hyp III, or 
that there is such a mess in Hyp IV, or that the others will appear large, but take a 
closer look, it is not so in Hyp VII, it is rather that Plato is trying to explicate the 
importance for the others to have a share of Unity, otherwise, we will have to 
admit such unacceptable result. Actually, 1 believe that Plato is doing exactly this 
in the last part o f the same/different argument. That we are considering a 
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hypothetical situation - what if the Unity and the others do not relate to each other 
as whole/part. If it is the case that the Unity is the same to others completely not 
one, in what sense they are the same. Plato does not answer this question in Hyp II. 
Yet, he does answer it in Hyp III，Hyp IV and Hyp VII. It tums out that these 
others will be totally indefinite without relating to the Unity, and at best, according 
to the deduction in Hyp V11, these others will appear the same to the Unity, yet, 
take a closer look, it is not quite so. Again, I will take the last part of the 
same/different argument as true tentatively and wait for Plato to defend himself in 
those subsequent hypotheses. Nonetheless, the last part of the same/different 
argument is philosophical illuminating because it stirs us to re-consider the 
importance o f the relation between Unity and the others as whole to parts. 
7.5 Conclusion ( 155c-e ) 
In the conclusion, Parmenides argues that there would be knowledge & 
opinion & perception of Unity, further. Unity has a name & an account; Unity is 
named & spoken of. The conclusion in Hyp 11 is completely contradicting with that 
o f H y p l . 
I fmy analysis is correct and i f i t is indeed the case that pros heauto/pros ta 
alla distinction is the clue to intersectional contradiction, then we should expect 
the conclusion o fHyp 11 to mean that ifUnity is allowed to relate to many other 
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Forms, Unity would have a name & an account. Also, there would be knowledge & 
opinion & perception ofUnity. 
In the conclusion ofHyp I, there would be no knowledge, opinion & 
perception ofUnity. The conclusion ofHyp 1 points to the fact that whether Unity 
is knowable, perceptible or opininable is not part of the nature or definition of 
Unity. Yet, Unity does have these features by relating to the Form Knowledge and 
other Forms. Therefore, when considering Unity in relation to others, it is indeed 
the case that we should have knowledge, opinion and perception of the Unity. 
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Chapter 8: Hvp IIA: A Reconciliation between Hyp 1 and Hyp 11 
According to the methodological remark, we should examine what follows 
for the Unity and the Others, in relation to itselfand in relation to others, i f the 
Unity is and i f the Unity is not. Thus, the methodological remarks, if i t is 
interpreted this way，should generate eight deductions altogether. Yet, we 
apparently have nine sections due to the fact that there is an “ additional “ section -
that is Hyp llA. 
Thus, the status of Hyp lIA becomes another battlefield for different 
scholars. Some believe that Hyp IlA is an additional section while other scholars 
believe that Hyp IIA forms an appendix to the Hyp I and Hyp II/ I am in favor of 
the latter position, lt is because the opening of Hyp 11A also makes it clear that we 
are to reconsider the issue one more time. According to Parmenides: 
Let us take the matter up still a third time. If Unity is as we have described 
it, then since it is both one and many and neither one nor many and has a 
share of time ..... ( Farmenides, 155e ) 
Instead ofgenerating new result, the opening o fHyp IIA summarizes the 
results generated so far. In Hyp I, we consider what follows for the Unity in 
relation to itself, if the Unity is; in Hyp II, we consider what follows for the Unity 
in relation to others, i f the Unity is. According to Parmenides, we are to pick up the 
issue a third time. At this point, it is not clear whether Hyp IlA is an additional 
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section or simply an appendix and Parmenides does not make it explicit. Anyway, 
as we shall see in the coming analysis, it is more likely that Hyp lIA is an appendix. 
Notice that the summary includes results from both Hyp I and Hyp II, from 
Hyp 1，we have the Unity that is neither one nor many, from Hyp II, we have the 
Unity that is both one and many. According to Chen, he believes that Hyp IIA is a 
continuation ofHyp II. ln Hyp 11, Parmenides considers categories such as small, 
large, equal, is or is not. In Hyp IIA, Parmenides further considers categories such 
as “ becoming “ � “ ceasing to exist “ � “ assimilation “ � “ dissimulation “ � “ 
increasing “ or “ decreasing “2 However, that Hyp IIA is a continuation ofHyp II 
is problematic because Parmenides never makes it explicit that he is continuing 
from Hyp II. Instead, Parmenides summarizes the results from both Hyp I and Hyp 
II. Therefore, it is quite unlikely that Hyp IIA is only a continuation of Hyp II. 
Further, the discussion of‘‘ instance “, which 1 believe is a reconciliation of Hyp I 
and Hyp II, also tells against the belief that Hyp IlA is only a continuation of Hyp 
II. 
Therefore, I believe that in Hyp IIA, Plato is discussing something that is 
relevant to both Hyp 1 and Hyp II. 
Parmenides first argues that since Unity is both one and many and neither 
one nor many and has a share oftime and also not has a share oftime. Unity 
sometimes is and sometimes is not. Therefore, Unity sometimes has a share and 
sometimes does not have a share of being. Further, it is not the case that Unity has 
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a share of Being and not has a share at the same time. Rather, Unity has a share at 
one time and not has a share at some other time. 
The deduction is true given that we accept the conclusions ofboth Hyp I 
and Hyp II. In Hyp I, Parmenides argues that since Unity does not partake oftime, 
it does not partake ofBeing, therefore. Unity is not. In Hyp II, Parmenides argues 
that since Unity is, it must partake ofBeing. Further, we must take both deductions 
from Hyp I and Hyp II as positive. If we believe that the Unity destroys itselfin 
Hyp I, then we may expect some embarrassment here. If Unity must relate to Being 
in order to generate some positive result and Unity without Being destroys itself, it 
is curious at this point why Parmenides still considers both alternatives - Unity has 
a share and not has a share as possible. 
There is another complication in the deduction in Hyp lIA that perhaps 
requires some clarification. According to the middle theory, any Platonic Form is 
etemal. ln the Phaedo, Plato points out that there are some properties that are 
etemally related, for example, Hotness and Fire. ( Phaedo, 103c-e ) In the Sophist, 
Plato also says that some Forms are eternally related to other Forms. ( Sophist, 
254e ) Ifthat is the case, how can Unity at any time not has a share ofBeing. 
According to Chen, the being ofUnity is not intrinsic. Unity's nature one, not is. 
Further, Chen believes that the being ofUnity is additional, that is to say, besides 
its own nature as one. Unity also relates to Being ] I believe that Chen is correct in 
this regard. When considering Unity in relation to itself, or asking what is the 
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definition ofUnity, Being is indeed not part of the definition ofUnity. The 
moment when we grasp the notion “ Unity “, we do only grasp that Unity as one 
absolutely. 
Although Unity always relates to the Form Being for all Platonic Forms are 
eternal, when considering the notion “ Unity “ � i t is indeed true that we do not call 
up the notion “ Being “ to account for the nature of Unity as one. Further, in order 
to grasp the notion “ Unity “ fully, it is better to remove those features that is not 
intrinsic to the Unity. Notice that Parmenides had done this once in the 2nd 
Unlimited Argument: 
Ifby reflection we take Unity itself, which we say has a share of Being, 
just alone by itself, without that of which we say it has a share, will it 
appear to be one only, or will that very thing appear many as well? 
One, I should think. ( Parmenides, 143a ) 
According to Parmenides in the 2nd Unlimited Argument, Unity appears 
one only when our reflection focuses on Unity just alone by itself, without 
considering any relation with any other Forms. As Hyp IIA proceeds, we will come 
across frequently such “ stripping o f f " offeatures until at the instance, we grasp 
the nature of Unity, without relating to any other Forms. Notice that ontologically 
speaking，Forms are always eternal. Yet, our reflection can single out the particular 
nature of a Form. 
Having settled the complication of to share or not to share, we can now 
move on to the next deduction. According to Parmenides, since Unity sometime 
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has a share of Being and sometimes not. There must be time when Unity is getting 
a share and letting the being-part go. When Unity is getting a share, it is becoming, 
when Unity is letting go its being-part, it is perishing. 
The reasoning here is very similar to that of the Phaedo. In the Phaedo, 
Plato points out the approaching and withdrawing of the immanent characters ( 
Phaedo, 102e ). Although the approaching and withdrawing of Forms, or 
immanent character is curious, it is nonetheless Plato's treatment of i t in the 
Phaedo and we see the same sort of argument here. Parmenides next moves on to 
discuss the withdrawal and approaching of more opposite characters. 
Having discussed the approaching and withdrawal ofbeing, Parmenides 
moves on to discuss three more pairs - one/many, like/unlike, and 
large/small/equal. Again, the Unity is capable oftaking and letting go these 
opposite characters. In Hyp 11, we have considered what follows for Unity in 
relation to others, ifUnity is; and these three pairs have been discussed. Thus, it is 
very likely at this point that Parmenides is once again re-considering Unity in 
relation to others only. (In fact, I believe that in discussing these approaching or 
withdrawing of properties, Plato is referring to the Unity in Hyp 11 while in his 
discussion of the “ instance '‘, he is referring to the Unity in Hyp I). Notice that 
these three pairs, like the approaching and withdrawing ofbeing, also undergo this 
kind ofapproaching and withdrawing and the Unity will not have both opposites at 
the same time. 
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Nonetheless, the discussion of the opposite pair one/many does generate 
some puzzles. Parmenides argues that “ since Unity comes to be one and many, 
must it not combine and separate? “ It is not clear what does Parmenides mean by “ 
combine and separate “ I shall consider various options open to us. 
I) That “ separate ‘‘ should refer to Hyp I that when Unity is not related to 
others and ‘‘ combine “ should refer to Hyp 11 when Unity is related to others and 
thus forming various combination with other Forms. However,judging from the 
grammatical structure，the most obvious interpretation of the argument is that 
when Unity is combine, it is one; and when Unity is separated, it is many. Yet, 
unlike the result in Hyp 1 that Unity is neither one nor many, in Hyp IIA, when 
Unity is separated, it turns out that it is many. Also, we should expect that Unity, 
when combine with other Forms, would have displayed many different characters, 
yet, in Hyp IIA, it is argued that Unity, when combined, is one. Thus, this sort of 
interpretation is facing some difficulties. 
II) That combine and separate should be read in connection with the 
beginning ofHyp II that the Unity which is, as a whole, is one and yet this whole 
also consists of many parts and thus is many. Ifthis interpretation is true, then 
combine and separate are no more refer to both Hyp 1 and Hyp II, rather, they refer 
to a particular argument in Hyp II. I believe that this is the correct interpretation for 
it has certain advantage. First of all, the deduction in Hyp IIA runs very smooth if 
we take this interpretation, [t is because in this part of the argument, we can 
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confine ourselves to Hyp II only and until the discussion of the “ instance “ we will 
have a chance to come across the results in Hyp I and thus the reconciliation 
attempt between Hyp I and Hyp 11 becomes more obvious. Secondly, we don't have 
the difficulties in I). However, I must admit that the pair Plato chose to discuss 
created some unnecessary confusions. Plato did not choose the pair whole/part, 
rather, he chose the pair one/many when combine or separate. I fhe did choose the 
whole/part, he would have avoided these confusions. Notice that if we are to 
understand combine and separate solely in connection with the beginning ofHyp 
II, then Unity is one should mean that it is one Form or as a whole, it is one. That 
Unity is many means that Unity consists of parts and therefore it is many. At this 
point, we only look at the Unity as a one whole. We haven't yet penetrated or 
reflected enough on the notion “ Unity “ and thus we are still not able to grasp the 
notion “ Unity “ as one absolutely. In the next few steps, Plato will lead us to 
perform some sort ofexercise or procedure o f " stripping o f f " those inessential 
features that attached to the Form Unity and eventually at the instance, we grasp 
Unity as one absolutely. 
Parmenides now picks up another pair ofopposite that had been discussed 
in the previous hypothesis; Motion and Rest. Again, like those opposite pairs, one 
approaches when the other withdraws. Parmenides moves on to further explicate 
the changing ofthese opposite properties: 
But when it comes to rest after moving, and changes to being moved after 
resting, it is surely impossible for it to be in one time at all. 
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How so? 
It is not possible for it to be at rest before and moved afterward, or to be 
moved before and at rest afterward, without changing. (Farmenides, 156c 
) 
Notice that such moment ofchange is of very strange nature. Consider an 
object moving from T1 to T2 and then at rest from T2 to T3. T2 is the moment of 
change that Parmenides is interested in. Based on our description of such object 
with reference to time, such object is both at rest and in motion at T2, which is 
impossible according to Parmenides. Perhaps we may want to modify our 
description ofsuch object a bit - say the body is moving from T1 to T2 and at rest 
from T3 to T4. Again, Parmenides would have pointed out that such description is 
impossible because then we have to account for what happens between T2 and T3, 
T2 and T3 is certainly a stretch of time, yet, in this length of time, such body is 
neither moved nor at rest. According to Parmenides, there is no time in which it is 
possible for such object to be neither moved nor at rest ( 150c ). Since in any 
length of time, an object cannot be both at rest and in motion, nor can it be neither 
at rest nor in motion, such moment of change must be out oftime. Thus, 
Parmenides concludes that: 
The instant. For the instant seems to signify something such that change 
proceeds from it into either state. There is no change from rest while 
resting, nor from motion while moving; but this instant, a strange nature, 
is something inserted between motion and rest, and it is in no time at all; 
but into it and from it what is moved changes to being at rest and what is 
at rest to being moved. ( Farmenides, 156d-e ) 
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Thus, Parmenides points out that at the instant. Unity is neither moved nor 
at rest. Also, the same account holds for other pairs of opposite such as, one/many, 
is/is not, like/unlike and large/small/equal. 
At the instant. Unity is neither one nor many, neither is nor is not, neither 
like nor unlike, and also neither large, small, nor equal. Thus, at the instant, we 
have the “ negative'‘ Unity in Hyp I. 
Notice that with the exception of the pair is/is not, all the other opposite 
pairs are discussed in Hyp 1. In Hyp I, Parmenides does not discuss explicit on the 
opposite pair is/is not. Although Parmenides had pointed out that the Unity is not, 
because Unity has no share ofbeing Yet, Parmenides does not argue that Unity has 
no share o f " is-not “ At this point, we are not sure whether “ is-not “ refers to any 
properties or simply the absence ofbeing. Certainly, we may argue that the 
definition of Unity should not require the presence or the absence ofbeing. 
Anyway, Parmenides did not argue for such position, rather, according to 
Cornford, Parmenides takes a short cut because the problem ofbeing, or not being, 
is to be discussed in Hyp V and Hyp V I , Therefore, Parmenides has very good 
reason not to discuss this opposite pair in Hyp I. In Hyp IIA, although Parmenides 
does argue for this opposite pair, the argument is very brief. Anyway, the argument 
is sound. Iffrom T1 to T2, Unity has a share ofBeing and from T2 to T3 Unity 
does not have a share of Being, then at T2 Unity both has a share and not has a 
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share of Being, which is impossible. Only at the instant. Unity can neither has 
being nor not has being. Thus, at the instant. Unity neither is nor is not. 
Notice that the notion o f " is not “ is another trouble spot that Parmenides 
will re-consider in Hyp V and Hyp VI. Therefore, we will accept the claim that 
Unity neither is nor is not at the instant as tentatively true until our discussion of 
Hyp V and Hyp VI. 
Therefore, Hyp IIA is generally divided into two halves, in the first half, 
Parmenides discusses the approaching and withdrawing ofopposite properties, and 
we should understand this half in connection with Hyp II. Then in the rest of Hyp 
IIA, Parmenides introduces the notion o f " instant “ and at the instant. Unity is 
neither/nor. The question now remains - what is the philosophical significance of 
the “ instant “ ？ 
Unity, besides at the instant, is either/or. It is related to many other Forms. 
We have the Unity in relation to others. At the instant, all these relation are 
stripped off, we have a bare Unity, or Unity in relation to itself. Miller puts forward 
an example which is philosophical illuminating: 
To violate the abstractness of the hypothesis once again: in a host of ways, 
any living being - say, for example, an oak tree - is constantly changing. It 
grows from being smaller to being larger than “ the others “ around it; in 
its seasonal tumings it become unlike itself; in its rhythm of summer 
growth and winter dormancy, it alternates between motion and rest. 
Because it is constantly transiting between contrary states in these and 
other ways, it is also constantly passing through the ‘ instant'. In the ‘ 
instant '�however, it has neither of any of the contraries as a character, 
but, rather, is the atemporal One of hypothesis I; that is, in the ‘ instant', 
the Form - in this case, Oak - is present in the particular... ^  
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I think Miller's example is partly correct and partly incorrect. It is incorrect 
because the Form Oak is present not only at the instant. Form Oak is also present 
during the time when the oak tree is growing, or at rest, or in motion. Yet’ we 
grasp Oak as oak absolutely during the instant. On the other hand. Miller correctly 
pointed out that this oak tree, besides as an oak tree and participates in the Form 
Oak, is also in motion or at rest, or is larger, or small... etc. Thus, this oak tree also 
participates in the Form Largeness，Smallness, Motion or Rest at different time. In 
this case, the Form Oak is also related to many other Forms (type II )• Notice that 
this interpretation also agree with Plato's position in the Sophist. 
...when we speak of a man we give him many additional names - we 
attribute to him colors and shapes and sizes and defects and good 
qualities, and in all these and countless other statements we say he is not 
merely a ‘ man ‘ but also ‘ good ‘ and any number of other things. And so 
with everything else. We take any given thing as one and yet speak ofit as 
many and by many names. ( Sophist, 251 d ) 
However, a Platonist will be interested in the question what makes oak oak? 
In the windy winter, we have a moving oak. On a non-windy day during the 
summer, we have an oak at rest. In the dry winter, we have a dry oak and yet on a 
humid summer day, we have a wet oak. It turns out that an oak does have all these 
opposite properties at different time. In the early Socratic dialogues, the historical 
Socrates is always not satisfied with an example of F and keeps pressing on the 
question - what is F. In the middle dialogue, for example, the Bk. I of the Republic, 
though a lot of jus t acts have been discussed, Plato insists on the question - what is 
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Justice. Again, in the case of oak, a Platonist will not be satisfied with different oak 
trees or an oak tree at different time as an answer to the question “ what is oak? ‘‘ 
Perhaps an oak tree is moving, or at rest, yet, whether it moves or at rest doesn't 
make this oak tree more oak or less. In Peterson's term, move or not-move is 
simply not part of the definition of oak. 
The situation is rather like this: we want to know what is oak, or to grasp 
the notion “ Oak “ as absolutely oak. Unfortunately, we no more live in the world 
of Ideas, further, we no more remember our experience in the world ofIdeas. All 
we have before us is a particular oak tree. Certainly, this oak tree will have the 
immanent character, oak, in it. Yet, it also partakes in many other Forms such as 
Motion, Rest, Largeness, Smallness, or Equality. Therefore, an oak tree is only an 
imperfect resemblance to the Form Oak because the immanent character, oak，can 
withdraw, perhaps after a forest fire, or perhaps after a thunderstorm. Although 
this oak tree, during the time when it is living, never appears not oak, it 
nonetheless admits opposite properties; just like a finger, Plato points out that it 
doesn't appear not finger, yet it can be thick or thin when compare to different 
objects. ( Republic, 523d ) To a certain degree, the definition of oak is masked in a 
particular oak tree. We may point at an particular oak tree in windy winter and say 
that this is oak. A moving oak tree is certainly an oak tree but this is only an 
example ofoak. Further, moving is not part of what is to be oak. However, i fby 
our reflection, we focus on this oak tree, since neither in motion nor at rest makes 
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this oak more oak or less, we strip off this opposite characters. Further, we strip off 
any other characters which is irrelevant to the definition o f " Oak “�even coming 
to be or cease to be, or is/is not. Until at the instant, we reach the notion ‘‘ Oak ‘' as 
oak absolutely. 
I suggest that this is what Parmenides is doing in Hyp IIA. In stripping off 
all those opposites, we reach the notion “ Unity “ as absolutely one at the instant. 
By reflection, we begin from a one entity, this one entity partakes both being and 
unity, and perhaps many other Forms. In looking for the definition ofUnity, we 
strip offall those characters which is not part of the definition ofUnity, at the 
instant, we grasp it. At the instant. Unity is not one i f " is “ signifies in time 
because whether in time or not is not what is to be one. Thus, in Hyp IIA, 
Parmenides demonstrates to us how to start from the Unity which is in Hyp 11 and 
reach the bare Unity ofHyp I. Hyp IIA thus bridges the gap between Hyp I and 
Hyp II. 
The claim “ Unity is not one but that Unity one “ is curious. According to 
White: 
IfI say that a thing is a triangle, what I actually have in mind typically 
involves no reference to time at all. True, the thing that I refer to 
seemingly was previously and subsequently will be nontriangular. 
Nevertheless what I consciously think to say when I use the phrase ‘ is 
triangular ‘ is not ‘ is triangular ‘ or ‘ is triangular roundabout now ‘ or ‘ is 
triangular at 10:00am on such-and-such a date ', or anything of that kind. 
Rather, the consciously entertained meaning o f ' is triangular ‘ abstracts 
from and ignores all consideration of time. The point is not that it is felt to 
be talse to say that a thing is triangular when one knows that it is only 
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temporarily so. The point is that the introspectible notion expressed by the 
predicated incorporates no thought of time at all... 
White points out that a particular triangle is in time, yet, the introspectible 
notion “ Triangularity ‘‘ incorporates no thought of time. Notice that according to 
White, we may think about a particular triangle which is only temporarily so, yet, 
in answering the question ‘‘ what is triangularity? “, not only that triangularity 
neither was，is, nor will be, further, the tenselessness of triangularity is also out of 
our consideration, ln the case ofOak, in answering what is Oak, it is absurd to say 
that Oak is such-and-such and Oak either move or at rest and has many other 
opposite characters. It is absurd because the definition tells us too much. Again, if 
we say that Oak is such-and-such and Oak，as a Form, is eternal，unique ... etc., we 
are still saying too much about the definition ofOak. Certainly, once we grasp the 
notion ‘‘ Oak “ as oak absolutely, we can further examine if there is anything 
special about this notion, perhaps we should have a soul in order to grasp such 
notion, perhaps such notion is eternal, yet, I consider this to be only some second 
thought or further inquiry on such notion. 
I fmy analysis o fHyp IIA is correct, not only that it bridges the gap between 
Hyp I and Hyp II, it also solves some puzzles in the first half. Regarding the 
question on the extent of Forms that Plato is discussing in the Republic, on the one 
hand, the Argument of Opposite will severely limit the extent ofForms, for, man or 
finger never appears not-man or not-finger, it doesn't call upon our thought and if 
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there is Forms for such entity, we do not know. On the other hand, from Bk. X of 
the Republic, Form is perfect paradigm and Plato points out that there is a Form 
Bed which bed-makers look towards, yet, a particular bed never appears not-bed. 
We also have seen that how Parmenides makes such trouble conspicuous in the 
first half o f the Parmenides.^ 
In Hyp IIA, the discussion o f " instant “ bridges the gap between the 
Argument ofOpposite and the One over Many Argument in the Republic. Also, it 
suggests a solution to the problem regarding the extent ofForms. 
Man, although it never appears not-man, has many other features that is 
irrelevant to the definition ofMan. Only at the instant, when our reflection strip off 
those features such as motion/rest, good/evil,…，etc., we grasp the notion “ Man “ 
as man absolutely. Therefore, we are no more puzzled regarding if there is Form 
for Man, Fire or Water. Further, in case o fmud or dirt, whether mud is worthless 
or not doesn't make it more mud or less. Therefore, in principle, there should be 
Forms for mud or dirt. 
Gail Fine, in his book On Ideas, also reaches a very similar conclusion, 
though his conclusion does not base on the Parmenides: 
So far the only sort of compresence I have discussed is narrow 
compresence, which requires something to be F and not F in virtue of 
some one and the same aspect of itself. Bright colour, for example, makes 
some things beautiful and other things ugly; the action type of standing 
firm in battle has some courageous and some not courageous tokens. But 
in the Timaeus, for example, Plato says that every sensible sample offire 
is both fire and not fire. No sensible sample of fire is both fire and not fire 
in the narrow sense. Plato means instead that although each is fire, each is 
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also not fire in so far as each has features that are not essential to the 
nature offire, since each has bits of earth and the other elements mixed in 
(49c-51d); no sensible sample of fire is pure fire. Let us then say that 
sensible samples of fire are fire and not fire in the sense ofbroad 
compresence. Something is F and not F in the broad sensejust in case, in 
addition to being F, it is also not F in virtue ofhaving features that are not 
essential to being F as such. If something is in narrow compresence it is 
also in broad compresence, but the converse is not true. Although square, 
for instance, is not both shape and not shape in the narrow sense, it is both 
shape and not shape in the broad sense. For it is shape and, since it has 
features that are not essential to the nature of shape as such, it is also not 
shape. Everything F thing other than the property ofF is F and not F in the 
broad sense. 
Notice that Timaeus is written after Parmenides. In the Timaeus, Plato 
mentions Forms for Fire and Man.() For Fine, the notions broad compresence and 
narrow compresence is an attempt to bridge the gap between Argument of 
Opposite and the One over Many Argument, also, these notions are an attempt to 
explain Forms such as Fire or Man in the Timaeus. As I have mentioned in Chapter 
2, the Argument ofOpposite limits the extent ofForms, while in Bk. X, the One 
over Many argument loosens up this limit. Then in the first halfof the Parmenides, 
the mouthpiece young Socrates once again puzzles over the extent of Forms and 
gives us an impression that Plato has given up the One over Man argument. Yet, in 
the Timaeus, Plato once again admits that there are Forms for Fire and Man. 
According to Fine, the argument of opposite in Bk. V of the Republic is an attempt 
to pinpoint narrow compresence. For example, two equal sticks may appear 
unequal. That something is F may appear totally opposite to F. Fine classifies this 
phenomenon in sensibles as narrow compresence.'^' Yet, according to Plato, this 
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sort ofF-thing appearing opposite to F will call upon our thought and reflection 
until we grasp the notion “ Equality “ as equal absolutely and will never suffer 
from compresence. On the other hand, a man will never appear not man, according 
to Fine, although man will never appear not man, he nonetheless will display some 
other character which is not the nature ofman, for example，a man may be good or 
bad. Thus, a man, like two equal sticks, will also display something not-man, not 
that man will display something that is opposite to man, rather, man will display 
some features that is not part of the definition or nature of man. In this case. Fine 
classifies this kind of phenomenon as broad compresence. In fact, this broad 
compresence also calls upon our thought for a man also displays other feature that 
is irrelevant to the definition of man. Unfortunately, in the Republic, Plato only 
tells us how to reflect on two equal sticks, a case ofnarrow compresence. If my 
analysis of Hyp IIA so far is correct, then Plato has offered us another opportunity 
to reflect on something that suffers from broad compresence. That we are to strip 
offall those inessential features ofUnity and until at the instant, we grasp the 
notion “ Unity “ as one absolutely. 
Not only that Hyp I, Hyp II and the reconciliation in Hyp IIA solve the 
problem regarding the extent ofForms. In fact, they solve many other puzzles in 
the first half, ln the final chapter, I will base on my analysis so far and try to 
propose solution to some other puzzles in the first half. Meanwhile, I shall move on 
to the next hypothesis. 
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Chapter 9: Hvp 111 & IV: What follows for the others 
in relation to themselves & the Unity, if the Unity is 
If the distinction being/having as a solution to the Third Man is not clear 
enough in Hyp I-IIA, Parmenides provides us with another chance to get to know 
this distinction in Hyp III. According to Parmenides, we should also examine the 
qualifications that pertain to the Others, ifUnity is. First of all, Parmenides points 
out that these others refer to anything that is not Unity. Thus, we have an almost 
universal set with the exception that the Form Unity is excluded from this set. At 
this point, it is not clear whether others mean “ any Forms other than Unity ‘‘ or 
that “ any entities other than Unity “ I prefer the latter because Forms do relate to 
one another in both type I and type 11 relations. 
Parmenides further argues that the others are surely not completely deprived 
of Unity, but have a share ofi t in some way. Since the others are somehow one, 
they must have Unity as their parts. To claim that these others are somehow one 
but without any parts, they would be completely one. According to Parmenides, 
only in case of the Unity itself, that it be one and yet without parts. ( Parmenides, 
158a) 
Thus, we can divide everything into two groups, the first group consists of 
only one element: Unity itself, it is one and yet has no parts; the second group 
consists of all other things except Unity, they are somehow one, not by virtue of 
themselves, rather, they partake in Unity and have unity as their parts. 
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Parmenides then moves on to further consider in what sense these others 
are one. First ofall, since others have parts, each part must belong to a whole. As a 
whole, it must relate to the Form Unity. Further, each part is one part, therefore, 
not only that others, as a whole, is related to the Form Unity, also, each part ofthis 
whole, since it is “ each “ � i t must relate to the Form Unity. 
Again, the different between the one of Unity and the one ofothers is the 
difference between being a nature and having a feature. According to Parmenides, 
others are one when have a share of Unity, but Unity one absolutely for “ it is 
impossible, I take it, for anything except Unity itself to be one." ( Parmenides, 
158a) 
Notice that in Hyp III, Parmenides argues explicitly that “ it would not have 
a share, but be Unity itself. “ In the Third Man Argument, the regress starts if we 
assume that the Form Largeness, like other large thing, must have a share of 
Largeness as its part in order to be large. Here, Parmenides denies this assumption 
explicitly and pinpoints the fact that Unity one by virtue of itself and there is no 
whole/part issue in this regard, while the others are one by having a share ofUnity 
as their parts. 
However, there is certain puzzles in the whole/part argument that requires 
some clarification. In Hyp II, it is argued that Unity does have parts because it is. 
Further, in the 1st Unlimited Argument, it is argued that Unity has many parts. On 
the other hand, in Hyp III, according to Parmenides, or at least Parmenides 
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seemingly assumes that Unity is without parts to pinpoint the difference between 
the one ofUnity and the one of the others. Yet, I believe that the puzzle is only 
apparent. Parmenides is focusing on the oneness ofUnity and others. It turns out 
that the others will display oneness if they have a share of Unity while Unity will 
not share with itself in order to be one. In fact, i fwe insist that Unity is, we can 
focus on the “ is “ aspect of the Unity and others, we will have a very similar 
conclusion, namely, all Forms ( except Being) and many other things, since each 
ofthem is, they must have a share ofBeing, and thus have parts; on the other hand. 
Being also is, yet. Being does not have “ is ‘‘ as its part, but be it. 
9.1 Limit and Unlimited (158b-d ) 
Next, Parmenides considers the situation when these others are not related 
to the Form Unity, or their situation before their relation to Unity. It tums out that 
these others, prior to their relation to the UnityJust in themselves, are unlimited in 
multitude. 
According to the whole/part argument, others are those Forms other than 
Unity and many other things, in order to display oneness, they must relate to the 
Unity and thus have parts. Without this part, they are in no sense one, it is 
impossible for these others to be one. Parmenides then considers three alternatives: 
one, more than one, or nothing. Assume that these others are something, prior to 
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their relation with the Unity, they are in no sense one, we have no option left but to 
admit that they are many. Thus, Parmenides points out that: 
If the others were neither one nor more than one, they would be nothing.( 
Farmenides, 158b) 
Notice that Parmenides is considering a hypothetical situation: what if 
others without one. That the situation is only hypothetical is confirmed by the 
method of deduction Parmenides proposed - that by reflection, we subtract the 
unity from these others. 
At this point, our language becomes a barrier to our philosophical reflection. 
Others, without Unity as parts, are multitudes. Thus, Parmenides concludes that “ 
they are multitudes “ and “ the Others will be unlimited in multitude “• The claim 
that “ the Others are unlimited “ should be treated with cautions. I fwe say “ they 
are boys “, we actually mean that “ each ofthem is boy “. However, without Unity 
as their part, the others is neither a whole nor have parts. Further，whether such 
others is “ they “ or ‘‘ each “ is questionable. Finally, the notion “ others “ is also 
problematic. The very possibility of marking offsuch others from Unity is 
problematic because to allow such action of marking off would pre-suppose that 
these others is/are in some sense determined, ln Hyp IV, Parmenides will further 
discuss such indefinite nature of these others without Unity. 
As many commentators have pointed out, Parmenides here is discussing the 
importance ofUnity as a limiting principle so that Forms can be distinguished from 
196 
each others. ‘ Certainly, the argument does have such implication. Yet, what is 
more important, I take it, is that Parmenides here offers a possible perspective to 
look at others as mere many or unlimited. Parmenides next moves on to discuss 
under what circumstance these others can be one or limited. Just like what 
Parmenides had done in Hyp II, Parmenides is telling us under what circumstance 
the others display different features. 
According to Parmenides, from the communion of Unity and the others, not 
only that parts are distinguished, also, each of these others will form a whole. 
Thus, Unity provides a limit for the others. As a result, the others are both limited 
and unlimited. 
Notice that this is the first time Plato uses the term “ communion “ and this 
is going to be the main theme in the Sophist. Although the blending of Forms is the 
main theme in the Sophist, I do believe that this theme is also presupposed in the 
Parmenides, though it is not explicitly argued here. Anyway, Parmenides moves on 
to consider another pair ofopposites - likeness and unlikeness. 
9.2 Likeness and Unlikeness (158e-159a ) 
According to Parmenides, since the others are limited in relation to Unity 
and the others are unlimited when conceived apart from their relation to Unity, 
therefore, in respect of either qualification taken singly they are, in themselves, 
both like themselves and each other. On the other hand, since the others are both 
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limited and unlimited, they are qualified by affections that are opposite to each 
other. But opposites are as unlike as possible. Thus, in respect to both together they 
are unlike. 
Notice that to say that others are like or unlike prior to their relation to 
Unity is problematic because to say so will presuppose that such others would be 
somehow determined. In Hyp IV, as we shall see, prior to their participation in the 
Form Unity, these others are neither like nor unlike. Yet，at this point, our 
reflection does reach the likeness and unlikeness，limited and unlimited of the 
others when comparing the pre-Unity others and the post-Unity others. 
Nonetheless, the deduction so far is true, but only tentatively. When our thought 
proceed further, we find out that these others, prior to their relation to Unity, is 
totally indetennined. ( Parmenides, 160a-b ) 
Also notice that there is very strong indication that Plato treats notion such 
as “ different", “ like ‘‘ or “ unlike “ as properties rather than relation. According 
to Parmenides, since the others are qualified by affections that are opposite, the 
others are unlike. Parmenides does not argue that the others are unlike to each 
other, and treats it as some relation, rather, it seems to me that Parmenides is 
arguing that the others, given the fact that the others have such opposite properties 
in them, also process the property ofunlikeness. ln the Sophist, Plato is defending 
pretty much the same position, it is argued that Difference, like Knowledge, is 
parceled out. We have difference between Unity and Existence, also, we have 
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difference between Existence and Motion and so on. Yet, among all these 
differences, there is one Form, the Difference which is over and above all these 
parceled out differences. 
So far, my discussion on Hyp III is finished. But before I move on to the 
next hypothesis, I have a few remarks on Miller's dialectical approach. 
According to Miller, the One in Hyp I refers to Forms in general and the 
One in Hyp 11 refers to a thing. So far so good. Yet his distinction gets into trouble 
in Hyp III, according to Miller, the others in Hyp III refer to the physical-sensible, 
the things. In Hyp III, Parmenides argues that the others must relate to the One in 
order to be One. However, here comes the trouble, what is the meaning o f " the 
One “ in Hyp III, certainly, it can't be a thing, nothing can become one by relation 
to a thing. Also, the One can't simply mean Forms in general, it is because things 
only relate to some particular Forms, not any Forms, in order to be one. Thus, the 
One must mean a third thing in Hyp III, namely, the Form Unity. Unfortunately, 
Miller doesn't take it this way: 
Thus the hearer is confirmed in interpreting ‘ the One ‘ throughout III and 
I V as the simple and unique One o f I and ( i f it should not be clear already 
)in interpreting this latter as the Form. ‘‘ This suggests, in tum, that ‘ the 
others ‘ refers to the physical-sensible, the things which, in according with 
the distinction expressed by I - II, are ‘ other ‘ than the Forms.^  
Therefore, Miller's Form-thing distinction is problematic in Hyp III. Notice 
that the puzzles in the first half do not simply arise from the difficulty to 
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understand this distinction. Rather, I believe, these puzzles arise from a more 
technical or fundamental philosophical problem - our understanding of self-
predication. On the surface, the trouble ofMiller is that his Form-thing distinction 
gets into trouble in Hyp 111, yet, in a deeper level, the trouble is how we identify the 
problem in the first half. Anyway, in Miller's approach, the scope o f " the One “ is 
too large while the scope o f " the others “ is too small. The scope o f " the One “ is 
too large because I can't see how a thing can relate to any Form in general to 
become one. The scope o f " the others “ is too small because in the Sophist, Plato 
points out that Forms will blend with each other, that Forms, beside their own 
nature, also process other features by having a share with other Forms. Yet, to treat 
“ the others “ as simply physical sensibles will deny the blending of Forms. Notice 
that such blending ofForms is to a certain degree mentioned in Hyp 11 - that Being 
is different to Unity, not by virtue of any one ofthem, rather, it is by virtue of 
Difference that they are different to each other. 
Anyway, although my analysis so far is quite different to Miller, in many 
occasion, we understand the second half in very similar way. It is because the 
difference between Miller's analysis and mine lies in the extension ofcertain terms 
- the One, the others. Therefore, in many occasions, our understanding coincide. 
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9.3 Hyp IV(159b-160b) 
In the previous hypothesis, we are considering what follows for the others 
in relation to Unity, ifUnity is. In this hypothesis, we are to consider what follows 
for the others in relation to themselves, ifUnity is. In Hyp I，Parmenides had 
considered what follows for Unity, in relation to itself, ifUnity is. In this 
hypothesis, Parmenides will consider how those things and Forms other than Unity 
in relation to themselves, ifUnity is. Thus, we will examine how these Forms and 
things other than Unity can relate to each other ( unfortunately, as it tums out, we 
are not even able to count these others each by each in the absence ofUnity )• 
Perhaps we may consider the relation between Difference, Motion and Rest (type 1 
) ,or perhaps we may consider how some moving bodies participates in many 
Forms (type II), yet, there are some sorts ofrelation we will not consider, we will 
not consider relations between Forms other than Unity and the Unity, also, we will 
not consider things other than Unity and their relation to Unity. It is because 
according to the methodological remarks, i fwe assume Unity is, we will consider 
four hypothesis, l )Unity in relation to itself, 2) Unity in relation to others, 3) 
Others in relation to Unity, and 4) others in relation to themselves (o r in relation to 
others). 
Parmenides has considered the first three, thus, in Hyp IV, we will consider 
the last alternative. 
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It turns out that the others, prior to their relation with the Unity, by virtue of 
themselves only, is some indefinite mess. In Hyp III, Parmenides has already 
considered this. There, Parmenides discussed what would happen ifby reflection 
we subtract Unity from the others. He then moves on to argue that the others are 
unlimited. On the other hand，they are limited when related to the Form Unity. 
Thus, the others are both limited and unlimited. As I have pointed out, since 
Parmenides has not addressed the question how indefinite they are prior to their 
relation with Unity, we must accept those deductions as tentatively true. Yet, if we 
proceed further, we might have some new discovery, this is what Parmenides is 
doing in Hyp IV. 
Parmenides first argues that i f the others do not have a share ofUnity, they 
certainly are in no way one ( Parmenides, 159d ). Not only that the others will not 
form one whole, they also will not consist ofany one part, otherwise, they will not 
totally separate from Unity. Further, the others are not many, for there is no “ each 
“ in them, unless we accept there is uncountable many, but this is impossible. 
Also, the others will not be like nor unlike Unity, nor is likeness or 
unlikeness in them, because if they have like and unlike in them, they would relate 
to these two Forms, and each of these opposite Forms is one Form. Finally, for the 
same reason, others cannot relate to any Forms, for they are not allowed to relate to 
even one Fonn. Thus, the others are neither the same nor different, move or at rest, 
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becoming or ceasing to be, great, less, or equal,... etc. As a result, we have some 
mess which is/are completely indetermined. 
Thus, Hyp IV throws light on some ofour previous conclusion, lt tums out 
that when we proceed further, others will not have likeness or unlikeness in them. 
Although Parmenides has argued that when considering either from the aspect of 
limitedness or unlimitedness, others are like each other in Hyp 111, it is true so far 
that our thought hasn't proceeded further. Also，the claim that since others are both 
limited and unlimited, they are unlike is only true without further consideration. 
Hyp IV is thus philosophically illuminating, not only that it tells us the importance 
of the Form Unity, it also re-evaluates some ofour previous deduction. 
In Hyp II, Parmenides has argued that ifUnity and the others are not 
different to each other, if we further assume that Unity and the others do not relate 
as whole/part, then we must admit that Unity is the same to others not-one. As I 
have pointed out, the conclusion is true tentatively because we have not considered 
the importance ofUnity. In Hyp IV, it tums out that to claim that Unity is the same 
to others not one is very problematic. Thus, we are to re-consider the deduction 
procedure once again. The trouble is that according to Hyp IV, the others are 
neither same nor different to the Unity because Unity cannot be the same to 
something indetermined. Based on the result in Hyp IV, we will have to re-open 
the possibility for the Unity and the others relate to each other as part/whole. 
Although Parmenides had assumed that Unity and the others do not relate as 
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part/whole in the same/different argument in the Hyp II, yet, Parmenides in Hyp IV 
tells us that such assumption is questionable. 
Perhaps someone may think that I am adopting a rejectionist approach 
because eventually 1 reject some deductions. Further, someone may compare my 
analysis with Miller's and say that like Miller, I also try to “ see through “ these 
contradictions and once again, re-appropriate the Theory ofForms. However, 
unlike Miller, I treat any deductions so far as true or at least true tentatively until 
further textual evidence is at hand. Until at that point, I reconsider those troubling 
arguments again. 
Finally, there is another puzzle in Hyp IV - how can we say that the others, 
by virtue of themselves, are indetermined? Are we not saying that Difference, by 
virtue of itself, is different. In fact, all Forms will be their own nature, it is amazing 
that Parmenides here claims that these Forms, by virtue of themselves, is 
indetermined. The solution is that while Forms be their nature, Forms must display 
certain features that make them definable and distinguishable. For example, the 
definition ofUnity is one. Yet, ifsomeone asks me what is the definition of F-ness 
and I tell him/her that F-ness is such and such and that F-ness is knowable, it is 
one, it is different to other definition, you will be surprised by my clumsy reply. 
However, the very possibility for such definition must pre-suppose that the term 1 
am trying to define is knowable, and this term is different to other term. Although 
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the definition itself does not require knowability and difference to other terms， 
these features are nonetheless some essential features of the definition. 
Thus, Hyp IV is philosophically illuminating. In Hyp II, we have examined 
four sorts ofrelations between Unity and the others - 1) Unity is different to the 
others, 2) Unity is the same to the others, 3) Unity relates to the other as whole to 
part or 4) Unity relates to others as parts to whole. As I have pointed out in my 
discussion ofHyp II, to deny 3) and 4) is problematic because it is argued in the 
Limited and 1 st Unlimited Argument in Hyp II that Unity, as a whole, has being as 
it part because Unity is. On the other hand, it is also true that Being, as a whole, 
has unity as its part because Being is one. lt simply is the case that we can't deny 
whole/part relation between Unity and the others, that Unity, as a whole, displays 
many features, not by virtue of itself, rather, it has a share ofmany other Forms and 
thus Unity has many parts. Then in the same/different argument in Hyp II, 
Parmenides puts the whole/part relation into test and it turns out that we will have 
to accept that Unity is the same to the others not one - a result that creates enough 
trouble to us. Finally, in Hyp IV, Parmenides once again penetrates into the 
whole/part issue between Unity and the others, that ifUnity and the others are not 
related in any ways, the result would be others that is totally indetermined, not only 
that Unity is not the same to the others. Unity is also not different to the others. 
Notice that these negative results are based on a hypothetical situation - that Unity 
and the others are not related in any ways. The deduction does not prove that the 
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others is totally indetermined, rather, it shows us that Unity and the others must 
relate as whole to part or part to whole, otherwise, results are totally unacceptable. 
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Chapter 10: Hyp V - Vll l : What foiIows iflJnitv is not 
Having discussed what follows if the Unity is, Parmenides now moves on to 
consider what follows i f the Unity is not. Again, we will have four deductions. 
According to the methodological remarks, we are to consider what follows for the 
Unity/the others, in relation to itself/others, if the Unity is not. However, the notion 
“ is not “ is a tricky one and perhaps we need some preliminary discussion of it 
before we actually proceed to the last four deductions. 
10.1 “ Is not “ in the Sophist 
The Sophist is written after Parmenides, yet, the discussion o f " is not “ is 
coherent to the notion o f " is-not “ in Hyp V and Hyp VII. In the Sophist, the 
discussion o f " is not “ proceeds in three steps. First ofall, the Eleatic Stranger 
points out the problem of Being, then, the Eleatic Stranger moves on to discuss the 
problem o f “ not-being “�finally, the Eleatic Stranger addresses the issue of false 
statement or “ is not “ statement. 
According to the Eleatic Stranger, the notion o f " Being “ is a tricky one. It 
is true that whatever is is in motion or is at rest, yet, Being itselfis neither in 
motion nor at rest ( Sophist, 250b-d )• To see the solution of this puzzle, the Eleatic 
Stranger points out that we can speak o f a man with many additional names, we 
attribute to him colors and shapes and sizes and defects and good qualities, thus, a 
man is not merely a “ man '‘ but is also “ good “ and any number ofother things ( 
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Sophist, 251a-b ). Then the Eleatic Stranger moves on to argue that some Forms 
blend and some do not. Thus, the solution offered by the Eleatic Stranger is that 
each thing can be said to be lots of things, notjust what it is by itself，but also other 
things that it is not by itself, but by standing in the appropriate relation to 
something else. Thus, the Form Unity, by itself, one, yet, the Unity also relates to 
the Form Being because Unity is, and this relation between Unity and Being is an 
appropriate one. Further, the Form Being can relate to the Form Motion and Rest 
in type 11 relation, because in case of an one-entity, since it has a share ofUnity 
and Being, and ifsuch one-entity has shape, then we have a Being-Unity-Shape 
complexus and such complexus must also relate to either Motion or Rest. Anyway, 
it is quite clear that in the Sophist, Plato is relying on the distinction in relation to 
itself/in appropriate relation to others to solve the problem ofBeing, as we shall 
see, the same distinction also plays a role in the problem o f " is-not “ 
Finally, such blending of Forms, according to Plato, is somewhat like the 
alphabet - some ofthese cannot be conjoined, others will fit together. ( Sophist, 
253a) In fact, some Forms play the role of a vowel, for example, as Plato will 
discuss later, the Form Difference is one ofthose most prevailing Forms. 
Plato next moves on to show that Forms can be said to be not being. Plato 
considers there are five distinct Forms of particular importance: Being, Motion, 
Rest, Sameness and Difference. In 255e, he singles out Motion and argues that 
Motion, being different to Rest, Sameness, Difference, and Being; is not Being, is 
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not Rest, is not Difference and is not Sameness. Further, with the exception of 
Being itself, all other Forms are “ is not “, because all other Forms, by virtue of 
themselves, not is. Thus，they are not ( perhaps they not “ are “ is more accurate ) 
by virtue of themselves, and yet, they are because they partake of Being. On the 
other hand. Being is，yet. Being is not being other Forms. That is to say. Being, in 
itself, is; or that the nature ofBeing - is. However, it is not the nature ofBeing to 
be difference, same, motion or rest. Therefore, not only that other Forms are not, it 
is also true that Being is not those other Forms. Plato thus concludes: 
When we speak of ‘ that which is not ' , it seems that we do not mean 
something contrary to what exists, but only something that is different.( 
Sophist, 257b) 
Notice that Plato's discussion o f " is not “ proceeds rather slowly. At this 
point, his discussion o f " is not ‘‘ hasn't finished yet. If we slop al this point and 
conclude that “ is not “ means different or not identical, we only see part of the 
picture. In fact, this part of the picture is very problematic. If it is indeed the case 
that is-not means “ is not identical to “� then the claim that Theaetetus is not sitting 
is obviously true regardless whether Theaetetus is indeed sitting or not. In fact, we 
don't even need to look at Theaetetus to tell the truth value of the statement. As 
long as we understand the meaning of the terms ‘‘ Theaetetus “ and “ sitting “, the 
claim that Theaetetus is not sitting is always true because Theaetetus is a person 
and sitting is some sort ofaction and they are obviously not identical. However, if 
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we take it this way, then perhaps we will have too many is-not statements. 
Therefore, we should go back to the remaining part of the Sophist and see if Plato 
has more to say regarding is-not statement. 
Having pointed out the difference between Forms and thus Forms are not, 
Plato proceeds further. According to Plato, we speak of something as “ not-tall “� 
we may just as well mean by that phrase “ what is equal “ or “ what is short “ ( 
Sophist, 257b ) This step is problematic if we still insist on the equation “ is-not “ 
as ‘‘ not identical “ Something is not identical to tall, very well. Yet it is also true 
that this something is not identical to equal and short. Supposedly, i fwe stick to 
that original equation, this something should also be not equal and not short. The 
solution is that there are certain relations or non-relations exist between certain 
Forms, in the case ofTallness, Shortness and Equality, they are opposite to each 
other, yet, things must somehow has a share of either one ofthem at a time. I 
suggest that Plato is considering two sorts of difference here. At the beginning, he 
considers difference in general, therefore. Forms are different from one another, 
and thus, they are not, at this point, ‘‘ is-not “ is indeed treated as non-identity. Yet, 
Plato considers further the difference in particular between some Forms. In the 
case ofTallness, Shortness and Equality, thcy are certainly different to onc 
another, and obviously we can say that Shortness is not identical to Tallness. 
However, when considering the particular difference between them, not only that 
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they are not identical, it is also the case that they are opposite to one another. 
Therefore, Plato concludes that: 
The nature of different appears to be parceled out, in the same way as 
knowledge. Knowledge also is surely one, but each part ofit that 
commands a certain field is marked off and given a special name proper to 
itself. Hence languages recognizes many arts and forms of knowledge. 
And the same thing is true of parts of the single nature of the different.( 
Sophist, 257c) 
Further, Plato moves on to consider a part ofdifferent that is set in contrast 
to the Beauty. At this point, we are not considering any Forms that is different to 
the Form Beauty, rather, we are considering some particular Forms, namely 
Ugliness, that is in contrast to Beauty. ( Sophist, 257d-e ) Only Ugliness is a 
suitable candidate in this case because Forms such as Motion or Rest is not in 
contrast to (though different to ) the Form Beauty. 
Thus, we are to consider three alternatives: beautiful, ugly, and something 
intermediate between the two. According to Plato, not beautiful is an instance of 
something that exists being set in contrast to some other thing that exists. (Sophist , 
257e ) That is to say, we mark off those things that are beautiful and make them 
one group, those remain will form another group. Thus, we have a group of 
beautiful and a group ofnot beautiful. In the case ofTallness, Shortness and 
Equality, on the one hand, we have a group oftall, on the other hand, we have a 
group ofnot tall - a group that consists ofequal and short. 
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In fact, it is quite misleading to say that Plato is talking about two sorts of 
difference here. If the interpretation so far is correct, then Plato begins with 
difference in general, and he further examines some particular difference between 
some Forms. It is not a matter of two different sorts, rather, difference in particular 
is simply a further elaboration or closer scrutiny of difference in general. 
Base on this line of interpretation, the two statements do follow regarding 
Theaetetus, that the statement Theaetetus is sitting is true while the statement 
Theaetetus is flying is false. Not only that sitting is different to flying, to be more 
precise, sitting is a different action that is set in contrast to flying. At this point, 
Plato never mentions that sitting is different to flying, or that both flying and sitting 
are not identical to the person Theaetetus, i fhe had done that, his analysis would 
be quite different. Rather, he points out that just happen in the case ofTheaetetus， 
that he does not belong to the group that marked off as flying, on the other hand, 
he belongs to the group ofthose sitting individuals. 
Nonetheless, even we equip with the understanding o f " is-not “ from the 
Sophist, some arguments in Hyp V still look embarrassing. Notice that the 
discussion o f " is-not “ in Hyp V - VIII is rather sketchy when compare with the 
detail discussion in the Sophist, thus, some seemingly bad arguments regarding “ 
is-not “ in the second halfis understandable because the Parmenides is only a 
beginning ofPlato 's second revolution. 
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10.2 Hyp V ( 160b-163b ): What follows for the Unity in relation to others, if 
Unity is not 
Parmenides begins with a discussion of two statements -1) ifUnity is not 
and ii) if not Unity is not. According to Parmenides, these two statements are 
completely opposite to each other. According to Comford, he believes in the 
equation not-one = no-thing. Further, Cornford points out that “ is-not ‘‘ means 
does not exist. Thus, these two statements becomes - ia) if one does not exist and 
iia) ifno-thing does not exist, ia) and iia) are opposite to each other because ia) 
points out that there is some one-thing which does not exist, yet from iia) there is 
no-thing which does not exist] However, as Allen had pointed out, there is 
nothing in the text which supports such interpretation. Further, to treat “ is-not “ as 
“ does not exist “ will have certain difficulties when interpreting some other 
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deductions in Hyp V. On the other hand, Parmenides has argued explicitly on the 
difference between Unity and the others, thus, perhaps it is more appropriate to 
treat ‘‘ is-not “ as “ difference “• Not only that such treatment agrees with the text, 
it also agrees with what was said in the Sophist. 
However, even with the treatment o f " is-not ‘‘ as “ difference “, the 
deduction so far is embarrassing. The trouble is that how can these two statements 
be opposite to each other. Certainly, they are two different claims and the subject ( 
Unity and not Unity ) are obviously different. Yet, these two statements do not 
seem to be opposite to one another. 
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To violate the abstractness of the deduction one more time, let me put 
forward a pair of statement regarding Theaetetus. a) Theaetetus is not flying and b) 
not-Theaetetus is not flying. Based on our discussion on the Sophist, a) should 
mean that Theaetetus does not belong to the group offlying. b) is a little 
complicated because there are two “ not “ operating in the statement. “ Is not flying 
“ is rather obvious, it simply means that we have marked off those flying things as 
a group and those remained form another group in contrast to the ‘‘ flying ‘‘ group. 
Applying the same principle ofmarking off, not-Theaetetus should mean that we 
mark offTheaetetus as a group, and not-Theaetetus will refer to those things which 
are not marked offyet. Thus, not-Theaetetus will be the group of everything with 
the exception ofTheaetetus. Based on this interpretation, it tums out that a) means 
Theaetetus does not belong to the group offlying and b) means that everything, 
with the exception ofTheaetetus, does not belong to the group of flying. Therefore, 
a) is opposite to b). 
I suggest that the two statements i) Unity is not and ii) not-Unity is not 
should be interpreted this way. It also tums out that i) and ii) are opposite to one 
another. According to my interpretation, i) should mean that Unity does not belong 
to certain group and ii) means that everything, except Unity, does not belong to 
certain group. Thus, i) and ii) are opposite. 
Notice that my interpretation so far is only a speculation because 1 assume 
that those two “ is not “ in ii) operate in the same way. Further, I am not sure 
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whether Plato at this point has such understanding o f " is not “ as he does in the 
Sophist. From a developmental point of view, it is likely that Plato is intended to 
argue this way, or at least, he was thinking about the issue o f " is not “ and perhaps 
his thought on “ is not “ may not as mature as that in the Sophist, thought 
nonetheless he is proceeding in that direction. 
Unfortunately, Parmenides only points out these two statements in a very 
causal manner, he never discusses how they are opposite, neither does he tell us 
what sort o f " is not “ he is referring to. Perhaps we should let these ambiguities 
stand and look for further insight from the hypothesis itself. Anyway, I believe that 
a fuller explanation and elaboration on the notion o f " is not “ should be found in 
the Sophist. 
Parmenides next moves on to argue that when someone says that Unity is 
not, he means that what is not is different from the others and we know what he 
means. Further, Parmenides argues that the very fact that we can point to Unity 
and say that it is or it is not, must presume that Unity is knowable and 
distinguishable. Therefore, to say that Unity is not, then we must know what Unity 
is, also, we must know how Unity is different from the others. 
The deduction here is sound. Notice that we have a similar argument in the 
Sophist and therefore it is likely that we should read this part of the deduction in 
connection to the Sophist) 
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Further, according to Parmenides, not only that Unity is different from the 
others, the others must be different from it. Also, difference belongs to the Unity in 
addition to knowledge. For when one says that Unity is different from the others, 
he does not mean the difference of the others, but of that. 
This part of the argument, according to Chen, is clumsy because to 
conclude that the Unity has difference, we do not need to argue that the others are 
different to Unity, the very fact that Unity is different to the others is good enough, 
further, this hypothesis should deal with what follows for the Unity, the results for 
the others are to be discussed in Hyp VII and VIII, therefore, Chen believes that 
the step that argues the others are different to the Unity is redundant.^ 
Notice that this part of the argument is difficult, especially the claim that “ 
he does not mean the difference of the others, but ofthat." It is not clear what this 
“ that “ should refer to. Thus, Allen translates it as “ but of that “ is ambiguous. 
Cornford translates it as “ its ( Unity ) difference in character, not oftheirs." which 
is more cIear/^ Afterall, I think Chen's Chinese translation is most clear. According 
to Chen, the last part ofthis argument should read: 
we are not speaking of the difference that belongs to the others, we are 
speaking of the difference that belongs to the Unity.^ 
With the help of Chen, I have removed one obstacle in my analysis. Perhaps 
we may still puzzle why Parmenides compares the difference with Knowledge. 
Notice that Plato has further elaboration on the difference between Forms in the 
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Sophist. Not only that there are difference in general between Forms, there are also 
difference in particular between particular Forms. Therefore, difference, like 
knowledge, is parceled out and we have difference between Unity and Many, 
Ugliness and Beauty and so on.... 
Parmenides now moves on to argue that since Unity is different from the 
others. Unity can thus has a share of many other Forms; 
Furthermore, Unity, if it is not, has a share of that and something and this， 
and ofbeing relative to this and of or than those, and so on; for neither 
Unity, nor things different from Unity could be spoken of, nor could 
anything be relative to it, nor would it be called something, if it did not 
have a share of something and the rest. ( Farmenides, 160e ) 
Notice that this part of the argument is very important. It is a summary of 
what we have deduced so far ( Hyp I - IV ) and Parmenides here tells us how to 
resolve the contradictions. At the end ofHyp I, the bare Unity cannot be spoken of, 
nor is it an object of opinion or knowledge. At the beginning ofHyp II, Parmenides 
first points out that Unity is not the same to Being and Unity has a share ofBeing, 
based on this most basic communion, Parmenides eventually concludes that such 
communion of Forms can be spoken ofand there would be knowledge of it. In Hyp 
III, Parmenides argues that things and Forms other than Unity, though in 
themselves, by themselves, not one, yet the others are surely not completely 
deprived ofUnity, but have a share of it. I fby reflection we abstract this share of 
Unity from the others, these others will be unlimited in multitude. In Hyp IV, 
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Parmenides picks up the issue again; what if without Unity, again it turns out that 
the others is/are completely indetermined. Thus, Unity cannot be spoken of 
according to Hyp I, and Unity can be spoken of according to Hyp II. In Hyp lIl, 
although Parmenides does not argue for knowability and accountability explicitly, 
his conclusion that others are qualified by all opposite affections, we should also 
expect that knowability and accountability belongs to the others. In Hyp IV, the 
others as completely indetermined without sharing in Unity will certainly precludes 
accountability and knowability. 
Parmenides now offers his solution to this paradox, the clue to the puzzles is 
the crucial fact that Unity is not, that is to say, Unity is different to the others. 
Since Unity is different to the others, it can thus related to others and has a share of 
them. In Hyp 111, Parmenides has already argued that if the others are one and yet 
do not have a share ofUnity, then these others would be Unity itself, but it is 
impossible (Parmenides’ 158a). Also, in the 2nd Unlimited Argument in Hyp 11, 
Parmenides argues that Unity and Being are different, not by virtue of themselves, 
but by virtue ofDifference. Actually, in Hyp V, Parmenides does not offer any new 
solution to the puzzles in the previous hypotheses, perhaps the only thing that is 
new is his equation: is not = different. Thus, only ifUnity is not ( i s different), it 
has a share ofthat and something and this. What makes pros ta alla predication of 
Unity possible is that Unity is not. Since Unity is different to other Forms, it can 
relate to them and displays many other features. 
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Although Parmenides does not offer any new solution in Hyp V to the 
puzzles in the first half and those intersection contradictions in the second half, his 
equation: is not = different; is nonetheless a further elaboration of the distinction 
being/having. In Hyp I and Hyp II, Parmenides explicated on this distinction, in 
Hyp IIA, he tells us how to strip off those “ having “ and at the instant, we grasp 
the notion o f " Unity “ as absolutely one. In Hyp III and IV, Parmenides addresses 
the issue of the importance ofUnity as the limiting factor. However, there are still 
some questions left unanswered. In Hyp V, Parmenides tells us not only that Unity 
relates to many other Forms, he also tells us what makes Unity relate to others 
possible, the answer is that Unity is not. In the Sophist, we perhaps have a more 
elaborate argument. Plato points out that the Form Difference is, by partaking of 
Existence. Yet, on the other hand. Difference is not that Existence ofwhich it 
partakes, but is different, and since it is different from Existence, quite clearly it 
must be possible that it would be a thing that is not. ( Sophist, 256e ) The point is: 
A may have a share of B，but A is not that share of B. If A is that share o fB , then 
A will not have that feature of B, but be it. 
Having shown that ifUnity is not, it has a share of many others things or 
Forms, Parmenides moves on to consider a pair ofopposite: Like/Unlike. The 
proof is straightforward. Unity has likeness with reference to itself and Unity has 
unlikeness with reference to others. Further, since Unity is not, it cannot equal to 
the others, otherwise. Unity would be like them with respect to Equality. However, 
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it has been shown that Unity is not and thus Unity unlike others. The deduction so 
far is clear enough and easy to follow. However, the argument that Unity has 
largeness, smallness, and equality is very difficult. 
The claim that the Unity is not and therefore Unity is not equal to the others 
is sound. Further, we can also argue that in this case. Unity has inequality with 
reference to the others, since Unity is not ( others ). Yet, the further step that since 
largeness and smallness belong to inequality, then Unity, given that it has 
inequality, must has either smallness and largeness is problematic. Certainly, Unity 
is different to the Form Being, and we can argue that Unity is unequal to Being. 
Yet, to say that Unity is then either larger than or smaller than Being is 
troublesome because Forms do not have size. Neither numerical difference is 
relevant here. We can certainly say that Twoness is not Threeness because they are 
two different Forms. We can also argue that Twoness is not equal to Threeness. In 
this particular case, we can also argue that Twoness is smaller than Threeness, not 
because the Form Twoness is smaller in size, rather, Twoness and Threeness 
occupy different position in the number line. However, the scope of the subject is 
larger than this，we are in fact discussing the Unity and the others, not simply the 
Form Number in particular. 
Perhaps type 11 relation between Forms may work. I can argue that a 
physical object, it partakes in Unity and Being since it is one object. Further, the 
one which is may also partake in Shape. Thus, such physical may be unequal in 
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size when compare with other objects. Since smallness and largeness belong to 
inequality, such object is either small or large when compares with another object. 
Further, since largeness and smallness are ever farthest apart from each other and 
there is ever something between the two, at these two extremes, largeness and 
smallness, yet, at the middle. Equality. Therefore, such physical object may appear 
large when puts with one object and appear small when puts with another. Since 
equality lies in the middle of this continuum while smallness and largeness are at 
the extreme ofthis continuum, it is also possible for such physical objects to appear 
equal when puts with an appropriate object. Finally, all these relations (type II) 
between Forms is made possible by the very fact that all these Forms I have 
mentioned are different to one another and so they are capable ofrelating to one 
another. Thus, if Unity is not, it relates to smallness, largeness and inequality (type 
n ) . 
Notice that the deduction here is very different to that of Hyp II. Parmenides 
also argues that Unity is related to Largeness, Smallness and Equality. However, 
Parmenides has given us enough warning that we are also considering type II 
relation there. He proceeds from the One which is, with further features attached to 
it, it has shape, in itself and in another, motion and rest, same and different, in 
contact and not in contact. At some point, we are sure that only type II relation is 
possible, thus, Parmenides will have no problem to further examine such physical 
object, whether it is also large, small or equal, from different perspective. 
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Yet, the situation in Hyp V is rather different, we simply not ready for such 
shifting from type I to type 11 Notice that the last six hypotheses occupy less than 
three pages and it is indeed that case that deductions in the last six hypotheses is 
very brief. Thus, instead ofgoing into detail step by step, Parmenides mentions 
only those conclusions or deductions that he considers as important or relevant. 
The reason for Plato jumping step is that the deduction is indeed very lengthy and 
the readers are really getting very tired. Thus, Plato's intention is perhaps 
understandable though nonetheless this kind of jumping step would create some 
unnecessary misunderstanding. 
Also notice that the argument here is also different from the previous 
argument in strategy. In the argument oflike/unlike, Parmenides still adopts his 
usual strategy oftelling us different perspectives to look at the Unity and its 
reference with the others. However, in the large/small/equal argument in Hyp V, 
the strategy is rather different. Parmenides tells us that since Unity has two of 
them, it must also display equality. 
Perhaps at this point, Plato thinks that discussion on the distinction in 
relation to itself/in relation to others and how this distinction is relevant to the 
puzzles in the first half is pretty much done. Therefore, he now moves on to 
explore an area that was previously unexplored. In Hyp I, we see the bare Unity at 
the brink ofdestruction and in Hyp II, we see that how Unity can relate to other 
Forms such that it is “ saved “ from such destruction. Then in Hyp IlA, Plato tells 
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us how to strip off those features and grasp the Unity as absolutely one. At this 
point, we begin to see the difference between features and nature. In Hyp III and 
IV, Plato points out the importance ofUnity, Forms are capable of relating to one 
another because each Form is one. Then in Hyp V, Plato points out that the Form 
Difference is also playing a very important role in the relation between Forms, not 
only that each Form must be one Form, each Form must also be distinguishable 
from other Forms. Yet, simply pointing out that each Form is not identical to other 
Forms is, to a certain degree, an incomplete analysis. We are also interested in 
some particular difference between Forms, perhaps that is the reason why Plato, 
through the mouthpiece Parmenides, tells us how those three Forms - Largeness, 
Smallness and Equality - are related to one another. Certainly, these three Forms 
are not identical to each other, yet, it is more important to further examine their 
particular difference. In the Sophist, Plato points out that it is the business of the 
science ofdialectic to examine kind by kind, in what ways the several kinds can or 
cannot combine. (Sophist , 253b-e ) If Plato is actually doing this in the argument 
ofLarge/small/ equal, then this is the very first attempt Plato tries to explore the 
particular difference between some Forms, and this argument is also the very first “ 
lab report “ ofthis new branch ofscience. 
Anyhow, the large/small/equal argument does not necessarily to be 
fallacious, lt is fallacious if we are uncertain of the author's intention. IfPlato is 
trying to argue that Unity is related to Largeness, Smallness and Equality in type 1 
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relation, then the argument is obviously false. Perhaps Plato is interested in type II 
relation, then the argument is sound. Obviously, some one thing will be large, 
small, or equal to when puts with other things. However, here comes a question, it 
seems that the properties largeness, smallness, and equality have some very 
mysterious relation. That although some one thing will not appear both large, 
small, and equal when puts with the same thing, it nonetheless will appear 
otherwise when put with another thing. Therefore, Plato may think that it is also 
necessary to address this issue and perhaps this is the motivation for Plato to argue 
this way in the argument of large/small/equal. Anyway, Plato is still responsible for 
not giving us enough warnings when he shifts his focus. 
Next, Parmenides moves on to argue that Unity, since it is not, must have a 
share of Being. The argument is straightforward, to speak truly that Unity is not. 
Unity must be in some way is. Thus, ifUnity is not, Unity has a share ofBeing. 
The logic is simple, only i fA is not B, A can have a share ofB. Further, not only it 
is true that ifUnity is not. Unity is, it is also true that Being must have not being in 
order completely to be: 
So, if it is not to be, it must have being a thing which is not as a bond of its 
not-being, and in the same way, again, what is must have not being a thing 
which is not in order completely to be. For it is in this way and only in this 
way that which is can be and which is not can not be, namely, by what is, 
if it is completely to be, having a share ofbeing in order to be a thing 
which is and a share of not-being in order to be a thing which is not; and 
by what is not having a share of not-being in order not be a thing which is 
and ofbeing in order to be a thing which is not, if again what is not is 
completely not to be. ( Parmenides, 162a-b ) 
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According to Chen, this part of the deduction is not particularly difficult, it 
is complicated because of our language barrier, especially our usage o f " is “ and “ 
is not “7 Further, this part of the deduction is only a further elaboration of what 
have said previously, Parmenides here does not offer anything new. Again, this 
part of the deduction is based on two principles: 
a) A has a share of B only if A is not B. 
b) To say that A is not, we are speaking something that is true o fA, 
therefore, A is. 
Parmenides has argued that so far we have said that Unity is not and we are 
indeed saying something that is true of Unity, then Unity is ( applying principle b ). 
Thus, Unity has a share ofBeing. Again, for A to have a share o fB, A is not B, 
thus. Unity has a share ofBeing, Unity is not Being, therefore Unity is not. In such 
a curious way, Parmenides tells us how Being and not-Being bonded together. 
Parmenides next moves on to discuss another opposite pair: Motion and 
Rest. Again, the deduction is problematic. That Unity, if i t is not, is and ifit is, it is 
not, thus, according to Parmenides, Unity changes from one condition ( i s ) to 
another ( i s not), such alternation of characters implies change and change is 
motion. According to Chen, this part of the deduction is also fallacious because it 
is not the case that Unity processes “ is “ and ‘‘ is not “ at different time, rather. 
Unity processes both properties at the same time.^ I think Chen's criticism here is 
sound and this part of the deduction is indeed very problematic. Further, 
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Parmenides suggests some sort ofbonding between is and is not, this strongly 
indicates that is and is not belongs to the Unity at the same time. 
In order to make this part of deduction sound, Plato must assume the 
following principle. 
Pl)Principle ofnon-co-existence of opposite characters - This is discussed 
in the Phaedo, according to Plato, not only that Tallness itselfabsolutely declines 
to be short, also, the tallness in us never admits shortness. Thus, tallness gives way 
and withdraws as its opposite shortness arrives. ( Phaedo, 102e ) 
P2) The immanent characters that are in us are to be conceived as some 
properties. Thus, it is not the case that Simmias is smaller than Phaedo because to 
treat it as a relation cannot lead to the conclusion that the Unity is under 
alternation. To be more precise, Simmias has smallness in him, or process such 
property in that particular circumstance.^ 
P3) That “ is “ and “ is not “ are opposite. 
Notice that in the Parmenides, Plato still conceives immanent characters as 
properties. Plato does not argue that Unity is unlike others, rather, he argues that 
Unity has unlikeness to others. Further, P2) is also observed in the Sophist ( 245a 
).However, P1) is not strictly observed in the Parmenides, in fact, Plato must deny 
P1), otherwise, how can he argue that Unity is many, and Many is one in the 1 st 
and 2nd Unlimited Argument in Hyp II. Nonetheless, P1) is observed again in the 
Sophist. There, Plato points out that some Forms blend and some do not. ln case of 
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Motion and Rest, they do not blend with each other. In fact, P1) is so strictly 
observed even at one point Plato argues that Motion itself, though it is stationary ( 
for all Forms are stationary ) � i t does not participate in Rest at all. (Sophist , 256b-c 
)Certainly, many other Forms can display “ stationary “ in relation to the Form 
Rest, yet, Motion, as an opposite to Rest, is excluded from such relation though it 
is also nonetheless stationary. To a certain degree, the relationship between Forms 
is “ tightened up ‘‘ in the Sophist. 
P3) is also not explicitly assumed in this part of the deduction. Nor is it 
explicitly denied. On the one hand, Parmenides claims that what is not is different 
from the others, this certainly does not suggest that is-not (that is difference ) is 
contrary to Being. Yet, Parmenides argues in 162c that everything that is such that 
it is both so and not so implies change. This seems to suggest there is something 
that is so in contrast to something that is not so. The deduction does suggest that 
we are dealing with an opposite pair. However, at the beginning ofHyp V, Plato 
argues that what is not does not mean what is contrary to “ existence “’ but only 
what is different from that existence. 
Thus, the argument of Motion is problematic, unless Plato assumes P l , P 2 
and P3. Yet, P1 must be denied, otherwise, it will create some tension between this 
part of the deduction and the 1 st and 2nd Unlimited Argument in Hyp II. 
Furthermore, perhaps Plato assumes P3 in this part of the deduction, then it creates 
tension between Plato's argument at the beginning of Hyp V. 
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The reason why I have pointed these inconsistency between the Phaedo, the 
Parmenides and the Sophist is not to argue that Plato is saying something 
contradicting himself in this part o f the deduction. Notice that this is the very first 
time Plato investigates in this new science of dialectic and Plato certainly will have 
a more mature formulation in the Sophist. At this point, we are not to point our 
finger at the rough work and say that it is bad. Yet, the argument here certainly 
needs more “ polishing “ 
The argument that since Unity is not. Unity is related to Rest is equally 
problematic. Perhaps a more “ polished “ version in the Sophist throws light on this 
argument, ln the Sophist, Plato argues that ifknowing is to be acting on something, 
it follows that what is known must be acted upon by it. Thus, Form when it is 
being known by the act ofknowledge must, in so far as it is known, be changed 
owing to being so acted upon. Yet，on the other hand, Plato argues that reality also 
relates to Rest, if everything is moving and changing, there would be no 
intelligence and knowledge of it. (Sophis t , 249b ) 
Indeed, the argument of Rest and Motion is fallacious. The purpose of the 
analysis above is not to explain this fallacy. Rather, 1 would like to point out that 
there might be some problems in this part of the deduction, nonetheless, Plato is 
still reflecting on those issues and we will find a more mature view in the Sophist. 
The last part o f the deduction in Hyp V is straightforward. If we accepted 
the conclusion that Unity alters characters, it follows that Unity both comes to be 
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and ceases to be. On the other hand, since Unity does not alter character, it does 
not come to be, nor ceases to be. 
10.3 Hyp VI (163b-164b )•• What follows for the Unity in relation to itself, if 
Unity is not 
Having considered the importance of the Form Unity and Difference in the 
communion ofForms, Parmenides now considers another “ vowel “ Forms: Being. 
In this hypothesis, Parmenides will consider what follows ifUnity is not related 
Being. 
The result is obvious, in Hyp II, it is exactly because Unity is related to 
Being，more Forms are related to such Unity-Being complexus. Thus, the 
conclusion of the present hypothesis must be neither/nor for we don't even have 
the original Unity-Being complexus to begin with and certainly no further Forms 
are attached to it. 
However, there is another thing in Hyp VI that really calls upon our 
thought. In Hyp V, since Unity is not, it is l)knowable, 2) different, 3) has a share 
ofthis, that and something, 4) has unlikeness and likeness, 5) has largeness, 
smallness and equality, 6) has a share of Being and not-Being, 7) has a share of 
Motion and Rest, 8) comes to be and ceases to be, 9) neither comes to be nor 
ceases. Yet, in Hyp VI, since Unity is not related to Being, obviously what has no 
share ofBeing can neither get nor lose it. Thus 8) is denied. Then Parmenides 
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moves on to deny 7), 6), 5)，4)，3), 2), 1). Injust the reverse order, Parmenides 
denies all these relations. The question now is, why does Parmenides argue this 
way? 
The answer is that Hyp VI, to a certain degree, is a complement to Hyp V. 
In Hyp V, Plato tells us ifUnity is not, it is. If it is not clear enough to the readers 
that is-not signifies difference, Plato now offers us another opportunity to realize 
that Unity is not does not mean the absence of Being from Unity. If we are to 
misconceive is-not as anything more than difference，Plato here tells us, step by 
step, that we will deny conclusion whatsoever deduced in Hyp V. Not only that 
Plato tells us the importance of Being in the communion ofForms, Plato thinks it 
more important that we are not to conceive is-not as the absence of Being. 
10.4 Hyp VII (164b-165e): What follows for the others in relation to 
themselves, if Unity is not 
Having considered the importance of Unity, Being and Difference in the 
communion ofForms, in Hyp V11, Parmenides further considers how the others are 
related to each other. In Hyp V, we are considering what follows for the Unity in 
relation to others, ifthe Unity is not. lt turns out that Unity does relate to other 
Forms because Unity is different ( i s not) from the others. The principle is that if 
A is to have a share ofB, A is not B. In Hyp VI, we are considering what follows 
for the Unity in relation to itself, ifUnity is not. It turns out that since Unity is not 
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related to Being, we have all the negative results we once had in Hyp I. According 
to Meinwald, Hyp VI is a pros heauto section, we are to consider Unity in itself, by 
itself. Obviously, Unity, not in itself, Being. Therefore, we have all the negative 
consequence as that ofHyp 1. Anyway, Hyp VI serves two purposes, on the one 
hand, according to the methodological remarks, we should also consider what 
follows for the subject in relation to itself, i f the subject is not. On the other hand, 
although Unity not in itself, by itself. Being, Hyp VI tells us the vital role that 
Being is playing in the blending ofForms. That Unity must relate to Being as Hyp 
V suggested. 
According to the methodological remarks, we should have two more 
deductions. We are to consider what follows for the others in relation to others, if 
Unity is not, also, what follows for the others in relation to the Unity, ifUnity is 
not. In Hyp VII, we will consider what follows for the others in relation to others, 
ln Hyp Vni, we will consider the last alternatives. 
Notice that we are considering these other Forms and perhaps other things 
that is set in contrast to the Form Unity and we are to consider how the others 
relate to one another, relation to the Unity is not the concern in the present 
hypothesis, since we are dealing with others pros others. 
Therefore, whether “ the Unity is not ‘‘ should refer to that Unity is different 
or that Unity as having no sort of Being whatsoever is irrelevant here because 
Unity is a non-player in this hypothesis. Chen has correctly pointed this out in his 
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commentary - whether is-not means either one of the sense will not affect the 
consequence of the deduc t i on . 
First ofall, others must relate to the Form Being, otherwise, we are not able 
to talk about them. Also, others must relate to the Form Difference, for one thing, 
the very possibility for us to group these others together and set in contrast to the 
Unity lies in the fact that these others are different to the Form Unity. Perhaps 
more important, these others are different to one another, and that these others 
have difference, with respect to another'‘ others “ 
At this point, like that o fHyp IV, we are considering the others in relation 
to themselves prior to their relation to the Form Unity. It is true that A-ness has 
difference with respect to B-ness and so on. Yet, we are to conceive both A-ness 
and B-ness prior to their relation to the Form Unity ( in fact, to claim that they are 
both is problematic because we are not even able to count them each prior to their 
participation in the Form Unity), therefore, it is not the case that we have one 
Form A-ness that is different to another Form B-ness. Rather，each is other than 
others as multitudes. However, such difference is incomplete because we are 
dealing with some different multitudes or mass ( or perhaps more accurate - a mess 
).In such a mess, according to Parmenides, in an instant, as in a dream, in place of 
what seemed one there appears many, what seemed smallest will appear enormous 
because it split up. Thus, there will be many masses, each appearing one but not 
being so. 
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Further, these others can also relate to the Form Number, Evenness or 
Oddness, again, these others will display these features incompletely. 
Similarly, some masses may appear small, yet, as an indefinite multitude, 
they also appear many and large relative to some smaller multitude. 
Since these masses appear both small and large, it also appears equal, for it 
would not pass from larger to smaller in appearance without seeming to come to an 
intermediate stage, and that would be an appearance of equality. 
Notice that at this point, Plato again brings out a particular relation or 
difference between three Forms - Smallness, Largeness, and Equality, that, 
Smallness and Largeness lie in the extreme and Equality at the middle. It is 
controversial at this point to claim that Plato already had the elaborate view on the 
relation between Forms as that of the Sophist, yet, it is certainly the case that Plato 
is reflecting on the issue and perhaps this particular relation between Largeness, 
Smallness and Equality is an initial discovery ofhis new science. 
Next, Parmenides argues that these masses will also appear limited with 
respect to one another. On the other hand, these masses will appear unlimited with 
respect to themselves. For example, we do admit that Largeness and Hotness 
belong to two different continua. To a certain degree. Largeness and Hotness are 
limited to one another because they are of two different properties. On the other 
hand. Largeness has neither beginning nor limit nor middle. As a indefinite 
multitude, there is no “ the largest “, rather, it is always larger. Therefore, 
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Parmenides argues that when someone by reflection takes any of them as if it were 
something which is, another beginning ever appears before the beginning, a 
different end is left over after the end. 
Finally, given that the others are indefinite as such, Parmenides would have 
no difficulty showing that these others will also appear like/unlike, same/different, 
motion/rest, come to be/cease to be. 
In fact, Hyp VII is a further explication ofHyp IV, in Hyp IV, Parmenides 
tells us that if the Unity is separated from the others, the others are indetermined. 
In what sense it is indetermined? In Hyp VII, Parmenides tells us that it is 
indetermined, not because the others are not capable of relating to one another, 
rather, it is that these relations are somewhat “ incomplete “ prior to their relations 
to the Form Unity, that the others may appear so and so but in fact, take a closer 
look, not quite so and so. In this sense, the others are indetermined. 
10.5 Hyp VIII (165e-166c ): What follows for the others in relation to the 
Unity, ifUnity is not 
We now come to the final hypothesis, in this hypothesis, we are to consider 
what follows for the others in relation to the Unity, ifUnity is not. Notice that 
Parmenides does not state explicitly in what sense the Unity is not at the 
beginning, rather, he proceeds to deduce some results first and then offers his 
reason to support his deduction: 
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Because the others can have no communion of any sort at all with thing 
which are not, nor is anything among things which are not present to them: 
for what is not has no parts. (Parmenides, 166a ) 
The reason Parmenides offers clearly indicates that he treats “ is-not ‘‘ in the 
absolute sense, it means that there is nothing whatsoever called “ Unity “ 
At this point, I believe that we are quite familiar with pros heauto and pros 
ta alla predications. In Hyp II, we have， 
(D1) Unity is different to Being pros ta al1a. 
D1 is true because Unity is different to Being, not by virtue of itself, nor in 
relation to itself, rather. Unity is different in relation to other Forms, namely. 
Difference. In fact, D1 is less accurate because the fact that Unity is different is not 
due to its relation to any Forms whatsoever, rather. Unity is different in relation to 
a particular Form. Thus, D1 can be modified to: 
(D2) Unity is different to Being in relation to Difference. 
Unity is related to Difference, then there must be such Form called 
Difference. Unity cannot relate to nothing when displaying difference. Thus，a 
more clumsy but precise formulation is: 
(D3) Unity is different to Being in relation to Difference, ifDifference is. 
Ifthere is no such Form whatsoever called ‘‘ Difference “, then we have: 
( � D 3 ) Unity is not different to Being in relation to Difference, ifDifference 
is not ( absolutely is not). 
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In case when there is no such Form Unity, then we have: 
( � U l ) X - n e s s is not one in relation to Unity, ifUnity is not. 
Also, in case o f a sensible participant, 
( � U 2 ) George Bush is not one in relation to Unity, ifUnity is not. 
ln any case, I am not trying to restrict the scope o f " others ‘‘ to either Forms 
other than Unity or other things. Anyway, both ( � U 1 ) and ( � U 2 ) are true. 
Once I have clarified what would follow if others is related to a non-entity, 
the deduction in Hyp VIII is straightforward. According to Parmenides, none of the 
others is conceived to be one or many, for without Unity, it is impossible to 
conceive others as many ( recall that in Hyp II, many requires some countable ones 
).In Hyp IV，Plato had explicated the impossibility of the notion ‘‘ uncountable 
many “• For something to be two, there must be two countable ones. Thus, ifothers 
are not one, others are not many. Once concluding this, the deduction pattem is the 
same to that ofHyp IV, for example, it is argued that ifothers have likeness, these 
others will have two characters, their own nature and likeness, yet, i f i t is 
impossible for them to have one character, in no way they will have two. 
Therefore, Parmenides will have no difficulty showing us in Hyp VIII that the 
others are neither like nor unlike, same nor different, and so on. 
Thus far, I have finished my discussion of the second half. In the next 
chapter, 1 will try to wrap up my analysis. 
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Chapter 11: Solution Plato offered to the puzzles 
in the First Half of the Parmenides 
Having finished our discussion on the second half of the Parmenides, we 
are now in a position to solve the puzzles in the first half. 
11.1 The Third Man 
According to the Third Man Argument, we have a group oflarge things, it 
tums out that they come to share a single Form - Largeness, which is large also. 
The question is that what makes this Largeness large. It we treat this Largeness as 
yet another large thing, then it must be a second Largeness that makes the first 
Largeness large, and the regress will continue forever. In the second half, by 
stressing the difYerence between being and having, Plato can now solve the Third 
Man puzzle. That any sensible particulars are large by having such feature and on 
the other hand, Largeness is large by being it. That Largeness and large things are 
two different sort ofentities. Notice that the distinction is a metaphysical one, not 
only that Forms and sensibles are ofdifferent sort, it is also the case that Plato has 
given the ontological priority to Forms. Recall that in Hyp IV, Plato argues that if 
Unity are separated from others, we will have something indefinite. Ifthis is not 
clear enough, then in Hyp VII, Plato tells us that if there is no such thing 
whatsoever call Unity, then in a dreamy fashion, others will be so and so, but when 
we take a closer look, others are not quite so and so. Therefore, from Hyp I, II and 
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IIA, we are getting familiar with the distinction beingy^aving, then in those 
subsequent hypotheses, Plato further explicates the importance of the relation 
between Forms and sensibles. In short, pros heauto/pros ta alla is not simply a 
matter ofpredication difference, it is rather a difference in ontological status. 
11.2 The Dilemma ofParticipation 
According to the Dilemma ofParticipation, if each participant get a whole 
ofForm, then a Form would be separated from itself; if this is not acceptable, then 
we will have to admit that each participant gets a part ofForm. However, this 
option is also unacceptable because in that case. Forms will be divided. For 
example, if a thing is to have a part ofLargeness, then this part ofLargeness is 
smaller than the whole Largeness, whether this thing will become large or small is 
in dispute. According to the second half, the Dilemma is partly solve. The fact is, 
according to the second half. Largeness is not a large thing, unlike any large 
sensibles. Largeness cannot be chopped up into piece. Thus, it is clear that 
participation is not some kind of physical relation, that when a sensible participates 
in the Form Largeness, the property is not transferred to the participant. However, 
Plato's discussion ofparticipation seems to end here. Instead ofpenetrating into 
the relation between Forms and sensible, Plato rather performs an experiment in 
the second half. In the 2nd Unlimited Argument, Parmenides presents us with 
three different pairs, yet, take a closer look, they share a common property - a 
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dual.� Although each pair consists of different elements, these pairs nonetheless 
have one and the same property, namely, twoness. Therefore, although we may not 
able to fully understand the mechanism of participation, we all have to accept the 
fact that there are many participants which share in one and the same Form. The 
situation is rather like this - we see some experimental results but we are not able 
to explain them. 
11.3 The extend of Forms 
Regarding the extend ofForms, Parmenides, discussion of the “ instant ‘‘ in 
Hyp IIA suggest that a Form may have many additional features. Notice that there 
is tension regarding the extend ofForms in Bk. V and Bk. X of the Republic, ln 
Bk. V, according to the Argument from Opposite, there are Forms for opposite. 
Yet, in Bk. X, Forms as paradigm suggests that there are more Forms. According 
to Gail Fine, there is no tension between these two arguments, rather, the 
Argument from Opposite discusses only a very special case ofcompresence -
narrow compresence; that although entities such as man will never appear not man, 
yet, man, besides being man, also has many other features? ln Hyp IIA, 
Parmenides tells us the procedure to strip off these features. In fact, in the Sophist, 
Plato has a very similar view: that man has many additional features. To a certain 
degree, the puzzle of the extend ofForms is solved - that we will admit that there 
are Forms for Man and Fire. In Hyp II, Parmenides pointed out that Unity does 
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relate to many other Form, as a result. Unity also has many additional features that 
are not what is to be Unity. Thus, we can say that Plato no more sticks to the 
Argument from Opposite and that Plato will have no trouble to accept Form for 
man. Yet, as 1 have mentioned in chapter 8, in principle, we should also admit 
Forms for mud or hair because they do suffer from broad compresence. Thus, the 
trouble is that we must draw the line. It is certainly problematic if we limit Forms 
to certain moral and mathematical terms, yet, it is equally problematic i fwe allow 
Forms for every entities in the world. Unfortunately, this issue is not discussed in 
the Parmenides. Eventually, Plato resorted to an analogy in the Sophist in order to 
solve this problem. According to Plato, the communion ofForms is somewhat like 
our alphabet system that some blend but some do not. However, unlike our 
alphabet system that we have a limited number ofletters and these letters form tens 
of thousand of words, we are not sure what Forms are to be classified as “ letter ‘‘ 
and what other entities are to be considered as a “ combination ofletters “ or 
Forms-complexus. 
11.4 The Greatest Difficulty 
The Greatest difficulty states that ifForms and sensibles are separated, then 
we, as sensibles, can only know things around us and we can't know Forms 
because Forms belong to another realm. In fact, in the second half, if we stop our 
analysis at the end ofHyp II, we are rather in very hopeless situation. It seems that 
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we are only able to know the rolling world and that the Unity, in itself and by itself, 
is not even one and we have no knowledge of it. The solution, I believe, lies in Hyp 
IIA, that we may begin with any one entity and start stripping off those additional 
features, and eventually at the instant, we grasp the notion “ Unity ‘‘ as one 
absolutely. Notice that Plato does not offer any theory to explain away the 
difficulty, rather, Plato's solution is a “ free trial “ Plato simply invites us to try it 
ourselves. To a certain degree, Plato's solution is quite empirical. Once we realize 
that it is possible to grasp the notion Unity at the instant, we find a reconciliation 
between Hyp I and Hyp II; it turns out that an entity will display certain features by 
virtue ofcertain Forms and this is the situation in our sensible world and on the 
other hand, our thought can still proceed and reach the Unity in itself. For those 
who are not fully convinced by Hyp lIA, Plato will re-address the issue in Hyp IV 
and VI, in those two sections, Plato will discuss the importance for others to relate 
to the Form Unity - that ifothers are not related to the Form Unity, we will have a 
indefinite mess. 
11.5 Analysis of Plato's solution to the First Half 
Notice that in the second half, Plato did not discuss “ why “ Forms are so 
and so or things are so and so, rather, his solution is an attempt to let us see “ how 
“Forms and things can be related. Instead ofsimply claiming that there is a 
distinction between being and having, Plato lets us see it by ourselves. In the first 
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half, we are facing the trouble that we will no more know Forms, Plato did not 
argue that we can, rather, Plato lets us try it by ourselves in Hyp IIA, that at the 
instant, we are indeed able to grasp the notion “ Unity “ This explain why Plato 
chose the format of exercise in the second half to solve the puzzles in the first half. 
In the exercise, we are to follow Parmenides，guidance and with Plato's carefully 
calculated examples and arguments, we will be able to grasp the distinction being 
and having, as well as the notion “ Unity “ at the instant. 
11.6 The Role of Parmenides in the development of Plato's thought 
In the above sections, we have seen how Plato solved the puzzles in the first 
halfby putting forward the distinction between being and having. Notice that the 
distinction is also a major theme in the Sophist and from a developmental point of 
view, we have very good reason to believe that Plato's thought is proceeding in 
this new direction. Ifthe proposal ofForms in the middle dialogues is a departure 
from Socrates' investigation in definition, then the blending ofForms in the 
Sophist is a second revolution in Plato's philosophy. If that is the case, then the 
Parmenides, as a dialogue written between the middle dialogues and the Sophist, 
does play a very important role in the second revolution. In fact, I believe that the 
Parmenides is the beginning of the second revolution. 
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11.7 Demonstrative vs Dialectical 
There is dispute regarding whether we should treat the second half as 
dialectical or demonstrative. Under the demonstrative approach, we are to consider 
every parts ( or at least, most parts ) of the second half as true or false. A typical 
example of this approach is Meinwald's treatment of the Parmenides, according to 
Meinwald, the second half is a demonstration of pros heauto and pros ta alla truth 
and Meinwald believes that most deductions in the second half ( probably the 
exception is the One is not one argument in Hyp I) , when equip with the pros 
heauto/pros ta alla distinction, is valid. On the other hand, Chen's approach is also 
demonstrative, for Chen, there is no need to see through the contradiction between 
Hyp I and Hyp II because the contradictions are real, and in fact, these 
contradictions are not destructive at all i fwe are willing to give up the separation 
ofForms. Instead, the negative results in Hyp I are confirmations ofPlato 's denial 
o fh is middle theory and the positive result in Hyp 11 is the discussion ofPlato 's 
new Theory ofForms ( in fact, Chen claimed that this new Theory of Forms is no 
longer Platonic because this new theory denies the ontological priority of Forms ). 
Thus, under Chen's approach. Hyp I is a demonstration of the falsity of the middle 
theory and Hyp II is a demonstration of the new Theory of Forms. 
On the other hand, under the dialectical approach, scholars will question the 
philosophical ability ofAristotle, and that most contradictions arise from 
Aristotle's wrong admission. For the readers, when facing these intersectional 
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contradictions, we are to look into each step of the deduction to see whether 
Aristotle had made any wrong admission or that Parmenides had done anything 
misleading. All these will become our point ofreflection, perhaps we will think it 
just the opposite when we detect any wrong admission from Aristotle, or perhaps 
we will have to once again re-affirm some distinction in the middle theory when 
facing some contradictions. A typical example of such approach is Miller. To a 
certain degree, Cornford also belongs to this approach because Cornford believes 
that it is due to the ambiguity of certain notion such as ‘‘ Unity ‘‘ or “ others “ that 
creates the contradiction. Notice that the term “ dialectical “ is so widely used in 
the academic circle that at some point 1 really can't tell what does it really mean. 
For the sake ofconvenience, I suggest that we shall regard those approaches that 
require our effort to see through any perplexities as dialectical. 
However, I believe that the second half is neither dialectical nor 
demonstrative. First of all, I doubt whether Plato had such distinction in his mind. 
It is problematic to treat the second halfas dialectical because in many occasion 
when contradictions arise in the course of deduction, Plato will further explain 
such perplexity in later section. A typical example of this is the One not is in Hyp I, 
that the One, in itself, by itself, does not have being as its parts and therefore the 
One is not. Eventually, it turns out that since the One is not, the One is not even 
one. This creates enough trouble for the readers and scholars are puzzled by it and 
attempts were made to see through it. Yet, before we make any attempt to see 
244 
through it, we must ascertain that whether Plato will re-address the difficulty in 
later section, it turns out that at the beginning of Hyp II, Plato explains the 
difficulty by pointing to the fact that although the One is not in itself is, it 
nonetheless relates to the Form Being and thus it is. Again, in Hyp III, i fby 
reflection we take away the Unity from the others, we have something 
indetermined. If this is not clear enough, Plato will re-pick up the issue in Hyp IV 
and Hyp VII. The fact is, it is not the case that we are to see through the puzzles by 
ourselves or that we are stirred to think just the opposite, it is rather that Plato is 
guiding us, step by step, to solve the puzzles. In this regard, Cornford grasps the 
spirit of the second half, that Plato is indeed taking some short-cut and reaches 
some absurd conclusions due to the fact that Plato cannot explain everything at 
once, and the solution lies elsewhere. 
If Cornford's insight in the second half is correct, then we shall not treat the 
second halfas demonstrative also. It is because according to the demonstrative 
approach, we shall either treat a particular hypothesis or deduction as 
demostratively false or true. For Chen, some hypotheses are true while other 
hypotheses are false. For Meinwald, all hypotheses are true i fwe apply the proper 
distinction. However, the trouble is that not all deductions are so obviously true 
even if we apply the pros heauto/pros ta alla distinction. In fact, Meinwald also 
admits that perhaps we should separated out the last part of Hyp I. Also, Chen's 
treatment of Hyp II as positive is problematic because it is very absurd to accept 
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that the One is same to others not one according to the same/different argument in 
Hyp II. The point is, ifPlato did not re-address the issue of the others totally 
deprived ofUnity in Hyp IV and Hyp VII，the claim that the One is the same to 
others not one can hardly be true. Yet, although we are facing many perplexities in 
the course ofdeduction, Plato usually defends his position, or further elaborates his 
idea, or simply refines his argument in later hypotheses. By constantly reflecting on 
the issue between Unity and the others, the outlook ofPlato 's philosophy is 
gradually emerging. Thus, I consider the second half as simply a philosophical 
reflection and that the readers are not simply to decide a particular deduction to be 
true or false, rather, the readers are to follow Plato step by step, eventually, we will 
see how Plato penetrates into the issue between Unity and the others. 
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Chapter 12: Conclusion 
Plato's Parmenides is a dialogue that is complete and incomplete. As an 
attempt to offer solution to the difficulties in the first half and to remove 
ambiguities that arise from the Republic and the Phaedo, mission completed. The 
distinction being/having does indeed remove the puzzles in the first half. That 
many things are large, not by being it, but by having it. On the other hand. 
Largeness is large by being it. Thus, we will no more treat Largeness as the largest 
thing and restore the ontological priority of Forms as being such nature. Further, 
such attempt restores the One over many argument in the Republic. I f w e are to 
treat Largeness as the largest thing, we are indeed no more assuming the One over 
many argument, rather, we unconsciously assume the One among many, that 
Largeness is yet another very large thing among those many large particulars. 
Nevertheless, Plato does not restrict being a nature to Forms and having a 
feature to things. Rather, the second half suggests that Forms also have many other 
features besides their own nature. To a certain degree, as Meinwald puts it. Forms 
do roll between is and is not. ' Say, the Form Beauty, on the one hand，it is one 
Form, on the other hand, Beauty also has Being as its part and therefore it has 
many parts. Thus, Beauty is both one and not one ( many ). Again, the solution is 
the distinction between being and having. If the solution is not clear enough, Plato 
actually demonstrates to us in Hyp IIA how to strip off these features, and at the 
instant, we grasp the nature of a Form. 
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Thus, the ontological priority ofForms does not lie in the separation of 
Forms from things as suggested in the Republic. In the Parmenides, Plato offers us 
a modified view. Not only that things roll, it is also the case that Forms roll. A 
particular Form has a share ofmany other Forms. At this point, we may suspect 
that Plato has given up his ontological priority ofForms, yet, this is not true. In 
fact, the ontological priority ofForms is now confined to the nature ofthese Forms. 
That the Form Beauty is beautiful absolutely, although Forms do roll regarding 
their features, yet, the particular nature of a particular Form never rolls. 
Regarding the extent ofForms, Plato's discussion of the “ instant “ in Hyp 
IIA suggests that he no more restricted the range of Forms as he seemingly did in 
the Phaedo. In the Republic, entities such as finger create puzzles for Plato, 
because finger never appears not finger, ln Hyp lIA, Plato points out that at the 
instant, when features such as becoming, ceasing to be, or the approaching and the 
withdrawal ofbeing are strip offor put aside, we grasp the Unity as one absolutely. 
In fact, in the Sophist, Plato offers a similar argument: 
Well, when we speak of man we give him many additional names - we 
attribute to him colors and shapes and sizes and defects and good 
qualities, and in all these and countless other statements we say he is not 
merely a ‘ man ‘ but also ‘ good ‘ and any number of other things. And so 
with everything else. We take any given thing as one and yet speak of it as 
many and by many names. ( Sophist, 251b ) 
Gail Fine also argues in a similar way. He points out that although notion 
such as man will never suffer from the narrow sense of compresence, it 
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nonetheless suffers from a broader sense ofcompresence? Although man never 
appears not-man, yet, it may appear either good or evil, as suggested by the 
Sophist, we speak of man by many names. To grasp the notion “ Man “ as 
absolutely man, all we need to do is to remove those additional names and grasp it 
at the instant. Thus, according to the Hyp IIA, we should have Form for Man. 
Thus far, these are the major achievements in the second ha l fo f the 
Parmenides, it does solve most of the puzzles in the first half, in this regard, the 
dialogue is complete. Yet, the solution Plato offered has certain drawbacks and 
therefore regarding the consequence of the solution offered, the dialogue is 
incomplete. 
Perhaps these are not drawbacks. Notice that it is the very beginning of 
Plato's inquiry into the communion of Forms and we are not to criticize Plato's 
position in a unpolished work. Clearly, Plato is reflecting on the issue. In the 
Parmenides, Plato never claims that some blend and some do not. In fact. Many is 
related to Unity, also, Unity is related to Many. In the Sophist, Plato points out that 
Motion never related to Rest，yet，there would be nothing outrageous in speaking 
of i t as stationary (Sophist , 256d ). In the Parmenides, Plato does not address the 
issue that in what way Forms blend. The troublespot is the relation between 
opposite Forms. There would be no problem i fwe say that Beauty is both one and 
many because we are in fact looking at the Form Beauty from different perspective 
and unity will withdraw while many is approaching. Further, Parmenides' 
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discussion of the instant also suggests this sort of withdrawal and approaching of 
opposite characters. Yet, the potential trouble is that Unity one pros heauto but 
Unity is many pros ta alla. At this point, we are talking about a pair of opposite 
Form relating to each other. In the Parmenides, it seems to me that Plato has not 
yet reflected on this issue. 
Regarding the whole/part issue, Plato maintained that each Form is one for 
they all related to the Form Unity. However, Plato did not discuss the issue 
whether in such case Unity is chopped up into piece. Also, Plato did not tell us 
whether such Unity parceled out will jeopardize the ontological priority ofForms. 
Perhaps Plato's position is, according to Cornford; 
We must not, therefore, shrink from the second hom ofParmenides’ 
dilemma, or be afraid ( as Socrates was in 131 c ) to say that a Form can be 
portioned out among things and still be one.] 
However, to tell someone not to afraid of the problem is hardly a solution. 
Yet, the fact is that it is actually the case that we grasp a single property of 
Twoness and it is also true that each Number is a single property. Thus, we can't 
deny that Forms do display Unity. On the other hand, Plato also demonstrated to us 
that Unity one absolutely during the instant. We do see many ‘‘ instance “ ofUnity 
and also the Unity itselfbut Plato did not explain in what way Unity can be 
parceled out and at the same time still be one. At best, Plato only tells us “ how “ 
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Unity can be parceled out and still be one, yet, Plato did not discuss the “ why “ 
question. 
Moreover, there are some ambiguities in Plato's suggestion ofboard 
compresence. Eventually, we will have a larger extent ofForms. In the Sophist, 
Plato points out that the communion ofForms is rather like the alphabet system. If 
that is the case, then there will be a limited number ofForms and perhaps there 
won't be Form for dirt, instead, we are looking for a combination ofForms and 
that if Forms are blended in a particular way, it represents dirt. Nonetheless, the 
trouble is - at what point we draw the line that there are Forms for some properties 
or entities and beyond that, only a combination ofForms is good enough. 
Yet, regarding the relation between opposite Forms, Plato's discussion is 
rather sloppy, that on the one hand. Unity is related to the Form Many, supposedly 
Unity and Many is a opposite pair. It seems that Plato has no difficulty to blend 
these two Forms together. However, in the same/different argument in Hyp II, 
Plato argues that difference will never be in what is the same. This is only the 
beginning of the trouble, and in fact Plato can still argue that sameness must 
withdraw before difference entering into a sensible particular. Plato had already 
discussed this issue in the Phaedo. However, the potential problem is that in case 
ofForms displaying certain features, can a Form display some feature that is 
opposite to its own nature, ln the 2nd Unlimited Argument, it seems that Plato is 
willing to accept such possibility, yet, in the Sophist, Plato argues that the Form 
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Motion, though it is stationary, it does not relate to the Form Rest. I cannot tell the 
extent of trouble such ambiguity will cause. Fortunately, the puzzles in the first 
half do not arise from this ambiguity, rather, those puzzles stem from the mixing up 
ofbeing and having. 
Anyhow, these are some second thought that creep in during the finaI stage 
of my thesis. I don't have a solution to these problems, yet, some ofthis problems 
further convinced me that Plato does not have a major overhaul in his Theory Of 
Forms, ln the Phaedo, Plato had a long discussion on opposite characters and that 
one must withdraw before its opposite approaches. In the Parmenides, he argues in 
a very similar way in the same/different argument in Hyp II. Eventually, in the 
Sophist, such relation between opposite characters extends to Forms - that in case 
of the Form Motion, it is stationary, yet, it does not relate to the Form Rest. Thus, I 
believe that Plato is pretty much defending a very similar “ Theory ‘‘ in the 
Phaedo, the Parmenides, and the Sophist. From a developmental point ofview, 
Plato is modifying his position in the Parmenides and that some ambiguities that 
arise from the Republic and the Phaedo are removed. Eventually, we will see a 
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^Ibid., p. 36-37. Notice that I have made some alternation on Meinwald's ordering. It is 
because Meinwald's ordering will deal with any original hypothesis, since in this 
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particular case, the original hypothesis is “ ifUnity is “ and therefore I believe that this 
simplified version will be more straightforward. 
Chapter 5 
'Taylor, p. 350-351. 
^The label “ Rejectionist “ should be treated with caution because no scholars will claim 
that he/she is a rejectionist. Nonetheless, this label is a convenient way to classify 
different approaches to the Parmenides. For example, although Comford never claimed 
himself a rejectionist, Meinwald, in her discussion of rejectionism, nevertheless put this 
label on Comford. Anyway, the readings about Parmenides I have come across so far, 
none of the scholars have labeled themselves rejectionist. In fact, regarding rejectionism ( 
ifthere is such a “ school “ existing at all), I must say I know only a little because all I 
know about rejectionism is based on Meinwald's discussion. Please refer to Meinwald, p. 
21 -24 for more discussion on rejectionism. 
^Meinwald, p. 8-10. 
^Miller, p. 89-91. 
^Again, this label is a convenient way to classify certain approaches to the Parmenides. 
For example, although Cornford constantly refers to ambiguities in certain terms in the 
second half, he never labeled his approach “ ambiguity theory “ ln fact, it is Allen who 
labeled Cornford this way. Please refer to Allen, p. 184-186 for details. 
6Allen,p. 185. 
7por more discussion on this approach, please see Meinwald, p. 24-26. Again, the label is 
at best a “ tool “ to mark offcertain approaches so that we can have a more fruitful 
discussion. 
^Allen, p. 185. 
^hen, p.218-221. 
i()Both Allen and Miller have a discussion on the role of Aristotle in the dialogue. Please 
see Allen p. 196-197 and Miller 78-79. 
iiCornford,p.l35-136. 
^'Allen, p. 187. 
Bpiease refer to Chapter 2 for details. 
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i4Allen, p. 196-197 and Miller, p. 78-79. 
i^ A typical example is the same/different argument in Hyp II, please refer to Comford, p. 
162. 
i6Miller, p. 88-99. 
i^For example, both Meinwald and Comford used the term “ dialectical exercise “ 
occasionally to label the second half and yet their approach is altogether different to that 
ofMillerandAllen. 
'^According to Meinwald, Comford's approach is a mixture of rejectionism and multi-
subject approach. On the other hand, Allen labeled it ambiguity theory. Please refer to 
discussion above. 
!tornford, p. 244. 
2()Miller, p. 228; note 15 and p. 240; note21. 
2ipiease refer to Chapter 2 for details. 
22Comford, p. 143. 
23por example, ‘‘ others ‘‘ can either means “ other ones ‘‘ or “ other as indefinite 
multitude “. 
24Meinwald, p. 35-37. 
25lbid., p. 63. 
26lbid., p. 67-68. 
27lbid., p. 68. 
28Ibid.，p. 68. 
^ i d , p . 6 1 . 
-30lbid.,p. 155-157. 
3iprede, p. 400-401. 
^^icholas P. White, “ Plato's Metaphysical Epistemology “； The Cambridge Companion 
to Plato, edited by Richard Kraut ( New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992 ), p. 
277-310. 
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"Allen, p. 143. 
^^White has a very detail discussion on the self-predication. In short, F-ness is F 
absolutely in a sense that its being F is independent of all perspectives or circumstances. 
On the other hand, a sensible particulars may display F but its having or displaying F 
depends on circumstances or perspectives. Please refer to White's article for details. 
' ^ e a s e refer to Meinwald's discussion on the second half, p. 76-152. For example, 
Meinwald only discussed the 1 st and the 2nd unlimited argument, and also the older, 
younger and same age argument in the Hyp II. 
36Sandra Peterson, “ Plato's Parmenides: A Principle of Interpretation and Seven 
Arguments "; Journal ofthe History ofPhilosophy 34:2. April 1996, p. 167-192. 
3then, p. 124-128. 
'%id., p. 252-259. 
^ i d , p . 3 1 6 - 3 2 1 . 
'%d ,p .316-318 . 
4ilbid.,p.312. 
42lbid.,p.319-321. 
^'lbid, p. 256. 
44Gail Fine, On Ideas ( Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993 ), p. 36-38. Notice that Fine's 
work is a discussion on one ofthe Aristotle's short essay - Peri ideon. However, this 
short essay survives only in fragments. The authorship of this essay is also a controversial 
issue. In Fine's book, he first argued that this short essay is indeed written by Aristotle. 
Once establishing the authorship, Fine next took a closer look to the essay and concluded 
that Peri ideon is written after Parmenides. Furthermore, there are some interesting 
similarities between the Peri ideon and some passages in the late Platonic dialogue. For 
example, the Timaeus emphasizes the everlastingness of Forms more clearly than the 
middle dialogues do; and the everlastingness ofFonns is also discussed in the Peri ideon. 
In fact, Fine has put forward many other similarities. Thus, Fine believed that Aristotle 
was well aware ofthe development ofthe theory ofForms, yet, Aristotle never 
mentioned a sharp break in Plato's thought. For more discussion on this issue, please 
refer to Chapter 3 of Fine's book. 
� i d . , p. 40. 
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4()Chen, p. 186; note 301. In Timaeus 51e, Plato argued that ‘‘ one kind ofbeing is the 
Form which is always the same, uncreated and indestructible, never receiving anything 
into itself from without... “ 
Chapter 6 
iMeinwald, p. 87-91. 
^Allen, p. 205. 
^omford, p. 124. 
4peterson, p.l71. Basically, Peterson did not discuss the pair same/different. However, 
judging from her solution to the One is not one argument, I am quite confident that 
Peterson will deal with the same/different argument in this way. 
^omford, p. 123. 
'Miller, p. 101. 
'lbid, p. 96-99. 
^Ibid., p. 96-99. 
%id., p. 101. 
iOlbid.,p. 101. 
nimd.,p. 102. 
^^Chen., p. 108; note 209. 
i3lbid., p. 124; note 228. For further discussion of the destruction ofUnity, please refer to 
discussion below. 
i4peterson, p.l81. 
i5Miller, p. 89. 
''lbid., p. 90. 
'^Miller, p. 101. 
^^omford, p. 129. 
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i9lbid.,p. 130. 
2()MeimvaW, p. 180; endnote 14. 
2iComford, p. 129-131;Allen, p. 215. 
^^Peterson, p.l82. 
23lbid.,p.l83. 
' ' lbid,p.l84. 
25lbid.,p.l84. 
2^hen, p. 90; note 171. 
27!bid.,p. 124; note 228. 
28lbid., p. 122; note 225. 
Chapter 7 
'Chen, p.l31 -132. 
2Comford, p. l34. 
^For Cornford, the meaning o f" the One ‘‘ in Hyp II depends on different deductions. In 
some deductions, for example, that the One has shape, Comford would argue that the 
One means some “ one physical body “ 
4lbid.,p.l35. 
-'Miller, p.97 - 98. 
t h e n , p.258 - 259. 
^omford, p.139- 142. 
^Miller, p.84 - 87 & Allen, p.219, basically, according to Allen, Parmenides is dealing 
with two kinds of infinity, in the first unlimited argument, we may imagine a magnitude 
being divided infinitely while in the second unlimited argument, we may imagine an 
infinity ofnumbers which continues infinitely. 
^Meinwald, p.l07 - 112 & Allen, p. 219. 
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i(>Allen, p. 226. 
"Comford,p. 139. 
''Miller, p. 88-89. 
i3Cornford, p. 140-145. Notice that at this point, Cornford only argued on p. 145 that 
such number will evolve into one magnitude. Other subsequent evolution will be 
mentioned in his discussion of other deductions in Hyp II. 
"lbid., p. 143. 
'^Miller, p. 96-97. 
i6lbid.,p. 168-170. 
i7lbid.,p. 170-173. 
^^PIease refer to chapter 3, section 3.7 for details. 
i9Allen, p.219. 
2()Ibid., p. 225-226. 
2ilbid., p. 231-232. Please also refer to p. 311; endnote no. 166 for the source of this long 
quotation. 
^ i d . , p. 232. 
-'lbid., p. 228. 
24piease refer to Meinwald's discussion of the 1st and 2nd Unlimited Argument in p. 
107-112.1 believe that the most important part of the 2nd Unlimited Argument is that we 
can try to conceive the number properties of Twoness and Threeness. This is exactly 
where Meinwald did not discussed. 
25Cornford, p. 159. 
26chen, p. 162; note 274. 
2tomford, p. 160-163. 
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Chapter 8 
'Comford, p. 202-204. Also, Meinwald has a lengthy discussion on the status of this 
section, please see p. 117-124. 
2chen, p. 223-224; note 346. 
^lbid., p. 224; note 384. 
^Comford, p. 130. 
^Miller, p. 119. 
6White, p. 289. 
7piease refer to Chapter 3 above, section 3.5. 
^ n e , p. 100. 
9piease refer to Fine's discussion on Plato's late dialogues and Plato's commitment to the 
notion o f " Form “ in Fine's book, in particular, on p. 360; endnote 14. 
i ’me,p. 100-101. 
Chapter 9 
'For more detail on the discussion ofthis part of deduction, please refer to Allen, p. 265-
269, or Comford, p. 212-213. 
^Miller, p. 124-125. 
Chapter 10 
'Comford, p.219. 
^Allen, p. 281. 
^Please refer to Sophist, 256-258 for details. 
^Chen, p. 262; note 398. 
^Cornford, p. 221. 
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6Chen, p. 262. 
7lbid.,p. 270-271;note413. 
8lbid.,p. 273-274; note417. 
'^Phaedo, 102e, also, please refer to White's article for discussion on immanent character, 
^^hen, p. 289; note 439. 
Chapterll 
ipiease refer to Chapter 7, section 7.3 for details. 
¥ine, p. 100-101. 
Chapter 12 
'Meinwald, p. 164-172. 
^Fine, p. 100-101. 
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